NRS
176A.100 Authority and discretion of court to suspend sentence and grant
probation; persons eligible; enhanced supervision; submission of report of
presentence investigation.
1. Except as otherwise provided in this
section and NRS 176A.110 and 176A.120, if a person is found guilty in
a district court upon verdict or plea of:
(a) Murder of the first or second degree,
kidnapping in the first degree, sexual assault, attempted sexual assault of a
child who is less than 16 years of age, lewdness with a child pursuant to NRS 201.230, an offense for which the
suspension of sentence or the granting of probation is expressly forbidden, or
if the person is found to be a habitual criminal pursuant to NRS 207.010, a habitually fraudulent felon
pursuant to NRS 207.014 or a habitual felon
pursuant to NRS 207.012, the court shall
not suspend the execution of the sentence imposed or grant probation to the
person.
(b) A category E felony, except as otherwise
provided in this paragraph, the court shall suspend the execution of the
sentence imposed and grant probation to the person. The court may, as it deems
advisable, decide not to suspend the execution of the sentence imposed and
grant probation to the person if, at the time of sentencing, it is established
that the person had previously been two times convicted, whether in this State
or elsewhere, of a crime that under the laws of the situs of the crime or of
this State would amount to a felony. If the person denies the existence of a
previous conviction, the court shall determine the issue of the previous
conviction after hearing all relevant evidence presented on the issue by the
prosecution and the person. At such a hearing, the person may not challenge the
validity of a previous conviction. For the purposes of this paragraph, a
certified copy of a felony conviction is prima facie evidence of conviction of
a prior felony.
(c) Another felony, a gross misdemeanor or a
misdemeanor, the court may suspend the execution of the sentence imposed and
grant probation as the court deems advisable.
2. In determining whether to grant
probation to a person, the court shall not consider whether the person has the
financial ability to participate in a program of probation secured by a surety
bond established pursuant to NRS 176A.300
to 176A.370, inclusive.
3. If the court determines that a person
is otherwise eligible for probation but requires more supervision than would
normally be provided to a person granted probation, the court may, in lieu of
sentencing the person to a term of imprisonment, grant probation pursuant to
the Program of Enhanced Supervision established pursuant to NRS 176A.440.
4. Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, and unless the court approves a stipulation waiving the requirement
for the Division to make a presentence investigation and report to the court
pursuant to subsection 1 of NRS 176.135,
if a person is convicted of a felony and the Division is required to make a
presentence investigation and report to the court pursuant to NRS 176.135, the court shall not grant
probation to the person until the court receives the report of the presentence
investigation from the Chief Parole and Probation Officer. The Chief Parole and
Probation Officer shall submit the report of the presentence investigation to
the court not later than 45 days after receiving a request for a presentence investigation
from the sentencing court or county clerk. If the report of the presentence
investigation is not submitted by the Chief Parole and Probation Officer within
45 days, the court may grant probation without the report.
5. If the court determines that a person
is otherwise eligible for probation, the court shall, when determining the
conditions of that probation, consider the imposition of such conditions as
would facilitate timely payments by the person of an obligation, if any, for
the support of a child and the payment of any such obligation which is in
arrears.
(Added to NRS by 1967,
1434; A 1973,
68, 1802;
1975,
84; 1977,
289, 658,
1631;
1979,
1460; 1981,
369; 1989,
1887; 1991,
71, 1002,
2044,
2045,
2046;
1993,
9; 1995,
224, 857,
1249,
1328,
2388,
2389;
1997,
519, 1187,
2505,
2509;
1999,
565, 1192;
2003,
846, 2827;
2019,
4392; 2021,
2424; 2025,
2825)
Notes of Decisions
United States v. Miguel Angel Arellano-Torres, 303 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2002).
“Some recidivists are not eligible for this mandatory grant of probation, see NRS 176A.100, but — as discussed above — Corona- Sanchez instructs us to focus on the first-time offender.”
Little v. Warden, 34 P.3d 540 (Nev. 2001).
“185(1) provided that persons convicted of sexual assault were ineligible for probation.”
Savage v. Third Jud. Dist. Court, 200 P.3d 77 (Nev. 2009).
“As a starting point, NRS 176A.100 broadly authorizes the district court to place an offender on probation, and NRS 176A.”
Bailey v. State, 734 A.2d 684 (Md. 1999).
“§ 46-18-201 (1997); Nev.Rev. Stat. § 176A.100 and 176A.440 (1997); N.”
Roberts v. State, 89 P.3d 998 (Nev. 2004).
· cites it 6× “OPINION Per Curiam: In this appeal, we consider whether the State is required to provide a defendant charged with first-offense possession of a controlled substance with formal notice in the charging document that, pursuant to NRS 176A.100, 1 probation is discretionary rather…”
Martin (Shanell) v. State (Nev. 2022).
· cites it 2× “We recognize that the district court may have been under the impression that NRS 176A.100(1)(b), a discretionary probation statute, applied to Martin's sentencing.”
Toribio-Ruiz v. Garrett (D. Nev. 2022).
· cites it 2× “Indeed, because Toribio-Ruiz’s 14 sexual assault conviction was non-probational, see NRS § 176A.100(1)(a), arguing for 15 Toribio-Ruiz’s lewdness conviction to run concurrent to the sexual assault conviction 16 was a reasonable strategic decision.”
Harlow (Paul) v. State (Nev. 2016).
“See NRS 176A.100(1)(a) (listing crimes SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A for which probation is not permissible); NRS 176A.”
Silvanus (damien) v. State (Crim.), 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 15 (Nev. 2026).
“See NRS 176A.100(1)(a) (listing offenses for which “the court shall not suspend the execution of the sentence imposed or grant probation to the person’).”
Pineda v. State (Nev. 2013).
“probation, see NRS 176A.100(1)(c); NRS 193.140; NRS 199.”
Missouri (Kyle) v. State (Nev. 2013).
“We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion, see NRS 176A.100(1)(c); NRS 193.130(2)(c); NRS 193.”
Harpe (Jeremy) v. State (Nev. 2013).
“court's discretion to grant probation or diversion, NRS 176A.100(1)(c); NRS 176A.290(1); NRS 458.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176A.100(1) — 1 case
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176A.100(1)(a) — 4 cases
Toribio-Ruiz v. Garrett (D. Nev. 2022).
“Indeed, because Toribio-Ruiz’s 14 sexual assault conviction was non-probational, see NRS § 176A.100(1)(a), arguing for 15 Toribio-Ruiz’s lewdness conviction to run concurrent to the sexual assault conviction 16 was a reasonable strategic decision.”
Harlow (Paul) v. State (Nev. 2016).
“See NRS 176A.100(1)(a) (listing crimes SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A for which probation is not permissible); NRS 176A.”
Silvanus (damien) v. State (Crim.), 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 15 (Nev. 2026).
“See NRS 176A.100(1)(a) (listing offenses for which “the court shall not suspend the execution of the sentence imposed or grant probation to the person’).”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176A.100(1)(b) — 2 cases
Roberts v. State, 89 P.3d 998 (Nev. 2004).
“OPINION Per Curiam: In this appeal, we consider whether the State is required to provide a defendant charged with first-offense possession of a controlled substance with formal notice in the charging document that, pursuant to NRS 176A.100, 1 probation is discretionary rather…”
Martin (Shanell) v. State (Nev. 2022).
“We recognize that the district court may have been under the impression that NRS 176A.100(1)(b), a discretionary probation statute, applied to Martin's sentencing.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176A.100(1)(c) — 8 cases
Pineda v. State (Nev. 2013).
“probation, see NRS 176A.100(1)(c); NRS 193.140; NRS 199.”
Missouri (Kyle) v. State (Nev. 2013).
“We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion, see NRS 176A.100(1)(c); NRS 193.130(2)(c); NRS 193.”
Harpe (Jeremy) v. State (Nev. 2013).
“court's discretion to grant probation or diversion, NRS 176A.100(1)(c); NRS 176A.290(1); NRS 458.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176A.100(b)(4) — 1 case
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176A.100(l)(a) — 1 case
Little v. Warden, 34 P.3d 540 (Nev. 2001).
“185(1) provided that persons convicted of sexual assault were ineligible for probation.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176A.100(l)(b) — 1 case
Roberts v. State, 89 P.3d 998 (Nev. 2004).
“OPINION Per Curiam: In this appeal, we consider whether the State is required to provide a defendant charged with first-offense possession of a controlled substance with formal notice in the charging document that, pursuant to NRS 176A.100, 1 probation is discretionary rather…”
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