a. Conduct is the cause of a result when:
(1) It is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred; and
(2) The relationship between the conduct and result satisfies any additional causal requirements imposed by the code or by the law defining the offense.
b. When the offense requires that the defendant purposely or knowingly cause a particular result, the actual result must be within the design or contemplation, as the case may be, of the actor, or, if not, the actual result must involve the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated and not be too remote, accidental in its occurrence, or dependent on another's volitional act to have a just bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense.
c. When the offense requires that the defendant recklessly or criminally negligently cause a particular result, the actual result must be within the risk of which the actor is aware or, in the case of criminal negligence, of which he should be aware, or, if not, the actual result must involve the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and must not be too remote, accidental in its occurrence, or dependent on another's volitional act to have a just bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense.
d. A defendant shall not be relieved of responsibility for causing a result if the only difference between what actually occurred and what was designed, contemplated or risked is that a different person or property was injured or affected or that a less serious or less extensive injury or harm occurred.
e. When causing a particular result is a material element of an offense for which absolute liability is imposed by law, the element is not established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the actor's conduct.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
41
cases (
13 in the last 5 years), 1989–2026 · leading case:
State v. Martin, 573 A.2d 1359 (N.J. 1990).
State v. Martin, 573 A.2d 1359 (N.J. 1990).
· cites it 6× “Consequently, in assessing whether a defendant’s conduct is the cause of a remote result, both codes focus on whether the actual result justly bears on the defendant’s culpability for the offense.”
State v. Pelham, 824 A.2d 1082 (N.J. 2003).
· cites it 4× “2d 1359 (1990) (discussing Code changes); see also II New Jersey Code: The Final Report of the New Jersey Law Commission § 2C:2-3 commentary at 49-51 (1971) (II N.”
State v. Buckley, 78 A.3d 958 (N.J. 2013).
· cites it 2× “” Final Report, supra, commentary to § 2C:2-3, at 50. The “actual result,” as the term is used in N.”
State v. Abella., 454 P.3d 482 (Haw. 2019).
“, HRS § 702-215(2) (considering whether the result is “too remote or accidental in its occurrence” or whether its occurrence is “too dependent on another’s volitional conduct”). Specifically, subsection (2) concerns the concept of intervening causation.”
State v. Thomas J. DiNapoli, No. A-56-24 (N.J. May 12, 2026).
· cites it 47× “The second and third elements, which relate to causation, are governed by N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3. Vehicular homicide requires that the State prove not only “but for” causation but also an additional causal element.”
State v. Whitted, 557 A.2d 327 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
“of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3, which would ordinarily apply with respect to strict liability offenses, however, the State need not show in a *390 prosecution under this section that the death was a "probable consequence of the defendant's conduct.”
State v. Michelle Lodzinski (083398) (Middlesex Cnty. & Statewide), No. A-50-19 (N.J. May 26, 2021).
· cites it 8× “] As explained by a leading commentator on the Code, “[w]here an offense requires purpose, the result must be the kind of result designed by the actor; where an offense requires knowledge, the result must be the kind contemplated even if it is not the precise injury contemplated…”
N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-3(a): 7 cases
State v. Michelle Lodzinski (083398) (Middlesex Cnty. & Statewide), No. A-50-19 (N.J. May 26, 2021).
“] As explained by a leading commentator on the Code, “[w]here an offense requires purpose, the result must be the kind of result designed by the actor; where an offense requires knowledge, the result must be the kind contemplated even if it is not the precise injury contemplated…”
N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-3(a)(1): 9 cases
State v. Michelle Lodzinski (083398) (Middlesex Cnty. & Statewide), No. A-50-19 (N.J. May 26, 2021).
“] As explained by a leading commentator on the Code, “[w]here an offense requires purpose, the result must be the kind of result designed by the actor; where an offense requires knowledge, the result must be the kind contemplated even if it is not the precise injury contemplated…”
State v. Thomas J. DiNapoli, No. A-56-24 (N.J. May 12, 2026).
“The second and third elements, which relate to causation, are governed by N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3. Vehicular homicide requires that the State prove not only “but for” causation but also an additional causal element.”
N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-3(a)(2): 1 case
State v. Thomas J. DiNapoli, No. A-56-24 (N.J. May 12, 2026).
“The second and third elements, which relate to causation, are governed by N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3. Vehicular homicide requires that the State prove not only “but for” causation but also an additional causal element.”
N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-3(b): 11 cases
State v. Michelle Lodzinski (083398) (Middlesex Cnty. & Statewide), No. A-50-19 (N.J. May 26, 2021).
“] As explained by a leading commentator on the Code, “[w]here an offense requires purpose, the result must be the kind of result designed by the actor; where an offense requires knowledge, the result must be the kind contemplated even if it is not the precise injury contemplated…”
N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-3(c): 13 cases
State v. Abella., 454 P.3d 482 (Haw. 2019).
“, HRS § 702-215(2) (considering whether the result is “too remote or accidental in its occurrence” or whether its occurrence is “too dependent on another’s volitional conduct”). Specifically, subsection (2) concerns the concept of intervening causation.”
State v. Thomas J. DiNapoli, No. A-56-24 (N.J. May 12, 2026).
“The second and third elements, which relate to causation, are governed by N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3. Vehicular homicide requires that the State prove not only “but for” causation but also an additional causal element.”
N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-3(d): 4 cases
N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-3(e): 5 cases
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