Missouri Revised Statutes

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.020 (2026)

Definitions

✓ current as of May 2026
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  1.020.  Definitions. — As used in the statutory laws of this state, unless otherwise specially provided or unless plainly repugnant to the intent of the legislature or to the context thereof:

  (1)  "Certified mail" or "certified mail with return receipt requested", includes certified mail carried by the United States Postal Service, or any parcel or letter carried by an overnight, express, or ground delivery service that allows a sender or recipient to electronically track its location and provides record of the signature of the recipient;

  (2)  "County or circuit attorney" means prosecuting attorney;

  (3)  "Executor" includes administrator where the subject matter applies to an administrator;

  (4)  "General election" means the election required to be held on the Tuesday succeeding the first Monday of November, biennially;

  (5)  "Guardian", if used in a section in a context relating to property rights or obligations, means conservator of the estate as defined in chapter 475.  "Guardianship", if used in a section in a context relating to rights and obligations other than property rights or obligations, means guardian of the person as defined in chapter 475;

  (6)  "Handicap" means a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, whether the impairment is congenital or acquired by accident, injury, or disease, and where the impairment is verified by medical findings;

  (7)  "Heretofore" means any time previous to the day when the statute containing it takes effect; and "hereafter" means the time after the statute containing it takes effect;

  (8)  "In vacation" includes any adjournment of court for more than one day whenever any act is authorized to be done by or any power given to a court, or judge thereof in vacation, or whenever any act is authorized to be done by or any power given to a clerk of any court in vacation;

  (9)  "Incompetent", if used in a section in a context relating to actual occupational ability without reference to a court adjudication of incompetency, means the actual ability of a person to perform in that occupation.  "Incompetent", if used in a section in a context relating to the property rights and obligations of a person, means a disabled person as defined in chapter 475.  "Incompetent", if used in a section in a context relating to the rights and obligations of a person other than property rights and obligations, means an incapacitated person as defined in chapter 475;

  (10)  "Justice of the county court" means commissioner of the county commission;

  (11)  "Month" and "year".  "Month" means a calendar month, and "year" means a calendar year unless otherwise expressed, and is equivalent to the words year of our Lord;

  (12)  The word "person" may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate, and to partnerships and other unincorporated associations;

  (13)  "Personal property" includes money, goods, chattels, things in action and evidences of debt;

  (14)  "Place of residence" means the place where the family of any person permanently resides in this state, and the place where any person having no family generally lodges;

  (15)  "Preceding" and "following", when used by way of reference to any section of the statutes, mean the section next preceding or next following that in which the reference is made, unless some other section is expressly designated in the reference;

  (16)  "Property" includes real and personal property;

  (17)  "Real property" or "premises" or "real estate" or "lands" is coextensive with lands, tenements and hereditaments;

  (18)  "State", when applied to any of the United States, includes the District of Columbia and the territories, and the words "United States" includes such district and territories;

  (19)  "Under legal disability" includes persons within the age of minority or of unsound mind or imprisoned;

  (20)  "Ward", if used in a section in a context relating to the property rights and obligations of a person, means a protectee as defined in chapter 475.  "Ward", if used in a section in a context relating to the rights and obligations of a person other than property rights and obligations, means a ward as defined in chapter 475;

  (21)  "Will" includes the words testament and codicil;

  (22)  "Written" and "in writing" and "writing word for word" includes printing, lithographing, or other mode of representing words and letters, but in all cases where the signature of any person is required, the proper handwriting of the person, or his mark, is intended.

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(RSMo 1939 §§ 649, 650, 653, 655, A. 1949 S.B. 1001, A.L. 1957 p. 587, A.L. 1978 H.B. 971, H.B. 1634, A.L. 1983 S.B. 44 & 45, A.L. 1988 S.B. 655, A.L. 2009 H.B. 652)

Prior revisions: 1929 §§ 649, 650, 653, 655; 1919 §§ 7052, 7053, 7056, 7058; 1909 §§ 8051, 8052, 8055, 8057

CROSS REFERENCE:

Criminal code definitions, 556.061

(1965) St. Louis alderman held not "resident" of ward from which he had been elected and thereby forfeited office, although he had been born and raised in ward, was registered to vote there, spent his working day there, had living accommodations in ward above drug store operated by brothers and sister, and received his business mail and business phone calls there.  He maintained home outside ward where he kept family and spent evenings and Sundays.  Actual place of residence controls.  State v. Mueller (A.), 388 S.W.2d 53.

(1971) Legislative body of which he is a member has exclusive right to determine elected representative's qualifications to hold or assume office and courts are without jurisdiction to determine issue of removal of residence from district.  State v. Hickey (Mo.), 475 S.W.2d 617.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 43 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1955–2024 · leading case: David Ranken, Jr. Technical Inst. v. Boykins, 816 S.W.2d 189 (Mo. 1991).
David Ranken, Jr. Technical Inst. v. Boykins, 816 S.W.2d 189 (Mo. 1991). · cites it 9× “That case might be persuasive except for the fact that Missouri, unlike Louisiana, has section 1.020, which directs that the word “person” may mean corporation unless such construction would be plainly repugnant to the intent of the legislature.”
Andres v. Alpha Kappa Lambda Fraternity, 730 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1987). · cites it 6× “[7] Section 1.020 (10) provides the following definition for the term "person" as "used in the statutory laws of this state": The word "person" may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate, and to partnerships and other unincorporated associations.”
In Re the Marriage of Badalamenti, 566 S.W.2d 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). · cites it 3× “Section 1.020 RSMo 1969; Cain v. Cain, 536 S.”
Lincoln Cnty. Stone Co., Inc. v. Koenig, 21 S.W.3d 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 3× “Section 1.020 RSMo (Supp.1999). Consequently, the applicant for a permit must include in its application any permits held under sections 444.”
Delmain v. Meramec Valley R-III Sch. Dist., 671 S.W.2d 415 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 3× “Section 1.020(11), RSMo 1978. We ■ find nothing repugnant to this meaning of the term property in the context of § 537.”
Fritzshall v. Bd. of Police Commissioners, 886 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 3× “Section 1.020(13), RSMo Supp.1992; State ex rel.”
Marriage of Cain v. Cain, 536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). “’ But § 1.020 provides, in pertinent part, ‘As used in the statutory laws of this state, unless otherwise specifically provided or unless plainly repugnant to the intent of the legislature or to the context thereof: (8) “Personal property” includes money, goods, chattels, things…”
St. Louis Inv. Props., Inc. v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 873 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 3× “See Sections 1.020, 3.050, and 5.070. The Plan specifically gives MSD the power to establish by ordinance “a schedule or schedules of rates, rentals, and other charges, to be collected from, all real property served by the sewer facilities of the District, .”
Mark Twain Cape Girardeau Bank v. State Banking Bd., 528 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). · cites it 4× “Bancshares asserts it has such power by virtue of the statutory definition of “person” in § 1.020, RSMo: “As used in the statutory laws of this state, unless otherwise specially provided or unless plainly repugnant to the intent of the legislature or to the context thereof: .”
J.S. DeWeese Co. v. Hughes-Treitler Mfg. Corp., 881 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). “” Therefore, appellant contends, relying on § 1.020(11), a general definition statute, that the word “person” may extend to a corporation unless “plainly repugnant to the intent of the legislature or the context thereof’.”
Hill v. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 503 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1973). · cites it 2× “It can consist of personal property, which is defined in § 1.020(8) as including "money, goods, chattels, things in action and evidences of debt.”
Moore v. Pelzer, 710 S.W.2d 416 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 3× “See § 1.020(9), RSMo Supp.1984, wherein a month is defined as a calendar month unless otherwise expressed within an applicable statute.”
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.020(10): 2 cases
Andres v. Alpha Kappa Lambda Fraternity, 730 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1987). “[7] Section 1.020 (10) provides the following definition for the term "person" as "used in the statutory laws of this state": The word "person" may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate, and to partnerships and other unincorporated associations.”
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.020(11): 6 cases
David Ranken, Jr. Technical Inst. v. Boykins, 816 S.W.2d 189 (Mo. 1991). “That case might be persuasive except for the fact that Missouri, unlike Louisiana, has section 1.020, which directs that the word “person” may mean corporation unless such construction would be plainly repugnant to the intent of the legislature.”
Delmain v. Meramec Valley R-III Sch. Dist., 671 S.W.2d 415 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). “Section 1.020(11), RSMo 1978. We ■ find nothing repugnant to this meaning of the term property in the context of § 537.”
J.S. DeWeese Co. v. Hughes-Treitler Mfg. Corp., 881 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). “” Therefore, appellant contends, relying on § 1.020(11), a general definition statute, that the word “person” may extend to a corporation unless “plainly repugnant to the intent of the legislature or the context thereof’.”
State v. Fretwell, 224 S.W.3d 602 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
Reidy Terminal, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 898 S.W.2d 540 (Mo. 1995).
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.020(12): 5 cases
Genesis Sch., INC v. Missouri State Bd. of Educ., 688 S.W.3d 242 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024).
United States v. State of Missouri, No. 2:22-cv-04022 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 7, 2023).
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.020(13): 3 cases
Fritzshall v. Bd. of Police Commissioners, 886 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). “Section 1.020(13), RSMo Supp.1992; State ex rel.”
Trusler v. Tate, 941 S.W.2d 794 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
Ferguson v. Bd. of Police Commissioners, 782 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.020(14): 1 case
Victoria Datt v. Nicholas Schroer, No. ED109243 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2020).
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.020(18): 1 case
State Ex Rel. Nixon v. Turpin, 994 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.020(6): 3 cases
B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Benack, 423 S.W.2d 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
Hirbe v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 532 S.W.2d 848 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.020(7): 1 case
Mark Twain Cape Girardeau Bank v. State Banking Bd., 528 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). “Bancshares asserts it has such power by virtue of the statutory definition of “person” in § 1.020, RSMo: “As used in the statutory laws of this state, unless otherwise specially provided or unless plainly repugnant to the intent of the legislature or to the context thereof: .”
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.020(8): 1 case
Hill v. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 503 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1973). “It can consist of personal property, which is defined in § 1.020(8) as including "money, goods, chattels, things in action and evidences of debt.”
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.020(9): 3 cases
Moore v. Pelzer, 710 S.W.2d 416 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). “See § 1.020(9), RSMo Supp.1984, wherein a month is defined as a calendar month unless otherwise expressed within an applicable statute.”
Fowler v. Clayton Sch. Dist., 528 S.W.2d 955 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
In the Interest of: S.M.W., Juv. Officer v. S.E.W., No. WD85122 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2022).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.