516.180. On death of person under disability, cause of action survives. — If any person so entitled to sue, die before the expiration of the time herein limited for the commencement of such suit, if such cause of action shall survive to his representatives, his executor or administrator may, after the expiration of such time and within one year after such death, commence such action, but not after that period.
Notes of Decisions
Jenkins v. Thompson, 251 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. 1952).
· cites it 14× “180 provides: "Whenever a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of the state, territory or country in which it originated, said bar shall be a complete defense to any action thereon, brought in any of the courts of this state.”
Devine v. Rook, 314 S.W.2d 932 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
· cites it 3× “The application of this statute arises because of the Missouri “borrowing” statute, Section 516.180 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., which provides, “Whenever a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of the state * * * in which it originated, said bar shall be a complete defense…”
Yahne v. Pettis Cnty. Sheriff Dep't, 73 S.W.3d 717 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
“Yahne filed no reply to the Sheriffs answer in avoidance of the defense nor do we criticize that omission given the lack of notice in Sheriff s answer of what limitations statute the Sheriff relied upon.”
McLendon v. Kissick, 250 S.W.2d 489 (Mo. 1952).
· cites it 3× “Section 516.180, RSMo 1949, provides that when a cause of action has been barred by the laws of the state in which the cause originated, such bar shall be a complete defense in the courts of this state.”
Delaney v. Meiners, 842 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 4× “On October 23, 1991, Shearson Lehman filed a motion for summary judgment contending that, because Josephine Meiners was disabled when she died, the Delaneys had to initiate their action against it within one year of Meiners’ death pursuant to § 516.”
Keaton v. Crayton, 326 F. Supp. 1155 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
· cites it 2× “That statute provides that whenever a “cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of the state, territory or country in which it originated, said bar shall be a complete defense to any action thereon brought in any of the courts of the state.”
Brown v. Westport Fin. Co., 145 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
· cites it 2× “limitations other than Section 516.180, supra. Plaintiff supports this contention by asserting that defendant Westport Finance Company was not at any time pri- or to, or at the time the causes of action arose licensed or authorized to do business in Kansas as required by Section…”
Holland v. Duckworth, 539 S.W.2d 326 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
· cites it 10× “140 did not commence until treatment of Frank Holland ended on April 3, 1970, and (2) another statute, § 516.180, RSMo 1969, gave plaintiff one year from Holland’s death on January 23, 1972, within which to sue the defendant.”
Clyde C. Burgert v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1957).
“” Section 516.180 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. The allegation in plaintiff’s complaint that plaintiff might assert rights allegedly accruing to him under the provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act is wholly without merit.”
Giambelluca v. Thompson, 283 S.W.2d 531 (Mo. 1955).
“§ 516.180. The propriety of the trial court’s action in dismissing the petitions is the question for decision upon this appeal by the plaintiff and the intervenor.”
Est. of Stellwag v. Kennedy, 817 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 2× “By § 516.180, RSMo 1986, 2 the North Carolina Statute of Limitations will be applied in this state.”
Martinez v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 296 S.W.2d 90 (Mo. 1956).
“§ 516.180. *92 The plaintiffs have appealed from the judgments of dismissal and contend that the trial court erred in dismissing the action and in requiring the petition to be made more definite and certain.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.