Any person having the legal capacity to own real estate in this state, who has an unbroken chain of title to any interest in real estate by such person and his or her immediate or remote grantors under a deed of conveyance which has been recorded for a period of twenty-two years or longer, and is in possession of such real estate, shall be deemed to have a marketable record title to such interest, subject only to such claims thereto and defects of title as are not extinguished or barred by the application of the Uniform Environmental Covenants Act and sections 25-207, 25-213, 40-104, and 76-288 to 76-298, instruments which have been recorded less than twenty-two years, and any encumbrances of record not barred by the statute of limitations.
Notes of Decisions
Jordan v. LSF8 Master Participation Trust, 915 N.W.2d 399 (Neb. 2018).
“Any claim of invalidity of a deed of conveyance of homestead property because of failure to comply with the provisions of this section must be asserted within the time provided in sections 76-288 to 76-298. A purchase agreement or contract for sale of homestead property signed…”
Sacchi v. Blodig, 341 N.W.2d 326 (Neb. 1983).
· cites it 2× “Except as provided in sections 76-288 to 76-298, if a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in this chapter, Chapter 23, article 24, and sections 81-8,209 to 81-8,239, except for a penalty or forfeiture, or for the recovery of the title or possession of lands, tenements…”
Teater v. State, 559 N.W.2d 758 (Neb. 1997).
· cites it 2× “§ 25-213 (Reissue 1995) provides: Except as provided in sections 76-288 to 76-298, if a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in this chapter .”
Mobbs v. City of Lehigh, 655 P.2d 547 (Okla. 1982).
“Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-288 . The conceptual underpinning for the Marketable Record Title Act is not to be equated or confused with the doctrine of adverse possession.”
Burk v. Demaray, 646 N.W.2d 635 (Neb. 2002).
· cites it 2× “The court found that under § 76-288, to extend the chain of title back the required 22 years, the fraud claims had to be considered.”
MacKu by & Through MacKu v. Drackett Prod. Co., 343 N.W.2d 58 (Neb. 1984).
“At the date Amy sustained injury, and also when the complaint was filed in federal court, § 25-213 provided: “Except as provided in sections 76-288 to 76-298, if a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in this chapter, Chapter 23, article 24, and sections 81-8,209 to…”
Gordon v. Connell, 545 N.W.2d 722 (Neb. 1996).
“§ 25-213 (Reissue 1995) Although § 25-222 sets forth the statute of limitations for professional negligence actions, the limitations period may be tolled as set forth in § 25-213 which provides: Except as provided in sections 76-288 to 76-298, if a person entitled to bring any…”
Smith v. Berberich, 95 N.W.2d 325 (Neb. 1959).
· cites it 2× “Section 76-288, R. R. S. 1943, a part of the Marketable Title Act, contains this: “Any person having the legal capacity to own real estate in this state, who has an unbroken chain of title to any interest in real estate by himself and his immediate or remote grantors under *145…”
Omaha Paper Stock Co. v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 230 N.W.2d 87 (Neb. 1975).
“onal property, including actions for the specific recovery of personal property; (3) an action for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated; and (4) an action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the cause of action in…”
Budler v. Gen. Motors Corp., 689 N.W.2d 847 (Neb. 2004).
“The Eighth Circuit found no controlling precedent in the decisions of this court regarding the certified question and, because the answer to the question may be determinative of GMC’s appeal, certified the question to us. ANALYSIS We begin our analysis by setting forth the…”
Ahrens v. Tichota, No. A-18-094 (Neb. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2019).
· cites it 2× “However, our examination of the record presented to us demonstrates that none of the pleadings filed in this case raise the applicability or operation of the Marketable Title Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 76-288 to 76-294 (Reissue 2018).”
Jordan v. LSF8 Master Participation Trust, 300 Neb. 523 (Neb. 2018).
“14 Section 40-104 provides: Except as otherwise provided in this section, the home- stead of a married person cannot be conveyed or encum- bered unless the instrument by which it is conveyed or encumbered is executed and acknowledged by both spouses.”
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