Notes of Decisions
Hash v. U.S. West Commc'ns Servs., 886 P.2d 442 (Mont. 1994).
· cites it 61× “Hash argues that the statutory period started at the termination date because she hoped and believed, up to the time of termination, that she would be given another U.”
Bruner v. Yellowstone Cnty., 900 P.2d 901 (Mont. 1995).
· cites it 6× “Thus, her claim of negligent retention is not preempted by the HBA and is not controlled by the time constraints of § 49-2-501, MCA, which requires filing with the HRA within 180 days or with the EEOC within 300 days.”
Borges v. Missoula Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 2018 MT 14 (Mont. 2018).
· cites it 5× “Section 49-2-512(1), MCA. A claim for relief "may not be entertained by a district court other than by the procedures specified" in the Act.”
Powell v. Salvation Army, 951 P.2d 1352 (Mont. 1997).
· cites it 16× “The employer moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to timely file her complaint with the MHRC pursuant to § 49-2-501(4), MCA. We affirmed the district court’s decision granting the employer’s motion for summary judgment, and concluded her cause…”
Vainio v. Brookshire, 852 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1993).
· cites it 10× “Did the District Court err in finding that Helen Vainio was a party to the action? Appellant asserts that Brookshire failed to name Helen Vainio in her complaint to the HRC as required by § 49-2-501(1), MCA, and 24.9.209(2), ARM.”
Benjamin v. Anderson, 2005 MT 123 (Mont. 2005).
· cites it 4× “Noting that pursuant to § 49-2-501(4), MCA, a claimant has 180 days in which to file a complaint with the Department of Labor and Industry, and that Benjamin did not file her Complaint until September 17, 1999--well beyond 180 days from the December 1998 Christmas party--they…”
Hilands Golf Club v. Ashmore, 2002 MT 8 (Mont. 2002).
· cites it 4× “¶ 8 On August 20, 1990, Ashmore filed a preliminary complaint with the Montana Human Rights Commission pursuant to § 49-2-501(1), MCA, alleging gender discrimination.”
Simmons v. Mountain Bell, 806 P.2d 6 (Mont. 1990).
· cites it 12× “Mountain Bell and Montana Human Rights Commission appeal the decision made by the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, which held that the 180-day statute of limitations under § 49-2-501, MCA, did not apply to an amended complaint filed by Sabrina Simmons…”
Drinkwalter v. Shipton Supply Co., Inc., 732 P.2d 1335 (Mont. 1987).
· cites it 7× “If we were to decide the Human Rights Act provides the sole and exclusive remedy for all claims arising out of sexual harassment, we would also be imposing the 180 day statute of limitation found in § 49-2-501(2), MCA, on every possible remedy.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-501(1) — 9 cases
Vainio v. Brookshire, 852 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1993).
“Did the District Court err in finding that Helen Vainio was a party to the action? Appellant asserts that Brookshire failed to name Helen Vainio in her complaint to the HRC as required by § 49-2-501(1), MCA, and 24.9.209(2), ARM.”
Hilands Golf Club v. Ashmore, 2002 MT 8 (Mont. 2002).
“¶ 8 On August 20, 1990, Ashmore filed a preliminary complaint with the Montana Human Rights Commission pursuant to § 49-2-501(1), MCA, alleging gender discrimination.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-501(2) — 4 cases
Drinkwalter v. Shipton Supply Co., Inc., 732 P.2d 1335 (Mont. 1987).
“If we were to decide the Human Rights Act provides the sole and exclusive remedy for all claims arising out of sexual harassment, we would also be imposing the 180 day statute of limitation found in § 49-2-501(2), MCA, on every possible remedy.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-501(2)(a) — 4 cases
Hash v. U.S. West Commc'ns Servs., 886 P.2d 442 (Mont. 1994).
“Hash argues that the statutory period started at the termination date because she hoped and believed, up to the time of termination, that she would be given another U.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-501(2)(b) — 1 case
Hash v. U.S. West Commc'ns Servs., 886 P.2d 442 (Mont. 1994).
“Hash argues that the statutory period started at the termination date because she hoped and believed, up to the time of termination, that she would be given another U.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-501(2)(c) — 3 cases
Hash v. U.S. West Commc'ns Servs., 886 P.2d 442 (Mont. 1994).
“Hash argues that the statutory period started at the termination date because she hoped and believed, up to the time of termination, that she would be given another U.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-501(3) — 2 cases
Borges v. Missoula Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 2018 MT 14 (Mont. 2018).
“Section 49-2-512(1), MCA. A claim for relief "may not be entertained by a district court other than by the procedures specified" in the Act.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-501(4) — 5 cases
Benjamin v. Anderson, 2005 MT 123 (Mont. 2005).
“Noting that pursuant to § 49-2-501(4), MCA, a claimant has 180 days in which to file a complaint with the Department of Labor and Industry, and that Benjamin did not file her Complaint until September 17, 1999--well beyond 180 days from the December 1998 Christmas party--they…”
Powell v. Salvation Army, 951 P.2d 1352 (Mont. 1997).
“The employer moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to timely file her complaint with the MHRC pursuant to § 49-2-501(4), MCA. We affirmed the district court’s decision granting the employer’s motion for summary judgment, and concluded her cause…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-501(4)(a) — 5 cases
Powell v. Salvation Army, 951 P.2d 1352 (Mont. 1997).
“The employer moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to timely file her complaint with the MHRC pursuant to § 49-2-501(4), MCA. We affirmed the district court’s decision granting the employer’s motion for summary judgment, and concluded her cause…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-501(4)(b) — 1 case
Powell v. Salvation Army, 951 P.2d 1352 (Mont. 1997).
“The employer moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to timely file her complaint with the MHRC pursuant to § 49-2-501(4), MCA. We affirmed the district court’s decision granting the employer’s motion for summary judgment, and concluded her cause…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-501(c) — 1 case
Hash v. U.S. West Commc'ns Servs., 886 P.2d 442 (Mont. 1994).
“Hash argues that the statutory period started at the termination date because she hoped and believed, up to the time of termination, that she would be given another U.”
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