NRS
47.020 Scope of title 4 of NRS.
1. This title governs proceedings in the
courts of this State and before magistrates, except:
(a) To the extent to which its provisions are
relaxed by a statute or procedural rule applicable to the specific situation;
and
(b) As otherwise provided in subsection 3.
2. Except as otherwise provided in
subsection 1, the provisions of chapter 49 of
NRS with respect to privileges apply at all stages of all proceedings.
3. The other provisions of this title,
except with respect to provisions concerning a person with limited English
proficiency, do not apply to:
(a) Issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal
summonses and search warrants.
(b) Proceedings with respect to release on bail.
(c) Sentencing, granting or revoking probation.
(d) Proceedings for extradition.
4. As used in this section, “person with
limited English proficiency” has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 1.510.
(Added to NRS by 1971,
775; A 1997,
2286; 2013,
1460; 2017,
1144)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
18
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1980–2022 · leading case:
Dail v. State, 610 P.2d 1193 (Nev. 1980).
Dail v. State, 610 P.2d 1193 (Nev. 1980).
· cites it 2× “NRS 47.020(3)(c). Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the applicable standard of proof in probation revocation hearings, its opinion in Gagnon v.”
Anaya v. State, 606 P.2d 156 (Nev. 1980).
“NRS 47.020(3)(c). I find that the testimony in question carried with it the indicia of reliability contemplated by statute.”
Givens v. State, 657 P.2d 97 (Nev. 1983).
“155, enacted in 1971, provides in relevant part that “at the request of a party the judge shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses.”
Grace (lecory) Vs. Dist. Ct. (state), 2016 NV 51 (Nev. 2016).
· cites it 20× “Justice courts have express authority to suppress illegally obtained evidence during preliminary hearings Grace argues NRS 47.020 and NRS 48.025 expressly require justice courts to suppress illegally obtained evidence.”
Witter v. State, 921 P.2d 886 (Nev. 1996).
· cites it 3× “NRS 47.020 states that the rules of evidence under NRS Title 4 are to govern the proceedings of the courts of the State of Nevada, but are not to apply to sentencing proceedings.”
Las Vegas Sands v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2014 NV 13 (Nev. 2014).
· cites it 10× “3 Sands argues that NRS 47.020 and NRCP 26(b)(3) guarantee that the work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege apply at all stages of all proceedings except where they are "relaxed by a statute or procedural rule applicable to the specific situation.”
Grace (lecory) Vs. Dist. Ct. (state), 2016 NV 51 (Nev. 2016).
· cites it 5× “Justice courts have express authority to suppress illegally obtained evidence during preliminary hearings Grace argues NRS 47.020 and NRS 48.025 expressly require justice courts to suppress illegally obtained evidence.”
Bish (Travis) v. Just. Ct. For Sparks Twp. (Nev. 2022).
· cites it 3× “With respect to Bish's argument about the applicability of the rules of evidence at a bail proceeding, the legal issue is settled by NRS 47.020(3)(b), as the parties acknowledge in their appellate briefs, and therefore is unlikely to arise in the future.”
In Re: N.j., a Minor Child, 2018 NV 48 (Nev. 2018).
· cites it 2× “See NRS 47.020(1)(a) (providing, NRS 48.045 governs proceedings except "[t]o the extent to which its provisions are relaxed by a statute or procedural rule applicable to the specific situation").”
Coyote Springs Inv., LLC Vs. Dist. Ct. (brightsource Energy, Inc.), 2015 NV 18 (Nev. 2015).
· cites it 2× “" NRS 47.020(2). Clients and attorneys are generally not permitted to confer in the midst of giving testimony, however, and some jurisdictions have concluded that such conferences may lead to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.”
Contreras-Armas (Cesar) v. State (Nev. 2018).
“170(3), and even hearsay, see NRS 47.020(3)(c). Moreover, Contreras- Armas has not demonstrated that the evidence was impalpable or highly suspect.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 47.020(1) — 3 cases
Grace (lecory) Vs. Dist. Ct. (state), 2016 NV 51 (Nev. 2016).
“Justice courts have express authority to suppress illegally obtained evidence during preliminary hearings Grace argues NRS 47.020 and NRS 48.025 expressly require justice courts to suppress illegally obtained evidence.”
Las Vegas Sands v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2014 NV 13 (Nev. 2014).
“3 Sands argues that NRS 47.020 and NRCP 26(b)(3) guarantee that the work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege apply at all stages of all proceedings except where they are "relaxed by a statute or procedural rule applicable to the specific situation.”
Grace (lecory) Vs. Dist. Ct. (state), 2016 NV 51 (Nev. 2016).
“Justice courts have express authority to suppress illegally obtained evidence during preliminary hearings Grace argues NRS 47.020 and NRS 48.025 expressly require justice courts to suppress illegally obtained evidence.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 47.020(1)(a) — 4 cases
In Re: N.j., a Minor Child, 2018 NV 48 (Nev. 2018).
“See NRS 47.020(1)(a) (providing, NRS 48.045 governs proceedings except "[t]o the extent to which its provisions are relaxed by a statute or procedural rule applicable to the specific situation").”
Las Vegas Sands v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2014 NV 13 (Nev. 2014).
“3 Sands argues that NRS 47.020 and NRCP 26(b)(3) guarantee that the work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege apply at all stages of all proceedings except where they are "relaxed by a statute or procedural rule applicable to the specific situation.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 47.020(2) — 4 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 47.020(3) — 2 cases
Grace (lecory) Vs. Dist. Ct. (state), 2016 NV 51 (Nev. 2016).
“Justice courts have express authority to suppress illegally obtained evidence during preliminary hearings Grace argues NRS 47.020 and NRS 48.025 expressly require justice courts to suppress illegally obtained evidence.”
Grace (lecory) Vs. Dist. Ct. (state), 2016 NV 51 (Nev. 2016).
“Justice courts have express authority to suppress illegally obtained evidence during preliminary hearings Grace argues NRS 47.020 and NRS 48.025 expressly require justice courts to suppress illegally obtained evidence.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 47.020(3)(b) — 1 case
Bish (Travis) v. Just. Ct. For Sparks Twp. (Nev. 2022).
“With respect to Bish's argument about the applicability of the rules of evidence at a bail proceeding, the legal issue is settled by NRS 47.020(3)(b), as the parties acknowledge in their appellate briefs, and therefore is unlikely to arise in the future.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 47.020(3)(c) — 4 cases
Dail v. State, 610 P.2d 1193 (Nev. 1980).
“NRS 47.020(3)(c). Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the applicable standard of proof in probation revocation hearings, its opinion in Gagnon v.”
Anaya v. State, 606 P.2d 156 (Nev. 1980).
“NRS 47.020(3)(c). I find that the testimony in question carried with it the indicia of reliability contemplated by statute.”
Contreras-Armas (Cesar) v. State (Nev. 2018).
“170(3), and even hearsay, see NRS 47.020(3)(c). Moreover, Contreras- Armas has not demonstrated that the evidence was impalpable or highly suspect.”
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