473.444. Limitations on filing claims — when claims barred. — 1. Unless otherwise barred by law, all claims against the estate of a deceased person, other than costs and expenses of administration, exempt property, family allowance, homestead allowance, claims of the United States and claims of any taxing authority within the United States, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract or otherwise, which are not filed in the probate division, or are not paid by the personal representative, shall become unenforceable and shall be forever barred against the estate, the personal representative, the heirs, devisees and legatees of the decedent one year following the date of the decedent's death, whether or not administration of the decedent's estate is had or commenced within such one-year period and whether or not during such period a claimant has been given any notice, actual or constructive, of the decedent's death or of the need to file a claim in any court. No contingent claim based on any warranty made in connection with the conveyance of real estate is barred under this section.
2. Nothing in this section affects or prevents any action or proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge or other lien upon property of the estate; except that attachment, judgment, and execution liens shall be enforced as provided in this law and not otherwise.
Notes of Decisions
State Ex Rel. Houska v. Dickhaner, 323 S.W.3d 29 (Mo. 2010).
· cites it 40× “The trial court held that the claim was barred under sections 473.444 and 473.360, RSMo 2000. 1 Panagos filed a motion for rehearing, which was granted to determine if section 473.”
Hatfield v. McCluney, 893 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1995).
· cites it 35× “1 The claim, based on a pre-death judgment entered in appellant’s favor against the decedent, was denied because it was not timely filed in the probate division of the circuit court as required by § 473.444. 2 Because the constitutionality of a statute is at issue, this Court…”
Weems v. Montgomery, 126 S.W.3d 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 8× “Like the movant in King, Ms. Montgomery attached several exhibits to her motions to dismiss, including a copy of the residential real estate contract; a copy of the seller’s disclosure statement; a copy of the certificate of the clerk of the probate court confirming the…”
Hatfield v. McCluney, 871 S.W.2d 657 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 19× “The Probate Court dismissed the claim, since it was not filed within one year of decedent’s death, holding that the claim was barred by section 473.444, RSMo. The pertinent part of that section reads as follows: 1.”
Est. of Austin v. Snead, 389 S.W.3d 168 (Mo. 2013).
· cites it 6× “360 but within the one-year limitation for claims outlined in section 473.444. 8 Snead filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that dismissal was warranted because the children’s claims were tardy, the claims did not fall within an exception to section 473.”
Rychnovsky v. Cole, 119 S.W.3d 204 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 6× “Section 473.444 establishes a procedure for creditors to file such claims within one year of the decedent’s death, after which the claims are “unenforceable and .”
Consol. Grain & Barge, Co. v. Hobbs, 397 S.W.3d 467 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 8× “]” Section 473.444 does not violate the due process clause of the Missouri or United States Constitutions because it is a self-executing statute of limitation and does not involve sufficient state involvement to implicate due process protection.”
In Re Est. of Forhan, 149 S.W.3d 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 3× “Such six-month period and such two-month period do not extend the limitation period that would bar claims one year after the decedent’s death, as provided in Section 473.444, RSMo, or any other applicable limitation periods.”
Roberts v. Progressive Nw. Ins. Co., 151 S.W.3d 891 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 4× “Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit a plaintiff in such cause of action to pursue other assets of a decedent’s estate after the expiration of the time provided in section 473.444, RSMo. Subject to exceptions not relevant here, § 478.”
Morgan v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 344 S.W.3d 771 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 3× “Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit a plaintiff in such cause of action to pursue other assets of a decedent's estate after the expiration of the time provided in section 473.444, RSMo. 10 .The facts of this case are illustrative of potential due process…”
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