Nevada Revised Statutes
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.065 (2026)
Inference of burglarious intent
✓ current as of July 2026
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NRS 205.065 Inference of burglarious intent. Every
person who unlawfully breaks and enters or unlawfully enters any house, room,
apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or
other building, tent, vessel, vehicle, vehicle trailer, semitrailer or house
trailer, airplane, glider, boat or railroad car may reasonably be inferred to
have broken and entered or entered it with intent to commit grand or petit
larceny, assault or battery on any person or a felony therein, unless the
unlawful breaking and entering or unlawful entry is explained by evidence
satisfactory to the jury to have been made without criminal intent.
[1911 C&P § 370; RL § 6635; NCL § 10320]—(NRS A 1959, 19; 1983, 718; 1989, 1207)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 22
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1965–2022 · leading case: Hollis v. State, 606 P.2d 534 (Nev. 1980).
Hollis v. State, 606 P.2d 534 (Nev. 1980). “Rehearing was granted for the limited purpose of entertaining argument regarding jury instructions on the presumption of intent for burglary, NRS 205.065, and the effect of Sandstrom v.”
Redeford v. State, 572 P.2d 219 (Nev. 1977). “Appellant urges that the statutory presumption of intent as set forth in NRS 205.065 4 is violative of due process and the right against self-incrimination.”
Tucker v. State, 553 P.2d 951 (Nev. 1976). “Additionally, as stated supra, the officers testified he walked properly and spoke without slurring his words. The jury was advised that the fact of Tucker’s intoxication might be taken into consideration in determining intent.”
Barlow (keith) v. State (death Penalty-direct), 2022 NV 25 (Nev. 2022). “We disagree because the instruction accurately reflects NRS 205.065, and we have consistently upheld the statutes constitutionality.”
McNeeley v. State, 409 P.2d 135 (Nev. 1965). “They disregard, however, NRS 205.065 creating such an inference. 3 Statutory establishment of inferences similar to NRS 205.”
Owens v. State, 620 P.2d 1236 (Nev. 1980). “See NRS 205.065. Since appellant was acquitted on that charge, the comment obviously caused no prejudice.”
White v. State, 429 P.2d 55 (Nev. 1967). “Does NRS 205.065 violate due process of law? 3.”
Fritz v. State, 474 P.2d 377 (Nev. 1970). “After the jury verdict was received, the appellant’s motion for a new trial was denied, however, at a special hearing the district court judge, pursuant to NRS 207.”
Schnepp v. State, 415 P.2d 619 (Nev. 1966). “This instruction is in the same language of NRS 205.065. The statute and instruction given in the language of this statute has been held constitutional.”
Shepp v. State, 484 P.2d 563 (Nev. 1971). “A final assignment of error, relevant only to the burglary convictions, attacks the instruction based upon NRS 205.065 that one who unlawfully enters a building is deemed to have entered with the intent to commit larceny or a felony unless such unlawful entry shall be explained…”
Larsen v. State, 470 P.2d 417 (Nev. 1970). “060(1), the burglary statute, reads: “Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, bam, stable, outhouse or other building, tent, vessel, vehicle, vehicle trailer, semitrailer or housetrailer, or railroad car, with intent to commit…”
Kiper v. State, 655 P.2d 526 (Nev. 1982). “1 The jury was not instructed on the statutory intent presumption contained in NRS 205.065 as modified by NRS 47.230(2).”
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