New Hampshire Revised Statutes
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4-b (2026)
Damages From Construction
✓ current as of May 2026
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508:4-b Damages From Construction. –
I. Except as otherwise provided in this section, all actions to recover damages for injury to property, injury to the person, wrongful death or economic loss arising out of any deficiency in the creation of an improvement to real property, including without limitation the design, labor, materials, engineering, planning, surveying, construction, observation, supervision or inspection of that improvement, shall be brought within 8 years from the date of substantial completion of the improvement, and not thereafter.
II. The term "substantial completion" means that construction is sufficiently complete so that an improvement may be utilized by its owner or lawful possessor for the purposes intended. In the case of a phased project with more than one substantial completion date, the 8-year period of limitations for actions involving systems designed to serve the entire project shall not begin until all phases of the project are substantially complete.
III. If an improvement to real property is expressly warranted or guaranteed in writing for a period longer than 8 years, the period of limitation set out in paragraph I shall extend to equal the longer period of warranty or guarantee.
IV. In all actions for negligence in design or construction described in paragraph I, the standard of care used to determine negligence shall be the standard of care applicable to the activity giving rise to the cause of action at the time the activity was performed, rather than a standard applicable to a later time.
V. (a) The limitation set out in paragraph I shall not apply to actions involving fraudulent misrepresentations, or to actions involving the fraudulent concealment of material facts upon which a claim might be based. Such actions shall be brought within 8 years after the date on which all relevant facts are, or with due care ought to be, discovered by the person bringing the action.
(b) The 8-year limitation period in paragraph I shall not apply to actions arising out of any deficiency in the design, labor, materials, planning, engineering, surveying, observation, supervision, inspection or construction of improvements which are for nuclear power generation, nuclear waste storage, or the long-term storage of hazardous materials.
VI. Nothing in this section shall affect the liabilities of a person having actual possession or control of an improvement to real property as owner or lawful possessor thereof, and nothing contained in this section shall alter or amend the time within which an action in tort may be brought for damages arising out of negligence in the repair, maintenance or upkeep of an improvement to real property.
I. Except as otherwise provided in this section, all actions to recover damages for injury to property, injury to the person, wrongful death or economic loss arising out of any deficiency in the creation of an improvement to real property, including without limitation the design, labor, materials, engineering, planning, surveying, construction, observation, supervision or inspection of that improvement, shall be brought within 8 years from the date of substantial completion of the improvement, and not thereafter.
II. The term "substantial completion" means that construction is sufficiently complete so that an improvement may be utilized by its owner or lawful possessor for the purposes intended. In the case of a phased project with more than one substantial completion date, the 8-year period of limitations for actions involving systems designed to serve the entire project shall not begin until all phases of the project are substantially complete.
III. If an improvement to real property is expressly warranted or guaranteed in writing for a period longer than 8 years, the period of limitation set out in paragraph I shall extend to equal the longer period of warranty or guarantee.
IV. In all actions for negligence in design or construction described in paragraph I, the standard of care used to determine negligence shall be the standard of care applicable to the activity giving rise to the cause of action at the time the activity was performed, rather than a standard applicable to a later time.
V. (a) The limitation set out in paragraph I shall not apply to actions involving fraudulent misrepresentations, or to actions involving the fraudulent concealment of material facts upon which a claim might be based. Such actions shall be brought within 8 years after the date on which all relevant facts are, or with due care ought to be, discovered by the person bringing the action.
(b) The 8-year limitation period in paragraph I shall not apply to actions arising out of any deficiency in the design, labor, materials, planning, engineering, surveying, observation, supervision, inspection or construction of improvements which are for nuclear power generation, nuclear waste storage, or the long-term storage of hazardous materials.
VI. Nothing in this section shall affect the liabilities of a person having actual possession or control of an improvement to real property as owner or lawful possessor thereof, and nothing contained in this section shall alter or amend the time within which an action in tort may be brought for damages arising out of negligence in the repair, maintenance or upkeep of an improvement to real property.
Source. 1965, 118:1. 1990, 164:2, eff. June 26, 1990.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 22
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1973–2025 · leading case: Big League Ent., Inc. v. Brox Indus., Inc., 821 A.2d 1054 (N.H. 2003).
Big League Ent., Inc. v. Brox Indus., Inc., 821 A.2d 1054 (N.H. 2003). “The plaintiff countered that its claim was subject to an eight-year statute of limitations, see RSA 508:4-b, I (1997), or, alternatively, that the discovery rule of RSA *482 508:4, I, applied and, accordingly, that its claims were timely filed under that statute’s three-year…”
Lamprey v. Britton Constr., Inc., 37 A.3d 359 (N.H. 2012). “See RSA 508:4 (2010); RSA 508:4-b (2010). We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.”
Phaneuf Funeral Home v. Little Giant Pump Co., 48 A.3d 912 (N.H. 2012). “Each defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Phaneuf s claims were time-barred by RSA 508:4-b, I (2010), the statute of repose for “Damages From Construction.”
Lennartz v. Oak Point Assocs., P.A., 112 A.3d 1159 (N.H. 2015). “(Oak Point) and Ambient Temperature Corporation (Ambient), on the ground that RSA 508:4-b, I (2010) barred the plaintiffs claims against them.”
Winnisquam Reg'l Sch. Dist. v. Levine, 880 A.2d 369 (N.H. 2005). “) arguing that the court erred by: (1) holding that the statute of repose found in RSA 508:4-b (1997) was unconstitutional and denying the motion to dismiss; and (2) denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.”
Henderson Clay Prods., Inc. v. Edgar Wood & Assocs., Inc., 451 A.2d 174 (N.H. 1982). “This case comes to us on appeal from the granting, pursuant to RSA 508:4-b, of a motion to dismiss an indemnity claim.”
Antoniou v. Kenick, 474 A.2d 566 (N.H. 1984). “The plaintiff first argues that under RSA 508:4-b the superior court should not have granted the motion to dismiss.”
Deschamps v. Camp Dresser & McKee, Inc., 306 A.2d 771 (N.H. 1973). “) has certified under our rule 20 certain questions of law concerning RSA 508:4-b. This section reads as follows: “Damages from Construction.”
Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 643 A.2d 906 (Md. 1994). “206 (Michie 1986); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 508:4-b (Supp.1993); N.”
Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448 (Minn. 1988). “205 (Michie 1986); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 508:4-b (1983); NJ. Stat.”
Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288 (N.H. 1983). “Relying upon Carson , we concluded: “It is difficult to rationally permit a situation to exist whereby the supplier of labor and material has a liability exposure for a period of six years after the injury has been discovered or, in the exercise of due care, should have been…”
John C. Rankin & a. v. South Street Downtown Holdings, Inc. South Street Downtown Holdings, Inc. v. TruexCullins & Partners Architects & a., No. 2018-0604 (N.H. Aug. 6, 2019). “The trial court transferred the following question: Does RSA 508:4-b (“the statute of repose”) as amended in 1990 apply to and bar third party actions by a property owner defendant (in a premises liability action) for indemnity and/or contribution against architects involved in…”
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4-b(V)(a): 1 case
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. RFI Supply, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 2d 118 (D. Mass. 2005).
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