2C:13-5. Criminal Coercion.
a. Offense defined. A person is guilty of criminal coercion if, with purpose unlawfully to restrict another's freedom of action to engage or refrain from engaging in conduct, he threatens to:
(1) Inflict bodily injury on anyone or commit any other offense, regardless of the immediacy of the threat;
(2) Accuse anyone of an offense;
(3) Expose any secret which would tend to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute;
(4) Take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action;
(5) Bring about or continue a strike, boycott or other collective action, except that such a threat shall not be deemed coercive when the restriction compelled is demanded in the course of negotiation for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor acts;
(6) Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or
(7) Perform any other act which would not in itself substantially benefit the actor but which is calculated to substantially harm another person with respect to his health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation or personal relationships.
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on paragraphs (2), (3), (4), (6) and (7) that the actor believed the accusation or secret to be true or the proposed official action justified and that his purpose was limited to compelling the other to behave in a way reasonably related to the circumstances which were the subject of the accusation, exposure or proposed official action, as by desisting from further misbehavior, making good a wrong done, or refraining from taking any action or responsibility for which the actor believes the other disqualified.
b. Grading. Criminal coercion is a crime of the fourth degree unless the threat is to commit a crime more serious than one of the fourth degree or the actor's purpose is criminal, in which cases the offense is a crime of the third degree.
Notes of Decisions
State of New Jersey v. George E. Norcross, III (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2026).
· cites it 24× “defendants but which was calculated to substantially harm [DPI] and Developer-1 with respect to their business, career, financial condition, and reputation, with purpose to unlawfully restrict [DPI]'s and Developer-l's freedom of action from engaging in conduct, contrary to the…”
State of New Jersey v. Frank Nucera (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024).
· cites it 5× “1(b)(1) lists criminal coercion under N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5 as a crime the conviction of which mandates forfeiture of benefits under N.”
State of New Jersey v. Joseph Centanni (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2025).
· cites it 4× “June 11, 2012); see also Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Criminal Coercion (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5)" (approved Jan. 11, 2016).”
L.B.I. Vs. W.f.a.-y. (fv-09-0532-18, Hudson Cnty. & Statewide) (record Impounded) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2021).
· cites it 2× “]" 6 N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5 provides, in part: A person is guilty of criminal coercion if, with purpose unlawfully to restrict another’s freedom of action to engage or refrain from engaging in conduct, he [or she] threatens to: A-3579-19 3 allege as a predicate act that defendant…”
S.H.S. v. A.B. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024).
· cites it 2× “POINT II THERE COULD BE NO CRIMINAL COERCION UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5(a) BECAUSE TRUTH IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE AND THE SEXUAL TEXT MESSAGES BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND [A.”
E.A. Vs. G.D. (fv-02-0248-19, Bergen Cnty. & Statewide) (record Impounded) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019).
“In pertinent part, under N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5(a), a person is guilty of criminal coercion if: [W]ith purpose unlawfully to restrict another's freedom of action to engage or refrain from engaging in conduct, he threatens to: (1) Inflict bodily injury on anyone or commit any other…”
N.J. Stat. § 2C:13-5(a): 6 cases
S.H.S. v. A.B. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024).
“POINT II THERE COULD BE NO CRIMINAL COERCION UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5(a) BECAUSE TRUTH IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE AND THE SEXUAL TEXT MESSAGES BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND [A.”
State of New Jersey v. George E. Norcross, III (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2026).
“defendants but which was calculated to substantially harm [DPI] and Developer-1 with respect to their business, career, financial condition, and reputation, with purpose to unlawfully restrict [DPI]'s and Developer-l's freedom of action from engaging in conduct, contrary to the…”
E.A. Vs. G.D. (fv-02-0248-19, Bergen Cnty. & Statewide) (record Impounded) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019).
“In pertinent part, under N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5(a), a person is guilty of criminal coercion if: [W]ith purpose unlawfully to restrict another's freedom of action to engage or refrain from engaging in conduct, he threatens to: (1) Inflict bodily injury on anyone or commit any other…”
N.J. Stat. § 2C:13-5(a)(1): 4 cases
State of New Jersey v. Frank Nucera (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024).
“1(b)(1) lists criminal coercion under N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5 as a crime the conviction of which mandates forfeiture of benefits under N.”
N.J. Stat. § 2C:13-5(a)(4): 3 cases
State of New Jersey v. Frank Nucera (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024).
“1(b)(1) lists criminal coercion under N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5 as a crime the conviction of which mandates forfeiture of benefits under N.”
State of New Jersey v. George E. Norcross, III (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2026).
“defendants but which was calculated to substantially harm [DPI] and Developer-1 with respect to their business, career, financial condition, and reputation, with purpose to unlawfully restrict [DPI]'s and Developer-l's freedom of action from engaging in conduct, contrary to the…”
N.J. Stat. § 2C:13-5(a)(7): 2 cases
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