Missouri Revised Statutes

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.090 (2026)

Words and phrases, how construed

✓ current as of May 2026
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  1.090.  Words and phrases, how construed. — Words and phrases shall be taken in their plain or ordinary and usual sense, but technical words and phrases having a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law shall be understood according to their technical import.

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(RSMo 1939 § 655, A. 1949 S.B. 1001, A.L. 1957 p. 587)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 655; 1919 § 7058; 1909 § 8057

(1967) When used in statutes the word "shall" is generally regarded as imperative or mandatory and must be given a compulsory meaning. Stanfield v. Swenson (A.) 381 F.2d 755.

(1991) If language of statute may be subject to more than one construction, the law favors the construction which is in harmony with reason and common sense and tends to avoid unreasonable and absurd results.  Term "resident" means resident at time of commencement of appointed duties.  Shands v. City of Kennett, 756 F.Supp. 420 (E.D. Mo.).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 110 cases (14 in the last 5 years), 1959–2024 · leading case: Custer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 174 S.W.3d 602 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
Custer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 174 S.W.3d 602 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 14× “Section 1.090, RSMo 2000. Also, as already mentioned, the Workers' Compensation Act itself includes a provision relating to judicial interpretation and application of the Act: All of the provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed with a view to the public welfare…”
Sw. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 94 S.W.3d 388 (Mo. 2002). · cites it 6× “Section 1.090, RSMo 2000; Ryder Student Transp.”
Spradlin v. City of Fulton, 982 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. 1998). · cites it 6× “See section 1.090, RSMo; Abrams v. Ohio Pacific Exp.”
Derousse v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 298 S.W.3d 891 (Mo. 2009). · cites it 4× “See section 1.090. A statute is ambiguous when its plain language does not answer the current dispute as to its meaning.”
McKinney v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 123 S.W.3d 242 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 4× “§ 1.090, RSMo 2000; 6 Friends of Agric. for Reform of Mo.”
State v. Vaughn, 366 S.W.3d 513 (Mo. 2012). · cites it 3× “banc 2002) (quoting section 1.090, RSMo 2000). A limiting construction may be imposed only if it is readily susceptible to such a construction.”
Garland v. Dir. of Revenue, 961 S.W.2d 824 (Mo. 1998). · cites it 6× “Section 1.090, RSMo 1994; Abrams v. Ohio Pacific Exp.”
McDermott v. Carnahan, 934 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. 1996). · cites it 4× “§ 1.090, RSMo 1994. Sec *288 tion 571.015.”
Fleming Foods of Missouri, Inc. v. Runyan, 634 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. 1982). · cites it 4× “We must construe nontechnical words in "their plain or ordinary and usual sense," § 1.090, RSMo 1978, and "give" means to "transfer ownership or possession without compensation" or to "bestow upon another gratuitously or without consideration," Black's Law Dictionary 620 (5th ed.”
State v. Ajak, 543 S.W.3d 43 (Mo. 2018). · cites it 2× “banc 2017) (internal quotations omitted); see also § 1.090, RSMo (2016). ("Words and phrases shall be taken in their plain or ordinary and usual sense").”
Martinez v. State, 24 S.W.3d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 3× “banc 1990); Section 1.090 RSMo 1994. That meaning is usually derived from the dictionary.”
State v. Jones, 172 S.W.3d 448 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 6× “1 imposed on him a duty to report the corpse's location to proper authorities. Indeed, when a statute uses a pedestrian word such as "leave," the General Assembly has a right to expect that we will apply the word's plain and ordinary meaning unless it makes clear that it intends…”
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