New Hampshire Revised Statutes
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 556:10 (2026)
Pending Actions
✓ current as of May 2026
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556:10 Pending Actions. –
If such an action is pending at the time of the decease of one of the parties it shall abate and be forever barred, unless the administrator of the deceased party, if the deceased was plaintiff, shall appear and assume the prosecution of the action before the end of the second term after the decease of such party, or, if the deceased party was defendant, unless the plaintiff shall procure a scire facias to be issued to the administrator of the deceased party before the end of the second term after the original grant of administration upon his estate. Provided, that in the latter case, the administrator shall forthwith notify in writing the adverse party or his attorney of record of such death and grant of administration, and such action shall not be barred until the end of the second term after the giving of such notice. Such notice shall be by registered mail, return receipt requested, and such administrator shall file an affidavit in the probate court, showing compliance with the provisions thereof, provided further however, that any justice of the superior court shall for good cause shown grant leave from any of the foregoing provisions as justice may require.
Source. PS 191:9. PL 302:10. RL 355:10. 1951, 88:1, eff. April 26, 1951.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10
cases, 1956–2002 · leading case: Belkner v. Preston, 332 A.2d 168 (N.H. 1975).
Belkner v. Preston, 332 A.2d 168 (N.H. 1975). “Defendants filed motions to abate in reliance on RSA 556:10. At a hearing on defendants’ motions, Mullavey, J.”
Est. of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 406 A.2d 704 (N.H. 1979). “2d 168 (1975), concerning the limitations period for survival actions, RSA 556:10, that "[t]he procedural qualification of a citizen's access to the courts in civil matters" was not a "fundamental interest" triggering strict scrutiny.”
Costoras v. Noel, 119 A.2d 705 (N.H. 1956). “” The question presented in this case is whether the phrase “any of the foregoing provisions” which appears in the last sentence refers only to that part of RSA 556:10 that was inserted by the 1951 amendment or to the whole section.”
Coffey v. Bresnahan, 506 A.2d 310 (N.H. 1986). “2d 168 (1975), we considered the constitutionality of the time limitation contained in RSA 556:10, and applied a rational basis test.”
Kelley v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 268 A.2d 837 (N.H. 1970). “See RSA 556:10. There is a related common-law rule, dating from Baker v.”
Perutsakos v. Tarmey, 217 A.2d 177 (N.H. 1966). “See RSA 556:10. In other words section 11 permits suits within a designated period after the decedent’s death on all claims not already barred at the time of such death by the general statute of limitations.”
Theberge v. Transp. Sys., 611 F. Supp. 368 (D.N.H. 1984). “An initial inquiry is whether the retrospective application of RSA 556:10 (1984) effect a “remedy” or a “vested rights”.”
Lundberg v. Arne Hagen & Sentry Ins., 316 A.2d 177 (N.H. 1974). “The action in this case is not a statutory death action, but an action for personal injuries suffered by Mrs.”
Mayrand v. Water Pik, et al., 2002 DNH 038 (D.N.H. 2002). “Based upon the plain language of RSA 556:10, James Whitley's personal injury action did not abate upon his death.”
Harper v. Water Pik, et al., 2002 DNH 143 (D.N.H. 2002). “In denying defendants’ motion for reconsideration, the court explained that, pursuant to RSA 556:10, Whitley’s “personal injury action did not abate upon his death,” but survived because the administrator of his estate appeared and assumed prosecution of the case within the time…”
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