Mont. Code Ann. » TITLE 46. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE · CHAPTER 18. SENTENCE AND JUDGMENT · Part 1. Policy and Preliminary Procedure
Montana Code Annotated

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-115 (2026)

Sentencing Hearing -- Use Of Two-Way Electronic Audio-Video Communication

✓ current as of May 2026
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  1. MCA Contents
  2. TITLE 46
  3. CHAPTER 18
  4. Part 1
  5. 46-18-115 Sentencing hearing -- use of two-way electronic audio-video communication

TITLE 46. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

CHAPTER 18. SENTENCE AND JUDGMENT

Part 1. Policy and Preliminary Procedure

Sentencing Hearing -- Use Of Two-Way Electronic Audio-Video Communication

46-18-115. Sentencing hearing -- use of two-way electronic audio-video communication. Before imposing sentence or making any other disposition upon acceptance of a plea or upon a verdict or finding of guilty, the court shall conduct a sentencing hearing, without unreasonable delay, as follows:

(1) The court shall afford the parties an opportunity to be heard on any matter relevant to the disposition, including the imposition of a sentence enhancement penalty and the applicability of mandatory minimum sentences, persistent felony offender status, or an exception to these matters.

(2) If there is a possibility of imposing the death penalty, the court shall hold a hearing as provided by 46-18-301.

(3) Except as provided in 46-11-701 and 46-16-120 through 46-16-123, the court shall address the defendant personally to ascertain whether the defendant wishes to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment or reason why the defendant should not be sentenced. If the defendant wishes to make a statement, the court shall afford the defendant a reasonable opportunity to do so. For purposes of this section, the requirement that the court address the defendant personally may be satisfied by the use of two-way electronic audio-video communication. Audio-video communication may be used if neither party objects and the court agrees to its use and has informed the defendant that the defendant has the right to object to its use. The audio-video communication must operate as provided in 46-12-201.

(4) (a) The court shall permit the victim to present a statement concerning the effects of the crime on the victim, the circumstances surrounding the crime, the manner in which the crime was perpetrated, and the victim's opinion regarding appropriate sentence. At the victim's option, the victim may present the statement in writing before the sentencing hearing or orally under oath at the sentencing hearing, or both.

(b) The court shall give copies of any written statements of the victim to the prosecutor and the defendant prior to imposing sentence.

(c) The court shall consider the victim's statement along with other factors. However, if the victim's statement includes new material facts upon which the court intends to rely, the court shall allow the defendant adequate opportunity to respond and may continue the sentencing hearing if necessary.

(5) The court shall impose sentence or make any other disposition authorized by law.

(6) In felony cases, the court shall specifically state all reasons for the sentence, including restrictions, conditions, or enhancements imposed, in open court on the record and in the written judgment.

History: En. Sec. 221, Ch. 800, L. 1991; amd. Sec. 9, Ch. 125, L. 1995; amd. Sec. 5, Ch. 163, L. 1997; amd. Sec. 3, Ch. 524, L. 2001; amd. Sec. 6, Ch. 222, L. 2005.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 36 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1995–2025 · leading case: State v. McMaster, 2008 MT 268, 190 P.3d 302.
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State v. McMaster, 2008 MT 268, 190 P.3d 302. · cites it 70× “Section 46-18-115(4)(a), MCA. The victim may present this statement, "[a]t the victim's option, .”
State v. Legg, 2004 MT 26, 84 P.3d 648. · cites it 38× “Additionally, subsection 4(c) was added, which commands the court to "consider the victim's statement along with other factors.”
State v. Christianson, 1999 MT 156, 983 P.2d 909. · cites it 19× “¶2 The issue raised on appeal is whether the District Court’s restriction of Christianson’s parole eligibility complied with § 46-18-115(6), MCA, and § 46-18-202(2), MCA.”
State v. Christopher Lewis, 2012 MT 157, 282 P.3d 679. · cites it 8× “/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT We Concur: /S/ MIKE McGRATH /S/ BRIAN MORRIS /S/ JIM RICE 13 Justice James C. Nelson specially concurs.”
State v. McClelland, 2015 MT 281, 357 P.3d 906. · cites it 6× “Section 46-18-115(4), MCA; State v. McMaster, 2008 MT 268, ¶ 32 , 345 Mont.”
State v. Heath, 2004 MT 58, 89 P.3d 947. · cites it 4× “See § 46-18-115(2)(j), MCA. ¶35 To summarize, we conclude that direct evidence, in the form of Caldwell's statements, did not raise a serious question about her ability to be fair and impartial, and neither the prosecutor nor the District Court improperly rehabilitated her.”
State v. Knox, 2001 MT 232, 36 P.3d 383. · cites it 7× “¶20 In addition to the fact that Knox knew the consequences of his plea from the District'Court’s thorough colloquy, we also take notice of § 46-18-115(4)(a), MCA, which requires a trial court to allow victims to voice their opinions on sentencing.”
State v. Osterloth, 2000 MT 129, 1 P.3d 946. · cites it 6× “He also urges the District Court erred in imposing an “ ‘interim sentence’ or a condition of Osterloth continuing release on bail that he attend and participate in sex offender treatment” because it was not authorized by statute to do so and because § 46-18-115, MCA, requires…”
Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437 (2016). “07(b)(1) (2011); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-115 (2015); Nev. Rev.”
State v. Betterman, 2015 MT 39, 342 P.3d 971. · cites it 3× “) Section 46-18-115, MCA, provides: “the court shall conduct a sentencing hearingwithout unreasonable delay .”
State v. Rogers, 2007 MT 227, 168 P.3d 669. · cites it 4× “¶ 42 In accordance with § 46-18-115(6), MCA, the District Court articulated the reasons for its sentence.”
State v. R. Collins, 2023 MT 78, 528 P.3d 1106. · cites it 4× “Manywhitehorses, 2010 MT 225 , 6 See § 46-18-111(1)(a), MCA (when court may or must order PSI, and requiring court to consider PSI when ordered); § 46-18-112, MCA (“Content of presentence investigation report”); § 46-18-115(4), MCA (right of “victim to present a statement…”
Show all 36 citing cases →
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-115(1): 5 cases
State v. Hill, 2009 MT 134, 207 P.3d 307.
City of Billings v. Nelson, 2014 MT 98, 322 P.3d 1039.
State v. J. Lafield, 2017 MT 312.
State v. Carpenter, 2011 MT 249N.
State v. Tsuji, 2004 MT 207N.
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-115(2)(j): 1 case
State v. Heath, 2004 MT 58, 89 P.3d 947. “See § 46-18-115(2)(j), MCA. ¶35 To summarize, we conclude that direct evidence, in the form of Caldwell's statements, did not raise a serious question about her ability to be fair and impartial, and neither the prosecutor nor the District Court improperly rehabilitated her.”
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-115(3): 2 cases
State v. M. McCoy, 2021 MT 303, 498 P.3d 1266.
State v. Dunsmore, 2015 MT 108, 347 P.3d 1220.
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-115(4): 5 cases
State v. McClelland, 2015 MT 281, 357 P.3d 906. “Section 46-18-115(4), MCA; State v. McMaster, 2008 MT 268, ¶ 32 , 345 Mont.”
State v. Legg, 2004 MT 26, 84 P.3d 648. “Additionally, subsection 4(c) was added, which commands the court to "consider the victim's statement along with other factors.”
State v. R. Collins, 2023 MT 78, 528 P.3d 1106. “Manywhitehorses, 2010 MT 225 , 6 See § 46-18-111(1)(a), MCA (when court may or must order PSI, and requiring court to consider PSI when ordered); § 46-18-112, MCA (“Content of presentence investigation report”); § 46-18-115(4), MCA (right of “victim to present a statement…”
State v. Rickman, 2008 MT 142, 183 P.3d 49.
State v. J. Canfield, 2024 MT 151N, 552 P.3d 67.
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-115(4)(a): 4 cases
State v. McMaster, 2008 MT 268, 190 P.3d 302. “Section 46-18-115(4)(a), MCA. The victim may present this statement, "[a]t the victim's option, .”
State v. Knox, 2001 MT 232, 36 P.3d 383. “¶20 In addition to the fact that Knox knew the consequences of his plea from the District'Court’s thorough colloquy, we also take notice of § 46-18-115(4)(a), MCA, which requires a trial court to allow victims to voice their opinions on sentencing.”
State v. Legg, 2004 MT 26, 84 P.3d 648. “Additionally, subsection 4(c) was added, which commands the court to "consider the victim's statement along with other factors.”
State v. McDowell, 2011 MT 75, 253 P.3d 812.
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-115(4)(b): 1 case
State v. McMaster, 2008 MT 268, 190 P.3d 302. “Section 46-18-115(4)(a), MCA. The victim may present this statement, "[a]t the victim's option, .”
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-115(4)(c): 5 cases
State v. McMaster, 2008 MT 268, 190 P.3d 302. “Section 46-18-115(4)(a), MCA. The victim may present this statement, "[a]t the victim's option, .”
State v. Legg, 2004 MT 26, 84 P.3d 648. “Additionally, subsection 4(c) was added, which commands the court to "consider the victim's statement along with other factors.”
Inquiry Concerning Complaint of Jud. Standards Comm'n v. Baugh, 2014 MT 149, 334 P.3d 352.
State v. C. Jacob, 2025 MT 133.
In the Matter of Hon. G. Todd Baugh, 2014 MT 149.
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-115(6): 15 cases
State v. Legg, 2004 MT 26, 84 P.3d 648. “Additionally, subsection 4(c) was added, which commands the court to "consider the victim's statement along with other factors.”
State v. Christianson, 1999 MT 156, 983 P.2d 909. “¶2 The issue raised on appeal is whether the District Court’s restriction of Christianson’s parole eligibility complied with § 46-18-115(6), MCA, and § 46-18-202(2), MCA.”
State v. Christopher Lewis, 2012 MT 157, 282 P.3d 679. “/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT We Concur: /S/ MIKE McGRATH /S/ BRIAN MORRIS /S/ JIM RICE 13 Justice James C. Nelson specially concurs.”
State v. Rogers, 2007 MT 227, 168 P.3d 669. “¶ 42 In accordance with § 46-18-115(6), MCA, the District Court articulated the reasons for its sentence.”
State v. Osterloth, 2000 MT 129, 1 P.3d 946. “He also urges the District Court erred in imposing an “ ‘interim sentence’ or a condition of Osterloth continuing release on bail that he attend and participate in sex offender treatment” because it was not authorized by statute to do so and because § 46-18-115, MCA, requires…”
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