NRS
41.665 Legislative findings and declaration regarding plaintiff’s
burden of proof under NRS 41.660. The
Legislature finds and declares that:
1. NRS
41.660 provides certain protections to a person against whom an action is
brought, if the action is based upon a good faith communication in furtherance
of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with
an issue of public concern.
2. When a plaintiff must demonstrate a
probability of success of prevailing on a claim pursuant to NRS 41.660, the Legislature intends that in
determining whether the plaintiff “has demonstrated with prima facie evidence a
probability of prevailing on the claim” the plaintiff must meet the same burden
of proof that a plaintiff has been required to meet pursuant to California’s
anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation law as of June 8, 2015.
(Added to NRS by 2015,
2455)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
15
cases (
5 in the last 5 years), 2017–2026 · leading case:
Rosen Vs. Tarkanian, 2019 NV 59 (Nev. 2019).
Rosen Vs. Tarkanian, 2019 NV 59 (Nev. 2019).
· cites it 2× “Under prong two, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate "with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim.”
Coker v. Sassone, 432 P.3d 746 (Nev. 2019).
“Moreover, in NRS 41.665, the Nevada Legislature specifically stated that the standard for determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied its burden of proof under NRS 41.”
Taylor Vs. Colon, 2020 NV 50 (Nev. 2020).
· cites it 2× “1999) (holding that California's equivalent anti-SLAPP statutes only require the court to determine whether the plaintiff stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim); see also NRS 41.665(2) (stating that a plaintiffs burden under prong two is the same as a plaintiffs…”
In re Gawker Media LLC, 571 B.R. 612 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017).
“” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.665 (2). If the court denies *628 the special motion, its determination will not be admitted into evidence or affect the burden of proof at a later stage of the underlying action or subsequent proceeding.”
Kosor, Jr. Vs. Olympia Co.'s, LLC, 2020 NV 83 (Nev. 2020).
· cites it 2× “3 Additionally, perhaps as a result of the legislatively mandated breadth of California's anti-SLAPP statutes, Barretes blanket holding and the progeny that extends therefrom leapfrog what is traditionally a critical 3NRS 41.665(2) endorses California anti-SLAPP law with respect…”
Taylor Vs. Colon, 2020 NV 50 (Nev. 2020).
· cites it 2× “1999) (holding that California's equivalent anti-SLAPP statutes only require the court to determine whether the plaintiff stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim); see also NRS 41.665(2) (stating that a plaintiffs burden under prong two is the same as a plaintiffs…”
Abrams Vs. Sanson c/w 75834, 2020 NV 9 (Nev. 2020).
· cites it 2× “3 See NRS 41.665(2) (stating that a plaintiffs burden under prong two is the same as a plaintiff's burden under California's anti- SLAPP law); Navellier v.”
Abrams Vs. Sanson c/w 75834, 2020 NV 9 (Nev. 2020).
· cites it 2× “3 See NRS 41.665(2) (stating that a plaintiffs burden under prong two is the same as a plaintiff's burden under California's anti- SLAPP law); Navellier v.”
Coker Vs. Sassone, 2019 NV 2 (Nev. 2019).
· cites it 2× “Moreover, in NRS 41.665, the Nevada Legislature specifically stated that the standard for determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied its burden of proof under NRS 41.”
Sternberg v. Warneck (D. Nev. 2025).
· cites it 2× “” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.665 (2). In June 2015, California’s anti-SLAPP statute stated that the 22 plaintiff had to establish “that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”
Coker Vs. Sassone, 2019 NV 2 (Nev. 2019).
“Moreover, in NRS 41.665, the Nevada Legislature specifically stated that the standard for determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied its burden of proof under NRS 41.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.665(2) — 8 cases
Rosen Vs. Tarkanian, 2019 NV 59 (Nev. 2019).
“Under prong two, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate "with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim.”
Taylor Vs. Colon, 2020 NV 50 (Nev. 2020).
“1999) (holding that California's equivalent anti-SLAPP statutes only require the court to determine whether the plaintiff stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim); see also NRS 41.665(2) (stating that a plaintiffs burden under prong two is the same as a plaintiffs…”
Kosor, Jr. Vs. Olympia Co.'s, LLC, 2020 NV 83 (Nev. 2020).
“3 Additionally, perhaps as a result of the legislatively mandated breadth of California's anti-SLAPP statutes, Barretes blanket holding and the progeny that extends therefrom leapfrog what is traditionally a critical 3NRS 41.665(2) endorses California anti-SLAPP law with respect…”
Taylor Vs. Colon, 2020 NV 50 (Nev. 2020).
“1999) (holding that California's equivalent anti-SLAPP statutes only require the court to determine whether the plaintiff stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim); see also NRS 41.665(2) (stating that a plaintiffs burden under prong two is the same as a plaintiffs…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.