2C:1-4. Classes of Offenses.
a. (1) An offense defined by this code or by any other statute of this State, for which a sentence of imprisonment in excess of 6 months is authorized, constitutes a crime within the meaning of the Constitution of this State. Crimes are designated in this code as being of the first, second, third or fourth degree.
(2) An offense defined by the laws of any other jurisdiction, for which a sentence of imprisonment in excess of one year is authorized, shall be considered in this State to be a crime when a reference is made by this code, or by any other statute of this State, to such offense.
b. (1) An offense is a disorderly persons offense if it is so designated in this code or in a statute other than this code. An offense is a petty disorderly persons offense if it is so designated in this code or in a statute other than this code. Disorderly persons offenses and petty disorderly persons offenses are petty offenses and are not crimes within the meaning of the Constitution of this State. There shall be no right to indictment by a grand jury nor any right to trial by jury on such offenses. Conviction of such offenses shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a crime.
(2) (a) An offense defined by the laws of any other jurisdiction, for which a sentence of imprisonment of one year or less, but more than 30 days, is authorized, shall be considered in this State to be a disorderly persons offense when a reference is made by this code, or by any other statute of this State, to such offense.
(b) An offense defined by the laws of any other jurisdiction, for which a sentence of imprisonment of 30 days or less is authorized, shall be considered in this State to be a petty disorderly persons offense when a reference is made by this code, or by any other statute of this State, to such offense.
c. An offense defined by any statute of this State other than this code shall be classified as provided in this section or in section 2C:43-1 and, except as provided in subsection b. of 2C:1-5 and chapter 43, the sentence that may be imposed upon conviction thereof shall hereafter be governed by this code. Insofar as any provision of this State outside the code declares an offense to be a misdemeanor when such offense specifically provides a maximum penalty of 6 months' imprisonment or less, whether or not in combination with a fine, such provision shall constitute a disorderly persons offense.
d. Subject to the provisions of section 2C:43-1, reference in any statute, rule, or regulation of this State outside the code to the term "high misdemeanor" shall mean crimes of the first, second, or third degree and reference to the term "misdemeanor" shall mean all crimes.
Notes of Decisions
Raymond Holloway, Jr. v. Attorney Gen. United States, 948 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 2020).
“, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:1-4 (dividing offenses into “crimes,” “disorderly persons offenses,” and “petty disorderly persons offenses”); § 2C:43-1(a) (dividing “crimes” further into four degrees); State v.”
Lazaro Larios v. Attorney Gen. United States, 978 F.3d 62 (3d Cir. 2020).
“The IJ reasoned that simple assault, under New Jersey law, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:1-4(b), was not a “crime” at all, only “a disorderly persons offense [or] .”
State v. Ferretti, 461 A.2d 193 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983).
“The classification concept within §§ 2C:1-4 and 2C:43-1 apply to non-Code "offenses.”
Abraham v. Raso, 15 F. Supp. 2d 433 (D.N.J. 1998).
“N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(d). Thus, the rule emerging from Davis and related authorities would seem to be that an officer will not be hable for shooting at a fleeing criminal where the criminal has committed a first, second or third degree crime, if such deadly force is necessary to…”
State of New Jersey v. Rodney J. Miles, 128 A.3d 700 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).
“N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(b). They afford no right to indictment or trial by jury, and conviction of such an offense may not "give rise to any 8 A-2692-12T1 disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a crime.”
In re Hart, 626 A.2d 483 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
“N.J.S.A 2C:1-4(a); cf. State v. Senno, 79 N.”
Alexander Moss, Jr. - Adversary Proceeding (Bankr. D.N.J. 2020).
· cites it 4× ““An offense defined by this code or by any other statute of this State, for which a sentence of imprisonment in excess of 6 months is authorized, constitutes a crime within the meaning of the Constitution of this State.”
N.J. Stat. § 2C:1-4(a): 6 cases
In re Hart, 626 A.2d 483 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
“N.J.S.A 2C:1-4(a); cf. State v. Senno, 79 N.”
N.J. Stat. § 2C:1-4(a)(1): 2 cases
N.J. Stat. § 2C:1-4(a)(2): 1 case
N.J. Stat. § 2C:1-4(b): 7 cases
Lazaro Larios v. Attorney Gen. United States, 978 F.3d 62 (3d Cir. 2020).
“The IJ reasoned that simple assault, under New Jersey law, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:1-4(b), was not a “crime” at all, only “a disorderly persons offense [or] .”
State of New Jersey v. Rodney J. Miles, 128 A.3d 700 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).
“N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(b). They afford no right to indictment or trial by jury, and conviction of such an offense may not "give rise to any 8 A-2692-12T1 disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a crime.”
S. Wong, 28 I. & N. Dec. 518 (2022).
N.J. Stat. § 2C:1-4(b)(1): 4 cases
N.J. Stat. § 2C:1-4(b)(2)(a): 1 case
N.J. Stat. § 2C:1-4(d): 3 cases
Abraham v. Raso, 15 F. Supp. 2d 433 (D.N.J. 1998).
“N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(d). Thus, the rule emerging from Davis and related authorities would seem to be that an officer will not be hable for shooting at a fleeing criminal where the criminal has committed a first, second or third degree crime, if such deadly force is necessary to…”
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