NRS
42.021 Actions based on professional negligence of providers of health
care: Introduction of certain evidence relating to collateral benefits;
restrictions on source of collateral benefits; payment of future damages by
periodic payments.
1. In an action for injury or death
against a provider of health care based upon professional negligence, if the
defendant so elects, the defendant may introduce evidence of any amount payable
as a benefit to the plaintiff as a result of the injury or death pursuant to
the United States Social Security Act, any state or federal income disability
or worker’s compensation act, any health, sickness or income-disability
insurance, accident insurance that provides health benefits or
income-disability coverage, and any contract or agreement of any group,
organization, partnership or corporation to provide, pay for or reimburse the
cost of medical, hospital, dental or other health care services. If the
defendant elects to introduce such evidence, the plaintiff may introduce evidence
of any amount that the plaintiff has paid or contributed to secure the
plaintiff’s right to any insurance benefits concerning which the defendant has
introduced evidence.
2. A source of collateral benefits
introduced pursuant to subsection 1 may not:
(a) Recover any amount against the plaintiff; or
(b) Be subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff
against a defendant.
3. In an action for injury or death
against a provider of health care based upon professional negligence, a
district court shall, at the request of either party, enter a judgment ordering
that money damages or its equivalent for future damages of the judgment
creditor be paid in whole or in part by periodic payments rather than by a
lump-sum payment if the award equals or exceeds $50,000 in future damages.
4. In entering a judgment ordering the
payment of future damages by periodic payments pursuant to subsection 3, the
court shall make a specific finding as to the dollar amount of periodic
payments that will compensate the judgment creditor for such future damages. As
a condition to authorizing periodic payments of future damages, the court shall
require a judgment debtor who is not adequately insured to post security
adequate to assure full payment of such damages awarded by the judgment. Upon
termination of periodic payments of future damages, the court shall order the
return of this security, or so much as remains, to the judgment debtor.
5. A judgment ordering the payment of
future damages by periodic payments entered pursuant to subsection 3 must
specify the recipient or recipients of the payments, the dollar amount of the
payments, the interval between payments, and the number of payments or the
period of time over which payments will be made. Such payments must only be
subject to modification in the event of the death of the judgment creditor.
Money damages awarded for loss of future earnings must not be reduced or
payments terminated by reason of the death of the judgment creditor, but must
be paid to persons to whom the judgment creditor owed a duty of support, as
provided by law, immediately before the judgment creditor’s death. In such
cases, the court that rendered the original judgment may, upon petition of any
party in interest, modify the judgment to award and apportion the unpaid future
damages in accordance with this subsection.
6. If the court finds that the judgment
debtor has exhibited a continuing pattern of failing to make the periodic
payments as specified pursuant to subsection 5, the court shall find the
judgment debtor in contempt of court and, in addition to the required periodic
payments, shall order the judgment debtor to pay the judgment creditor all
damages caused by the failure to make such periodic payments, including, but
not limited to, court costs and attorney’s fees.
7. Following the occurrence or expiration
of all obligations specified in the periodic payment judgment, any obligation
of the judgment debtor to make further payments ceases and any security given
pursuant to subsection 4 reverts to the judgment debtor.
8. As used in this section:
(a) “Future damages” includes damages for future
medical treatment, care or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily
function, or future pain and suffering of the judgment creditor.
(b) “Periodic payments” means the payment of
money or delivery of other property to the judgment creditor at regular
intervals.
(c) “Professional negligence” means a negligent
act or omission to act by a provider of health care in the rendering of
professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a
personal injury or wrongful death. The term does not include services that are
outside the scope of services for which the provider of health care is licensed
or services for which any restriction has been imposed by the applicable
regulatory board or health care facility.
(d) “Provider of health care” means a physician
licensed under chapter 630 or 633 of NRS, genetic counselor, dentist, licensed
nurse, dispensing optician, optometrist, licensed physical therapist, podiatric
physician, naprapath, licensed psychologist, behavioral health and wellness
practitioner, chiropractic physician, doctor of Oriental medicine, holder of a
license or a limited license issued under the provisions of chapter 653 of NRS, medical laboratory director
or technician, licensed dietitian or a licensed hospital and its employees.
(Added to NRS by 2004 initiative petition, Ballot
Question No. 3; A 2011,
1511; 2019,
2710; 2023,
1684; 2025,
675, 1120,
2518)
STRUCTURED SETTLEMENT PROTECTION ACT
Notes of Decisions
Harper v. Copperpoint Mut. Ins. Holding Co., 2022 NV 33 (Nev. 2022).
· cites it 77× “: This appeal implicates the scope of NRS 42.021, Nevada's codification of the collateral source rule as it pertains to medical malpractice lawsuits.”
Capanna v. Orth, 432 P.3d 726 (Nev. 2018).
· cites it 3× “On cross-appeal, Orth challenges the constitutionality of NRS 42.021. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment on the jury verdict and the district court's orders awarding attorney fees and costs.”
Repub. Silver State Disposal, Inc. Vs. Cash, 2020 NV 88 (Nev. 2020).
· cites it 6× “035 (limiting the amount of noneconomic damages that may be awarded for professional negligence) and NRS 42.021 (governing collateral benefit evidence in professional negligence actions).”
Mccrosky Vs. Carson Tahoe Reg'l Med. Ctr., 2017 NV 115 (Nev. 2017).
· cites it 24× “Reading NRS 42.021 as a whole, section 1 benefits defendants by discouraging juries from awarding damages for medical costs that a plaintiff did not actually incur, but section 2 protects plaintiffs by prohibiting collateral sources from recovering against prevailing plaintiffs.”
Mccrosky Vs. Carson Tahoe Reg'l Med. Ctr., 2017 NV 115 (Nev. 2017).
· cites it 12× “Reading NRS 42.021 as a whole, section 1 benefits defendants by discouraging juries from awarding damages for medical costs that a plaintiff did not actually incur, but section 2 protects plaintiffs by prohibiting collateral sources from recovering against prevailing plaintiffs.”
Capanna, M.D. Vs. Orth c/w 70227, 2018 NV 108 (Nev. 2018).
· cites it 6× “On cross-appeal, Orth challenges the constitutionality of NRS 42.021. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment on the jury verdict and the district court's orders awarding attorney fees and costs.”
Capanna, M.D. Vs. Orth c/w 70227, 2018 NV 108 (Nev. 2018).
· cites it 6× “On cross-appeal, Orth challenges the constitutionality of NRS 42.021. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment on the jury verdict and the district court's orders awarding attorney fees and costs.”
Taylor v. Brill (Nev. 2023).
· cites it 6× “The district court based its decision on its interpretation of NRS 42.021(1); therefore, the issue presented is one of law that we review de novo.”
Taylor v. Brill (Nev. 2023).
· cites it 6× “The district court based its decision on its interpretation of NRS 42.021(1); therefore, the issue presented is one of law that we review de novo.”
Taylor v. Brill, M.D., 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 56 (Nev. 2024).
· cites it 6× “The district court based its decision on its interpretation of NRS 42.021(1); therefore, the issue presented is one of law that we review de novo.”
Capanna, M.D. Vs. Orth c/w 70227, 2018 NV 108 (Nev. 2018).
· cites it 3× “On cross-appeal, Orth challenges the constitutionality of NRS 42.021. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment on the jury verdict and the district court's orders awarding attorney fees and costs.”
Busick v. Trainor, M.D. (Nev. 2019).
· cites it 3× “Trainor's inconsistent testimony at trial compared to his deposition; and (3) the district court improperly admitted collateral source evidence because NRS 42.021 is unconstitutional and/or federally preempted.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 42.021(1) — 8 cases
Harper v. Copperpoint Mut. Ins. Holding Co., 2022 NV 33 (Nev. 2022).
“: This appeal implicates the scope of NRS 42.021, Nevada's codification of the collateral source rule as it pertains to medical malpractice lawsuits.”
Taylor v. Brill (Nev. 2023).
“The district court based its decision on its interpretation of NRS 42.021(1); therefore, the issue presented is one of law that we review de novo.”
Taylor v. Brill (Nev. 2023).
“The district court based its decision on its interpretation of NRS 42.021(1); therefore, the issue presented is one of law that we review de novo.”
Taylor v. Brill, M.D., 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 56 (Nev. 2024).
“The district court based its decision on its interpretation of NRS 42.021(1); therefore, the issue presented is one of law that we review de novo.”
Mccrosky Vs. Carson Tahoe Reg'l Med. Ctr., 2017 NV 115 (Nev. 2017).
“Reading NRS 42.021 as a whole, section 1 benefits defendants by discouraging juries from awarding damages for medical costs that a plaintiff did not actually incur, but section 2 protects plaintiffs by prohibiting collateral sources from recovering against prevailing plaintiffs.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 42.021(2) — 7 cases
Harper v. Copperpoint Mut. Ins. Holding Co., 2022 NV 33 (Nev. 2022).
“: This appeal implicates the scope of NRS 42.021, Nevada's codification of the collateral source rule as it pertains to medical malpractice lawsuits.”
Mccrosky Vs. Carson Tahoe Reg'l Med. Ctr., 2017 NV 115 (Nev. 2017).
“Reading NRS 42.021 as a whole, section 1 benefits defendants by discouraging juries from awarding damages for medical costs that a plaintiff did not actually incur, but section 2 protects plaintiffs by prohibiting collateral sources from recovering against prevailing plaintiffs.”
Mccrosky Vs. Carson Tahoe Reg'l Med. Ctr., 2017 NV 115 (Nev. 2017).
“Reading NRS 42.021 as a whole, section 1 benefits defendants by discouraging juries from awarding damages for medical costs that a plaintiff did not actually incur, but section 2 protects plaintiffs by prohibiting collateral sources from recovering against prevailing plaintiffs.”
Taylor v. Brill (Nev. 2023).
“The district court based its decision on its interpretation of NRS 42.021(1); therefore, the issue presented is one of law that we review de novo.”
Taylor v. Brill (Nev. 2023).
“The district court based its decision on its interpretation of NRS 42.021(1); therefore, the issue presented is one of law that we review de novo.”
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