Mont. Code Ann. » TITLE 46. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE · CHAPTER 18. SENTENCE AND JUDGMENT · Part 2. Form of Sentence
Montana Code Annotated

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-225 (2026)

Sentencing Of Nonviolent Felony Offenders -- Criteria -- Alternatives To Be Considered -- Court To State Reasons For Imprisonment

✓ current as of May 2026
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  1. MCA Contents
  2. TITLE 46
  3. CHAPTER 18
  4. Part 2
  5. 46-18-225 Sentencing of nonviolent felony offenders -- criteria -- alternatives to be considered -- court to state reasons for imprisonment

TITLE 46. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

CHAPTER 18. SENTENCE AND JUDGMENT

Part 2. Form of Sentence

Sentencing Of Nonviolent Felony Offenders -- Criteria -- Alternatives To Be Considered -- Court To State Reasons For Imprisonment

46-18-225. Sentencing of nonviolent felony offenders -- criteria -- alternatives to be considered -- court to state reasons for imprisonment. (1) In sentencing a nonviolent felony offender, the sentencing judge shall first consider alternatives to imprisonment of the offender in a state prison, including placement of the offender in a community corrections facility or program, a prerelease center, a prerelease program, or a day reporting program provided for in 53-1-203. In considering alternatives to imprisonment, the sentencing judge shall examine the sentencing criteria contained in subsection (2).

(2) Prior to sentencing a nonviolent felony offender to whom 46-18-219 does not apply to a term of imprisonment in a state prison, the sentencing judge shall take into account whether:

(a) the interests of justice and the needs of public safety truly require the level of security provided by imprisonment of the offender in a state prison;

(b) the needs of the offender can be better served in the community or in a facility or program other than a state prison;

(c) there are substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the offense, though failing to establish a defense;

(d) the offender acted under strong provocation;

(e) the offender has made restitution or will make restitution to the victim of the offender's criminal conduct;

(f) the offender has no prior history of conviction for a criminal act or, if the offender has a prior history of conviction for a criminal act, the offender has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present crime;

(g) the offender's criminal conduct was the result of circumstances that are unlikely to recur;

(h) the character and attitude of the offender indicate that the offender is likely to commit another crime;

(i) the offender is likely to respond quickly to correctional or rehabilitative treatment; and

(j) imprisonment of the offender would create an excessive hardship on the offender or the offender's family.

(3) If the judge sentences the offender to a state prison, the judge shall state the reasons why the judge did not select an alternative to imprisonment, based on the criteria contained in subsection (2).

History: En. Sec. 4, Ch. 794, L. 1991; amd. Sec. 66, Ch. 10, L. 1993; amd. Sec. 15, Ch. 482, L. 1995; amd. Sec. 215, Ch. 546, L. 1995; amd. Sec. 7, Ch. 189, L. 1997; amd. Sec. 9, Ch. 52, L. 1999; amd. Sec. 3, Ch. 517, L. 2005.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 45 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1993–2023 · leading case: State v. Barnaby, 2006 MT 203 (Mont. 2006).
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State v. Barnaby, 2006 MT 203 (Mont. 2006). · cites it 44× “Defense argued for alternatives to imprisonment in light of the fact that Barnaby was a nonviolent first time offender according to § 46-18-225, MCA. Defense counsel recommended that Barnaby receive a term at the Department of Corrections.”
State v. Kotwicki, 2007 MT 17 (Mont. 2007). · cites it 12× “¶ 14 Both Nelson and Swoboda involve situations where the trial court failed to consider sentencing alternatives as required by § 46-18-225, MCA, before imposing a prison sentence upon a nonviolent offender.”
State v. Shults, 2006 MT 100 (Mont. 2006). · cites it 11× “¶36 We note at the outset that Shults does not argue that the District Court failed to comply with § 46-18-225, MCA; rather, Shults insists that this Court should remand for “further consideration” of alternative punishment because he is a non-violent offender.”
State v. Nelson, 906 P.2d 663 (Mont. 1995). · cites it 13× “Section *20 46-18-201(11) states: “ If the offender is subsequently sentenced to the state prison ...”
State v. Wilson, 2011 MT 277 (Mont. 2011). · cites it 12× “¶30 Issue Three: Was the sentence the District Court imposed upon Wilson legal? ¶31 Wilson argues that the District Court augmented his sentence because he refused to confess his crimes, and that the District Court did not “first consider alternatives to imprisonment” or ‘Take…”
State v. Swoboda, 918 P.2d 296 (Mont. 1996). · cites it 13× “She argues that Montana law, § 46-18-201(11), MCA, requires the sentencing court to consider alternatives to incarceration, including the ten sentencing criteria found in § 46-18-225, MCA, when sentencing nonviolent offenders.”
State v. Weisweaver, 2010 MT 198 (Mont. 2010). · cites it 23× “¶2 Weisweaver contends on appeal that the District Court failed to apply § 46-18-225, MCA, at sentencing and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object.”
State v. Brendal, 2009 MT 236 (Mont. 2009). · cites it 8× “In light of the above, it is clear that the court considered alternatives to imprisonment, as mandated by § 46-18-225, MCA, and explained why it chose to impose incarceration rather than alternative punishment.”
State v. St. John, 2001 MT 1 (Mont. 2001). · cites it 6× “John also argues that the District Court erred by failing to set forth its reasons for rejecting an alternative sentence and by failing to mention in its written judgment that it was imposing the sentence because it desired St.”
State v. Ferguson, 2005 MT 343 (Mont. 2005). · cites it 4× “” Accordingly, we reverse and remand for sentencing consistent *140 with § 46-18-225, MCA, which provides for the sentencing of non-violent felony offenders.”
State v. Garrymore, 2006 MT 245 (Mont. 2006). · cites it 4× “If the court fails to abide by this requirement, the sentence is subject to challenge or objection.”
State v. Stevens, 904 P.2d 590 (Mont. 1995). · cites it 11× “Stevens also contends the court erred in analyzing § 46-18-225, MCA (1991), and sentencing him, a nonviolent felony offender, to a term of imprisonment.”
Show all 45 citing cases →
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-225(1): 5 cases
State v. Barnaby, 2006 MT 203 (Mont. 2006). “Defense argued for alternatives to imprisonment in light of the fact that Barnaby was a nonviolent first time offender according to § 46-18-225, MCA. Defense counsel recommended that Barnaby receive a term at the Department of Corrections.”
State v. Brendal, 2009 MT 236 (Mont. 2009). “In light of the above, it is clear that the court considered alternatives to imprisonment, as mandated by § 46-18-225, MCA, and explained why it chose to impose incarceration rather than alternative punishment.”
State v. Wilson, 2011 MT 277 (Mont. 2011). “¶30 Issue Three: Was the sentence the District Court imposed upon Wilson legal? ¶31 Wilson argues that the District Court augmented his sentence because he refused to confess his crimes, and that the District Court did not “first consider alternatives to imprisonment” or ‘Take…”
State v. Shults, 2006 MT 100 (Mont. 2006). “¶36 We note at the outset that Shults does not argue that the District Court failed to comply with § 46-18-225, MCA; rather, Shults insists that this Court should remand for “further consideration” of alternative punishment because he is a non-violent offender.”
State v. Novak, 2008 MT 157 (Mont. 2008).
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-225(2): 5 cases
State v. Barnaby, 2006 MT 203 (Mont. 2006). “Defense argued for alternatives to imprisonment in light of the fact that Barnaby was a nonviolent first time offender according to § 46-18-225, MCA. Defense counsel recommended that Barnaby receive a term at the Department of Corrections.”
State v. Wilson, 2011 MT 277 (Mont. 2011). “¶30 Issue Three: Was the sentence the District Court imposed upon Wilson legal? ¶31 Wilson argues that the District Court augmented his sentence because he refused to confess his crimes, and that the District Court did not “first consider alternatives to imprisonment” or ‘Take…”
State v. Weisweaver, 2010 MT 198 (Mont. 2010). “¶2 Weisweaver contends on appeal that the District Court failed to apply § 46-18-225, MCA, at sentencing and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object.”
State v. Zink, 2014 MT 48 (Mont. 2014).
Thomas L. Zink v. State, 2014 MT 48 (Mont. 2014).
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-225(2)(a): 1 case
State v. Shults, 2006 MT 100 (Mont. 2006). “¶36 We note at the outset that Shults does not argue that the District Court failed to comply with § 46-18-225, MCA; rather, Shults insists that this Court should remand for “further consideration” of alternative punishment because he is a non-violent offender.”
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-225(3): 2 cases
State v. Barnaby, 2006 MT 203 (Mont. 2006). “Defense argued for alternatives to imprisonment in light of the fact that Barnaby was a nonviolent first time offender according to § 46-18-225, MCA. Defense counsel recommended that Barnaby receive a term at the Department of Corrections.”
State v. Shults, 2006 MT 100 (Mont. 2006). “¶36 We note at the outset that Shults does not argue that the District Court failed to comply with § 46-18-225, MCA; rather, Shults insists that this Court should remand for “further consideration” of alternative punishment because he is a non-violent offender.”
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