(1) The state has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (a) the subject is a dangerous sex offender and (b) neither voluntary hospitalization nor other treatment alternatives less restrictive of the subject's liberty than inpatient or outpatient treatment ordered by the mental health board are available or would suffice to prevent the harm described in subdivision (1) of section 83-174.01.
(2) If the mental health board finds that the subject is not a dangerous sex offender, the board shall dismiss the petition and order the unconditional discharge of the subject.
(3) If the mental health board finds that the subject is a dangerous sex offender but that voluntary hospitalization or other treatment alternatives less restrictive of the subject's liberty than treatment ordered by the mental health board are available and would suffice to prevent the harm described in subdivision (1) of section 83-174.01, the board shall (a) dismiss the petition and order the unconditional discharge of the subject or (b) suspend further proceedings for a period of up to ninety days to permit the subject to obtain voluntary treatment. At any time during such ninety-day period, the county attorney may apply to the board for reinstatement of proceedings with respect to the subject, and after notice to the subject, the subject's counsel, and the subject's legal guardian or conservator, if any, the board shall hear the application. If no such application is filed or pending at the conclusion of such ninety-day period, the board shall dismiss the petition and order the unconditional discharge of the subject.
(4) If the subject admits the allegations of the petition or the mental health board finds that the subject is a dangerous sex offender and that neither voluntary hospitalization nor other treatment alternatives less restrictive of the subject's liberty than inpatient or outpatient treatment ordered by the board are available or would suffice to prevent the harm described in subdivision (1) of section 83-174.01, the board shall, within forty-eight hours, (a) order the subject to receive outpatient treatment or (b) order the subject to receive inpatient treatment. If the subject is ordered by the board to receive inpatient treatment, the order shall commit the subject to the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services for such treatment.
(5) A subject who (a) is ordered by the mental health board to receive inpatient treatment and (b) has not yet been admitted for such treatment pursuant to such order may petition for a rehearing by the mental health board based on improvement in the subject's condition such that inpatient treatment ordered by the board would no longer be necessary or appropriate.
(6) A treatment order by the mental health board under this section shall represent the appropriate available treatment alternative that imposes the least possible restraint upon the liberty of the subject. The board shall consider all treatment alternatives, including any treatment program or conditions suggested by the subject, the subject's counsel, or other interested person. Inpatient hospitalization or custody shall only be considered as a treatment alternative of last resort. The county attorney and the subject may jointly offer a proposed treatment order for adoption by the board. The board may enter the proposed order without a full hearing.
(7) The mental health board may request the assistance of the Department of Health and Human Services or any other person or public or private entity to advise the board prior to the entry of a treatment order pursuant to this section and may require the subject to submit to reasonable psychiatric and psychological evaluation to assist the board in preparing such order. Any mental health professional conducting such evaluation at the request of the mental health board shall be compensated by the county or counties served by such board at a rate determined by the district judge and reimbursed for mileage at the rate provided in section 81-1176.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
18
cases (
7 in the last 5 years), 2009–2025 · leading case:
In Re Interest of JR, 762 N.W.2d 305 (Neb. 2009).
In Re Interest of JR, 762 N.W.2d 305 (Neb. 2009).
· cites it 4× “asserts that the Board erred in finding that neither voluntary hospitalization nor other treatment alternatives less restrictive were available as required by § 71-1209. IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law; accordingly, we are…”
In re Interest of L.T., 886 N.W.2d 525 (Neb. 2016).
· cites it 2× “The State sought to appeal the district court’s order pursu- ant to § 71-1214, which provides: The subject of a petition or the county attorney may appeal a treatment order of the mental health board under section 71-1209 to the district court. Such appeals shall be de novo on…”
In Re Interest of OS, 763 N.W.2d 723 (Neb. 2009).
· cites it 6× “Third, he claims that the Board erred in finding that neither voluntary hospitalization nor other treatment alternatives less restrictive were available as required by § 71-1209. Under § 71-1209(1), [t]he state has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (a)…”
In Re Interest of DV, 763 N.W.2d 717 (Neb. 2009).
“01 and in finding that neither voluntary hospitalization nor other less restrictive treatment was available and sufficient under § 71-1209. ANALYSIS CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS [2] D.”
In Re Gh, 781 N.W.2d 438 (Neb. 2010).
· cites it 2× “[8] § 71-1209(1). See In re Interest of D.V., supra note 3.”
Martinez v. Whitmire (D. Neb. 2025).
· cites it 6× “treatment disposition would suffice to prevent the substantial risk of harm as described in Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 71-1209 and 83-174.01.”
In re Interest of D.I. (Neb. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 4× “However, the SOCA does institute procedural time constraints on the right to appeal certain orders.”
Martinez v. Dawson (Neb. Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 3× “The mental health board committed Martinez to the regional center pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-1209 (1) (Reissue 2018), which provides: -3- The state has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (a) the subject is a dangerous sex offender and (b) neither…”
In re Interest of R.T., 30 Neb. Ct. App. 405 (Neb. Ct. App. 2021).
“As it related to orders under § 71-1219, the court noted that, although § 71-1214 contemplated the right to directly appeal from a “treatment order” entered under § 71-1209 of SOCA, the same could not be said to review orders under § 71-1219.”
In re Interest of C.A. (Neb. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 2× “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-1209 (Reissue 2009); In re Interest of G.”
In re Interest of K.W. (Neb. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 2× “was a dangerous sex offender, the State has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that neither voluntary hospitalization nor other alternative treatment less restrictive than inpatient treat- ment would prevent a dangerous sex offender from harming himself or…”
In re Interest of M.J. (Neb. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 2× “STANDARD OF REVIEW The subject of a petition, or the county attorney, may appeal a treatment order of the mental health board under § 71-1209 to the district court for de novo review on the record.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-1209(1) — 3 cases
In Re Interest of OS, 763 N.W.2d 723 (Neb. 2009).
“Third, he claims that the Board erred in finding that neither voluntary hospitalization nor other treatment alternatives less restrictive were available as required by § 71-1209. Under § 71-1209(1), [t]he state has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (a)…”
In Re Gh, 781 N.W.2d 438 (Neb. 2010).
“[8] § 71-1209(1). See In re Interest of D.V., supra note 3.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-1209(1)(b) — 2 cases
In Re Interest of OS, 763 N.W.2d 723 (Neb. 2009).
“Third, he claims that the Board erred in finding that neither voluntary hospitalization nor other treatment alternatives less restrictive were available as required by § 71-1209. Under § 71-1209(1), [t]he state has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (a)…”
In Re Gh, 781 N.W.2d 438 (Neb. 2010).
“[8] § 71-1209(1). See In re Interest of D.V., supra note 3.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-1209(4) — 3 cases
In re Interest of D.I. (Neb. Ct. App. 2018).
“However, the SOCA does institute procedural time constraints on the right to appeal certain orders.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.