536.085. Definitions. — As used in section 536.087, the following terms mean:
(1) "Agency proceeding", an adversary proceeding in a contested case pursuant to this chapter in which the state is represented by counsel, but does not include proceedings for determining the eligibility or entitlement of an individual to a monetary benefit or its equivalent, child custody proceedings, eminent domain proceedings, driver's license proceedings, vehicle registration proceedings, proceedings to establish or fix a rate, or proceedings before the state tax commission;
(2) "Party":
(a) An individual whose net worth did not exceed two million dollars at the time the civil action or agency proceeding was initiated; or
(b) Any owner of an unincorporated business or any partnership, corporation, association, unit of local government or organization, the net worth of which did not exceed seven million dollars at the time the civil action or agency proceeding was initiated, and which had not more than five hundred employees at the time the civil action or agency proceeding was initiated;
(3) "Prevails", obtains a favorable order, decision, judgment, or dismissal in a civil action or agency proceeding;
(4) "Reasonable fees and expenses" includes the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project which is found by the court or agency to be necessary for the preparation of the party's case, and reasonable attorney or agent fees. The amount of fees awarded as reasonable fees and expenses shall be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished, except that no expert witness shall be compensated at a rate in excess of the highest rate of compensation for expert witnesses paid by the state in the type of civil action or agency proceeding, and attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of seventy-five dollars per hour unless the court determines that a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee;
(5) "State", the state of Missouri, its officers and its agencies, but shall not include political subdivisions of the state.
Notes of Decisions
Hutchings Ex Rel. Hutchings v. Roling, 193 S.W.3d 334 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 33× “Defendant, the director of a state agency, argues that the court should not have made any fee award because the underlying proceeding was not an “agency proceeding,” as defined in section 536.085(1) RSMo (2000), and his position was substantially justified under section 536.”
Greenbriar Hills Country Club v. Dir. of Revenue, 47 S.W.3d 346 (Mo. 2001).
· cites it 12× “[12] Section 536.085 provides an enumerated list of agency proceedings that are excluded from its coverage, and tax cases are not expressly mentioned.”
Baker v. Dep't of Mental Health, 408 S.W.3d 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 34× “2010), this court held that evidence that the prevailing hourly rate for competent attorneys is higher that the statutory rate specified in section 536.085 was insufficient to support the finding of a special factor.”
Washington v. Jones, 154 S.W.3d 346 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 22× “087 and (2) the award of fees in excess of the statutory minimum absent a “special factor” finding violated Section 536.085. We affirm and remand in part.”
Lucinda \Cindy\" Guthrie v. Missouri Dep't of Labor & Indus. Relations", 503 S.W.3d 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 15× “The Department filed a notice of reinstatement and requested that the AHC resolve Guthrie’s attorney’s fees claims (as the prevailing party) pursuant to sections 536.085 and 536.087. In Guthrie’s application for attorney’s fees, Mr.”
Karen Carpenter v. State Bd. of Nursing, 508 S.W.3d 110 (Mo. 2016).
· cites it 22× “Limiting a prevailing party’s recovery of attorney’s fees to success on only “the” significant issue would conflict with the plain language of section 536.085 and the interpretation of “prevailing party” by Missouri and federal courts.”
Hyde v. Dep't of Mental Health, 200 S.W.3d 73 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 9× “Because the underlying proceeding was an “agency proceeding” as defined by Section 536.085(1), RSMo 2000, and because the department’s decision was not substantially justified, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment and remand to the circuit court for it to set the proper…”
McGhee v. Dixon, 973 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. 1998).
· cites it 10× “The key subsection in the new law states: A party who prevails in an agency proceeding or civil action arising therefrom, brought by or against the state, shall be awarded those reasonable fees and expenses incurred by that party in the civil action or agency proceeding, unless…”
Missouri Real Est. Appraisers Comm'n v. Mark A. Funk, 492 S.W.3d 586 (Mo. 2016).
· cites it 4× “5 4 Under section 536.087.1 an applicant for attorney’s fees must also prove it is a “party” who “prevailed[ed]” in an “agency proceeding” or civil action arising therefrom brought by or against the “state,” as those terms are defined in section 536.”
Nathan T. Cooling v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., Fam. Support Div., 491 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 25× “ion argues that Cooling is not eligible for the awarded attorney’s fees because: (1) Cooling did not prevail in an adversary proceeding in a contested case where the Division was represented by counsel; (2) the Division was substantially justified in taking the underlying agency…”
— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.085(1) — 32 cases
Hutchings Ex Rel. Hutchings v. Roling, 193 S.W.3d 334 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
“Defendant, the director of a state agency, argues that the court should not have made any fee award because the underlying proceeding was not an “agency proceeding,” as defined in section 536.085(1) RSMo (2000), and his position was substantially justified under section 536.”
Hyde v. Dep't of Mental Health, 200 S.W.3d 73 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
“Because the underlying proceeding was an “agency proceeding” as defined by Section 536.085(1), RSMo 2000, and because the department’s decision was not substantially justified, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment and remand to the circuit court for it to set the proper…”
Washington v. Jones, 154 S.W.3d 346 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
“087 and (2) the award of fees in excess of the statutory minimum absent a “special factor” finding violated Section 536.085. We affirm and remand in part.”
— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.085(2) — 2 cases
— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.085(2)(a) — 4 cases
— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.085(2)(b) — 1 case
— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.085(3) — 14 cases
Karen Carpenter v. State Bd. of Nursing, 508 S.W.3d 110 (Mo. 2016).
“Limiting a prevailing party’s recovery of attorney’s fees to success on only “the” significant issue would conflict with the plain language of section 536.085 and the interpretation of “prevailing party” by Missouri and federal courts.”
Hutchings Ex Rel. Hutchings v. Roling, 193 S.W.3d 334 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
“Defendant, the director of a state agency, argues that the court should not have made any fee award because the underlying proceeding was not an “agency proceeding,” as defined in section 536.085(1) RSMo (2000), and his position was substantially justified under section 536.”
Washington v. Jones, 154 S.W.3d 346 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
“087 and (2) the award of fees in excess of the statutory minimum absent a “special factor” finding violated Section 536.085. We affirm and remand in part.”
— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.085(4) — 18 cases
Baker v. Dep't of Mental Health, 408 S.W.3d 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
“2010), this court held that evidence that the prevailing hourly rate for competent attorneys is higher that the statutory rate specified in section 536.085 was insufficient to support the finding of a special factor.”
Hutchings Ex Rel. Hutchings v. Roling, 193 S.W.3d 334 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
“Defendant, the director of a state agency, argues that the court should not have made any fee award because the underlying proceeding was not an “agency proceeding,” as defined in section 536.085(1) RSMo (2000), and his position was substantially justified under section 536.”
— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.085(5) — 1 case
Hutchings Ex Rel. Hutchings v. Roling, 193 S.W.3d 334 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
“Defendant, the director of a state agency, argues that the court should not have made any fee award because the underlying proceeding was not an “agency proceeding,” as defined in section 536.085(1) RSMo (2000), and his position was substantially justified under section 536.”
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