Mont. Code Ann. » TITLE 1. GENERAL LAWS AND DEFINITIONS · CHAPTER 2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION · Part 1. General Provisions
Montana Code Annotated

Mont. Code Ann. § 1-2-101 (2026)

Role Of The Judge -- Preference To Construction Giving Each Provision Meaning

✓ current as of May 2026
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  1. MCA Contents
  2. TITLE 1
  3. CHAPTER 2
  4. Part 1
  5. 1-2-101 Role of the judge -- preference to construction giving each provision meaning

TITLE 1. GENERAL LAWS AND DEFINITIONS

CHAPTER 2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Part 1. General Provisions

Role Of The Judge -- Preference To Construction Giving Each Provision Meaning

1-2-101. Role of the judge -- preference to construction giving each provision meaning. In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted. Where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.

History: En. Sec. 612, p. 198, L. 1877; re-en. Sec. 612, 1st Div. Rev. Stat. 1879; re-en. Sec. 630, 1st Div. Comp. Stat. 1887; re-en. Sec. 3134, C. Civ. Proc. 1895; re-en. Sec. 7875, Rev. C. 1907; re-en. Sec. 10519, R.C.M. 1921; Cal. C. Civ. Proc. Sec. 1858; re-en. Sec. 10519, R.C.M. 1935; R.C.M. 1947, 93-401-15(part).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 674 cases (94 in the last 5 years), 1979–2026 · leading case: State v. Bobby Cooksey, 2012 MT 226 (Mont. 2012).
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State v. Bobby Cooksey, 2012 MT 226 (Mont. 2012). · cites it 39× “§ 45-3-112” in which he requested that the District Court order the prosecution to provide a list of specific items including the decedent’s complete medical records; all drug and alcohol evaluations of the decedent; the decedent’s complete criminal record; a copy of all mental…”
Musselshell Ranch Co. v. Seidel-Joukova, 2011 MT 217 (Mont. 2011). · cites it 24× “" This sua sponte remaking of the statute is untenable in the extreme, and it violates any number of rules of statutory construction, not the least of which is § 1-2-101, MCA: "In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is…”
Montana Cannabis Indus. Ass'n v. State, 2016 MT 44 (Mont. 2016). · cites it 12× “” Section 1-2-101, MCA. “Statutory language must be construed according to its plain meaning and if the language is clear and unambiguous, no further interpretation is required.”
Montana Petroleum Tank Release Comp. Bd. v. Crumleys, Inc., 2008 MT 2 (Mont. 2008). · cites it 12× “" Section 1-2-101, MCA. For what the Legislature did not enact we may not allow the agency to implement.”
Sports Shooting Ass'n v. State, Mt. Dept. of Fwp, 2008 MT 190 (Mont. 2008). · cites it 12× “" Section 1-2-101, MCA. Lastly—and this principle follows from the other two—we may not create an ambiguity where none exists, nor may we rewrite a statute, by ignoring clear and unambiguous language, in order to accomplish what we may feel is a more sensible or palatable…”
Kluver v. PPL Montana, LLC, 2012 MT 321 (Mont. 2012). · cites it 18× “” Section 1-2-101, MCA. The plain language of this statute requires a written waiver by all the parties and the mediator before their confidentiality rights can be waived.”
State v. Damon, 2005 MT 218 (Mont. 2005). · cites it 12× “" Section 1-2-101, MCA. In general, the persistent felony offender statute, § 46-18-502, MCA, conflicts with all specific sentencing provisions.”
Lorang v. Fortis Ins., 2008 MT 252 (Mont. 2008). · cites it 8× “The Legislature has resolved that issue with the plain statutory language that categorically prohibits misrepresentations.”
Orr v. State, 2004 MT 354 (Mont. 2004). · cites it 12× “Had the legislature intended to limit the State’s role to that of industry advisor, presumably it would have both expressed that intent and avoided declarations of duties to others.”
State v. McGowan, 2006 MT 163 (Mont. 2006). · cites it 16× “In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted.”
State v. Brendal, 2009 MT 236 (Mont. 2009). · cites it 12× “" Section 1-2-101, MCA. In general, the persistent felony offender statute, § 46-18-502, MCA, conflicts with all specific sentencing provisions.”
Larson v. State, 434 P.3d 241 (Mont. 2019). · cites it 6× “" Section 1-2-101, MCA. When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must discern and effect *256 legislative intent from the plain meaning of the language used without further resort to means of statutory construction.”
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