213.101. Construction of statutes — abrogation of certain case law and jury instructions. — 1. The provisions of this chapter shall be construed to accomplish the purposes thereof and any law inconsistent with any provision of this chapter shall not apply. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to repeal any of the provisions of any law of this state relating to discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age, disability, or familial status.
2. The general assembly hereby expressly abrogates the case of McBryde v. Ritenour School District, 207 S.W.3d 162 (Mo.App. E.D. 2006), and its progeny as it relates to the necessity and appropriateness of the issuance of a business judgment instruction. In all civil actions brought under this chapter, a jury shall be given an instruction expressing the business judgment rule.
3. If an employer in a case brought under this chapter files a motion pursuant to rule 74.04 of the Missouri rules of civil procedure, the court shall consider the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and its progeny to be highly persuasive for analysis in cases not involving direct evidence of discrimination.
4. The general assembly hereby expressly abrogates by this statute the cases of Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814 (Mo. 2007) and its progeny as they relate to the contributing factor standard and abandonment of the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
5. The general assembly hereby expressly abrogates by this statute the holding in Hurst v. Kansas City Mo. School District, 437 S.W.3d 327 (Mo.App. W.D. 2014), that Missouri Approved Instruction 19.01 may be applied to actions brought pursuant to this chapter, and the holding in Thomas v. McKeever's Enterprises, Inc., 388 S.W.3d 206 (Mo.App. W.D. 2012), that juries shall not be instructed that plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing "but for" causation in actions brought pursuant to this chapter.
6. The general assembly hereby abrogates all Missouri-approved jury instructions specifically addressing civil actions brought under this chapter which were in effect prior to August 28, 2017.
Notes of Decisions
Bachtel v. Miller Cnty. Nursing Home Dist., 110 S.W.3d 799 (Mo. 2003).
· cites it 6× “Section 213.101 RSMo further provides that "the provisions of this chapter shall be construed to accomplish the purposes thereof and any law inconsistent with any provision of this chapter shall not apply.”
Rebecca J. Davison v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 449 S.W.3d 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 4× “Davison alternatively argues that we should disregard the aforesaid precedent because section 213.101 provides that “[t]he provisions of this chapter shall be construed to accomplish the purposes thereof and any law inconsistent with any provision of this chapter shall not apply.”
Sullivan v. Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 808 F. Supp. 1420 (E.D. Mo. 1992).
· cites it 5× “" Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.101 (Supp.1992). Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's claim for emotional damages under the MHRA is compensable only under the Workers' Compensation Law because the claim arose during her employment.”
H.S. v. Bd. of Regents, Se. Missouri State Univ., 967 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 3× “Section 213.101 RSMo further provides that “the provisions of this chapter shall be construed to accomplish the purposes thereof and any law inconsistent with any provision of this chapter shall not apply.”
Pollock v. Wetterau Food Distrib. Grp., 11 S.W.3d 754 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 2× “” Section 213.101. The plain and ordinary meaning of these words is that any prior law inconsistent with the provisions of the MHRA does not affect the rights and remedies created by the MHRA.”
Cromeans v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 1 F. Supp. 3d 994 (W.D. Mo. 2014).
· cites it 3× “Section 213.101 RSMo further provides that ‘the provisions of this chapter shall be construed to accomplish the purposes thereof and any law inconsistent with any provision of this chapter shall not apply.”
Morris v. Karl Bissinger, Inc., 272 S.W.3d 441 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 2× “040 contravenes the Missouri Human Rights Act’s declaration that “the provisions of this chapter shall be construed to accomplish the purposes thereof and any law inconsistent with any provision of this chapter shall not apply.”
Castellano, III v. Betts (E.D. Mo. 2021).
· cites it 4× “Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.101 (4) (expressly abrogating the contributing factor standard).”
Ronell Johnson v. City of St. Louis, Missouri (Mo. Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 2× “Section 213.101 (Cum. Supp. 2018). The statutory amendments include changing the causation standard from the contributing-factor standard to the more burdensome motivating-factor standard.”
— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.101(3) — 2 cases
Castellano, III v. Betts (E.D. Mo. 2021).
“Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.101 (4) (expressly abrogating the contributing factor standard).”
— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.101(4) — 2 cases
Castellano, III v. Betts (E.D. Mo. 2021).
“Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.101 (4) (expressly abrogating the contributing factor standard).”
— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.101(7) — 1 case
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