In order to prevent the creation or establishment of airport hazards, every political subdivision that has an airport hazard area within the area of its zoning jurisdiction shall adopt, administer, and enforce, under the police power and in the manner and upon the conditions prescribed in the Airport Zoning Act, airport zoning regulations for such airport hazard area. The regulations shall meet the minimum regulations as prescribed by the Division of Aeronautics of the Department of Transportation and may divide such area into zones and, within such zones, specify the land uses permitted and regulate and restrict the height to which structures may be erected and trees allowed to grow, except that a political subdivision or a joint airport zoning board provided for in section 3-304 may include modifications or exceptions to the airport zoning regulations adopted under the Airport Zoning Act that the political subdivision or joint airport zoning board deems appropriate. Such modifications and exceptions shall not be considered a conflict for purposes of section 3-306. The authority of a political subdivision to adopt airport zoning regulations shall not be conditional upon prior adoption of a comprehensive development plan or a comprehensive zoning ordinance.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
4
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 1999–2026 · leading case:
Groseth v. Groseth, 600 N.W.2d 159 (Neb. 1999).
Groseth v. Groseth, 600 N.W.2d 159 (Neb. 1999).
“209D, § 3-303 (1998) (setting forth application of law of this state); § 42-739, with Mass.”
State ex rel. Couns. for Dis. v. Frye, 771 N.W.2d 571 (Neb. 2009).
· cites it 2× “4, and disciplinary rules §§ 3-303(B), 3-309(E), and 3-321, as well as her oath of office as an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nebraska.”
Prososki v. Regan, 32 N.W.3d 593 (Neb. 2026).
“37 We find these sanctions to be appropriate in this case to address the issue of Jason’s counsel’s submitting fictitious authority and to protect the integrity of the judicial process. This finding, however, does not preclude Jennifer from filing for an award of attorney fees.”
Prososki v. Regan, 32 N.W.3d 593 (Neb. 2026).
“Anything less imperils the reputation of the legal profession and wastes time and resources of both the courts and litigants.”
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 3-303(B): 3 cases
State ex rel. Couns. for Dis. v. Frye, 771 N.W.2d 571 (Neb. 2009).
“4, and disciplinary rules §§ 3-303(B), 3-309(E), and 3-321, as well as her oath of office as an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nebraska.”
Prososki v. Regan, 32 N.W.3d 593 (Neb. 2026).
“37 We find these sanctions to be appropriate in this case to address the issue of Jason’s counsel’s submitting fictitious authority and to protect the integrity of the judicial process. This finding, however, does not preclude Jennifer from filing for an award of attorney fees.”
Prososki v. Regan, 32 N.W.3d 593 (Neb. 2026).
“Anything less imperils the reputation of the legal profession and wastes time and resources of both the courts and litigants.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.