New Hampshire Revised Statutes
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 626:8 (2026)
Criminal Liability for Conduct of Another
✓ current as of May 2026
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626:8 Criminal Liability for Conduct of Another. –
I. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.
II. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when:
(a) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; or
(b) He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the law defining the offense; or
(c) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense.
III. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if:
(a) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he solicits such other person in committing it, or aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or
(b) His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.
IV. Notwithstanding the requirement of a purpose as set forth in paragraph III(a), when causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense, if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense. In other words, to establish accomplice liability under this section, it shall not be necessary that the accomplice act with a purpose to promote or facilitate the offense. An accomplice in conduct can be found criminally liable for causing a prohibited result, provided the result was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conduct and the accomplice acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently with respect to that result, as required for the commission of the offense.
V. A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity.
VI. Unless otherwise provided, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if:
(a) He is the victim of that offense; or
(b) The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or
(c) He terminates his complicity prior to the commission of the offense and wholly deprives it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense or gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense.
VII. An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted.
I. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.
II. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when:
(a) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; or
(b) He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the law defining the offense; or
(c) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense.
III. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if:
(a) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he solicits such other person in committing it, or aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or
(b) His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.
IV. Notwithstanding the requirement of a purpose as set forth in paragraph III(a), when causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense, if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense. In other words, to establish accomplice liability under this section, it shall not be necessary that the accomplice act with a purpose to promote or facilitate the offense. An accomplice in conduct can be found criminally liable for causing a prohibited result, provided the result was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conduct and the accomplice acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently with respect to that result, as required for the commission of the offense.
V. A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity.
VI. Unless otherwise provided, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if:
(a) He is the victim of that offense; or
(b) The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or
(c) He terminates his complicity prior to the commission of the offense and wholly deprives it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense or gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense.
VII. An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted.
Source. 1971, 518:1. 2001, 216:1, eff. Jan. 1, 2002.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 92
cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1975–2025 · leading case: State v. Formella, 960 A.2d 722 (N.H. 2008).
State v. Formella, 960 A.2d 722 (N.H. 2008). “On the afternoon of Wednesday, June 13, 2007, the defendant, then a junior at Hanover High School, and two friends, were studying at the Howe Library near the school.”
State v. Anthony, 861 A.2d 773 (N.H. 2004). “See RSA 626:8 (Supp. 2004); RSA 644:8, III (Supp.”
State v. Noucas, 70 A.3d 476 (N.H. 2013). “See RSA 686:1 (2007) (robbery); RSA 626:8 (2007) (accomplice liability). On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred when it: (1) found that sufficient evidence supported his conviction; (2) failed to instruct the jury on defense of another under RSA 627:4 (Supp.”
State v. Rivera, 27 A.3d 676 (N.H. 2011). “), the defendant, Andre Rivera, was convicted of accomplice to reckless second-degree murder, see RSA 626:8 (2007); RSA 630:l-b, 1(b) (2007).”
State v. Thresher, 442 A.2d 578 (N.H. 1982). “RSA 626:8 states that “[a] person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.”
State v. Luv Pharmacy, Inc., 388 A.2d 190 (N.H. 1978). “According to RSA 626:8 I, “[a] person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by .”
State v. Donohue, 834 A.2d 253 (N.H. 2003). “See RSA 626:8 (1996) (amended 2001); RSA 629:3 (Supp.”
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007). “020 (2003); N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 626:8 (Supp.2006); N.”
State v. Laudarowicz, 694 A.2d 980 (N.H. 1997). “The defendant, Jay Laudarowicz, was convicted as an accomplice, see RSA 626:8 (1996), on two counts of attempted murder, see RSA 629:1 (1996) (attempt); RSA 630:l-a (1996) (first degree murder), and one count each of attempted arson, see RSA 634:1 (Supp.”
State v. Goodwin, 395 A.2d 1234 (N.H. 1978). “The defendant was indicted for being an accomplice to kidnapping, in violation of RSA 626:8 and 633:1, and being an accomplice to aggravated felonious sexual assault, in violation of RSA 626:8 and 632-A:2 (Supp.”
State v. Dellorfano, 517 A.2d 1163 (N.H. 1986). “The defendant was tried by a jury and convicted on charges of accomplice to armed robbery, RSA 636:1,111(a) and RSA 626:8, III; accomplice to kidnapping, RSA 633:1 and RSA 626:8, III; and possession of a controlled drug, second offense, RSA 318-B:26, 1(b)(2).”
State v. Locke, 761 A.2d 376 (N.H. 1999). “) rulings that the defendant, Danny Locke, could not be charged as an accomplice to second degree murder, see RSA 630:l-b, 1(b) (1996); RSA 626:8, 11(c) (1996), and that evidence of an intercepted conversation between the defendant and his co-defendant should be suppressed based…”
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