NRS
147.130 Rejection of claim; notice; time to file suit; procedure for
rejected claim; service of summons; removal of personal representative for
default.
1. If a claim is rejected by the personal
representative or the court, in whole or in part, the claimant must be
immediately notified by the personal representative, and the claimant must
bring suit in the proper court against the personal representative within 60
days after the notice or file a timely petition for determination of the
validity of the claim pursuant to subsection 2, whether the claim is due or
not, or the claim is forever barred. A claimant must be informed of the
rejection of the claim by written notice forwarded to the claimant’s mailing
address by registered or certified mail.
2. If a claim is rejected by the personal
representative, a creditor may, within 20 days after receipt of the written
notice of rejection, petition the court for determination of the validity of
the claim in lieu of bringing suit against the personal representative pursuant
to subsection 1. A petition for determination of the validity of the claim must
be filed with the clerk, who shall set the petition for hearing, and notice
must be given for the period and in the manner required by NRS 155.010. Allowance of the claim by the
court is sufficient evidence of its correctness, and it must be paid as if
previously allowed by the personal representative.
3. In any action brought upon a claim
rejected in whole or in part by the personal representative, if the personal
representative resides out of the State or has departed from the State, or
cannot, after due diligence, be found within the State, or conceals himself or
herself to avoid the service of summons, the summons, together with a copy of
the complaint, must be mailed directly to the last address given by the
personal representative, with a copy to the attorney for the estate, and proof
of the mailing must be filed with the clerk where the administration of the
estate is pending. This service is the equivalent of personal service upon the
personal representative, but he or she has 30 days from the date of service
within which to answer.
4. If the personal representative defaults
after such service, the default is sufficient grounds for his or her removal as
personal representative by the court without notice. Upon petition and notice,
in the manner provided for an application for letters of administration, an
administrator or an administrator with the will annexed must be appointed by
the court and, upon his or her qualification as such, letters of administration
or letters of administration with the will annexed must be issued.
[124:107:1941; 1931 NCL § 9882.124]—(NRS A 1969,
95; 1971,
317; 1983,
263; 1985,
115; 1995,
2575; 1999,
2311; 2003,
884; 2017,
1680)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
9
cases, 1964–2017 · leading case:
Bergeron v. Loeb, 675 P.2d 397 (Nev. 1984).
Bergeron v. Loeb, 675 P.2d 397 (Nev. 1984).
· cites it 8× “The lower court simply held that appellant’s claim against the estate was forever barred because he had failed to *56 file the claim in the proper court within the time limit as required by NRS 147.130(1). 1 Although appellant had filed his claim within the requisite 60 day…”
Bodine v. Stinson, 461 P.2d 868 (Nev. 1969).
· cites it 2× “NRS 147.130. We find nothing to suggest that this procedure may be disregarded in prosecuting a wrongful death action against the estate of the deceased tort-feasor.”
Weiler v. Ross, 395 P.2d 323 (Nev. 1964).
· cites it 2× “It is clear from the record that the creditor cannot start another suit because of the bar of NRS 147.130(1) which requires suit upon a rejected claim to be brought within 30 days after notice of rejection.”
Wells v. Bank of Nevada, 483 P.2d 205 (Nev. 1971).
· cites it 4× “NRS 147.130, subsection 1. 2 We reverse, and we remand the case to the district court for a trial on the merits.”
Kotecki v. Augusztiny, 487 P.2d 925 (Nev. 1971).
“010(4), including creditors who knew the deceased only as Parker, and that therefore their claims were forever barred, NRS 147.130(1). We do not share that view, and reverse.”
Heppner v. McCombs, 411 P.2d 123 (Nev. 1966).
“The claim was rejected by the administrator and a complaint was filed pursuant to NRS 147.130. The trial court allowed the claim on the ground that the separation agreement evinced an intention by the deceased to bind his estate for the child support and that the California…”
Klosterman v. Cummings, 476 P.2d 14 (Nev. 1970).
“NRS 147.130. We find nothing to suggest that this procedure may be disregarded in prosecuting a wrongful death action against the estate of the deceased tort-feasor.”
Brown v. Eiguren, 628 P.2d 299 (Nev. 1981).
· cites it 3× “*254 To rule otherwise would emasculate the notice provisions of NRS 147.130 . . . which specify that the .”
In Re: Est. of Shebanow (Nev. 2017).
· cites it 2× “Paul, as personal representative of the Estate, rejected the claim, and the lender filed a complaint with the district court pursuant to NRS 147.130. 'The Honorable Lidia Stiglich, Justice, voluntarily recused herself from participation in the decision of this matter.”
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 147.130(1): 6 cases
Bergeron v. Loeb, 675 P.2d 397 (Nev. 1984).
“The lower court simply held that appellant’s claim against the estate was forever barred because he had failed to *56 file the claim in the proper court within the time limit as required by NRS 147.130(1). 1 Although appellant had filed his claim within the requisite 60 day…”
Weiler v. Ross, 395 P.2d 323 (Nev. 1964).
“It is clear from the record that the creditor cannot start another suit because of the bar of NRS 147.130(1) which requires suit upon a rejected claim to be brought within 30 days after notice of rejection.”
Bodine v. Stinson, 461 P.2d 868 (Nev. 1969).
“NRS 147.130. We find nothing to suggest that this procedure may be disregarded in prosecuting a wrongful death action against the estate of the deceased tort-feasor.”
Kotecki v. Augusztiny, 487 P.2d 925 (Nev. 1971).
“010(4), including creditors who knew the deceased only as Parker, and that therefore their claims were forever barred, NRS 147.130(1). We do not share that view, and reverse.”
Brown v. Eiguren, 628 P.2d 299 (Nev. 1981).
“*254 To rule otherwise would emasculate the notice provisions of NRS 147.130 . . . which specify that the .”
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.