N.M. Stat. § 12-2A-1 (2026)

A. This act [12-2A-1 to 12-2A-20 NMSA 1978] may be cited as the "Uniform Statute
and Rule Construction Act".

    B. The Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act applies to a statute enacted or
rule adopted on or after the effective date of that act unless the statute or rule expressly
provides otherwise, the context of its language requires otherwise or the application of
that act to the statute or rule would be infeasible.

   C. Subsection B of this section does not authorize an administrative agency to
exempt its rules from a provision of the Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act.

History: Laws 1997, ch. 173, § 1.

                                        ANNOTATIONS

Effective dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 173 § 22 made the Uniform Statute and Rule
Construction Act effective July 1, 1997.

                                   I.      IN GENERAL.

Construction is issue of law. — Where the question is simply one of construction, the
courts may pass upon it as an issue "solely of law." Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co., 1966-NMSC-271, 77 N.M. 481, 424 P.2d 397.

Rules of construction to resolve not create ambiguity. — Techniques in aid of
construction of a statute are used to resolve an ambiguity, not to create one. Tafoya v.
New Mexico State Police Bd., 1970-NMSC-106, 81 N.M. 710, 472 P.2d 973.

Rules not inconsistent with intent. — If there be doubt as to a statute's construction,
courts are permitted to interpret, to arrive at the intention of the legislature, but rules or
canons of construction are not to be invoked to arrive at a construction inconsistent with
clear intent. State ex rel. Maloney v. Sierra, 1970-NMSC-144, 82 N.M. 125, 477 P.2d
301.
All rules of statutory construction are but aids in arriving at the true legislative intent
and should never be used to override same where it otherwise plainly appears.
Bradbury & Stamm Constr. Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 1962-NMSC-078, 70 N.M. 226,
372 P.2d 808.

Statute construed to make whole act consistent. — In statutory construction, the
inquiry is to determine what particular words, clauses or provisions mean and to
determine the legislative intent. Statutes are enacted as a whole and each part should
be construed in connection with every other part to ascertain the intent, and where a
comparison of one clause with the statute as a whole makes a meaning clear the act
must be so construed as to make the whole consistent. Reed v. Styron, 1961-NMSC-
119, 69 N.M. 262, 365 P.2d 912.

When power conferred, rights to effect are implied. — It is a fundamental rule of
construction that when a power is conferred by statute everything necessary to carry out
the power and make it effective and complete will be implied. Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 1967-NMSC-182, 78 N.M. 398, 432 P.2d 109.

When power not granted is implied. — A power not expressly granted is implied only
where it is necessary to carry into effect powers expressly granted. Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 1967-NMSC-182, 78 N.M. 398, 432 P.2d 109.

                     II.    CONSTRUCTION OF CONSTITUTION.

Usual principles governing construction of statutes apply also to interpretation of
constitutions. State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. City of Aztec, 1967-NMSC-046, 77
N.M. 524, 424 P.2d 801.

No interpretation when provision is clear and unambiguous. — When a
constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, it is not subject to interpretation or
construction by this court. State ex rel. Sage v. Montoya, 1959-NMSC-029, 65 N.M.
416, 338 P.2d 1051.

Intent arrived at from vantage point of framers. — What the framers of the
constitution intended as disclosed by the language employed is, of course, the
interpretation properly to be given the instrument. That intent must be arrived at by
construing together its various pertinent provisions and giving to each the meaning
which its language most naturally suggests when considered in proper relationship to
the others. We should, as nearly as we may, endeavor to look at the instrument from
the vantage point of the framers the better to understand their view of the matter and
the meaning likely intended. Whenever we refer to the framers that term is to be taken
as embracing the people who adopted it. We are not unmindful of the rule of
construction applicable to a constitution that its language is to be taken in its common
and ordinary sense and as likely understood by the people who adopted it. State ex rel.
Witt v. State Canvassing Bd., 1968-NMSC-017, 78 N.M. 682, 437 P.2d 143.
Intent controls literal application of language when result incongruous. — The
supreme court is limited to determining the intention of those who adopted the
constitution, and where the spirit and intent is clearly ascertainable as contrary to the
strict letter of the language and literal application would lead to an incongruous result, it
should not be permitted to control. State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 1968-NMSC-167, 79
N.M. 578, 446 P.2d 445.

Purpose and scope of constitutional provision must be considered. — Canon of
construction that a sovereign is presumptively not intended to be bound by its own
statute unless included by the clearest implication is but a rule of construction and
consideration must be given to the purpose and scope of the constitutional provision
(here N.M. Const., art. IX, § 12) involved. State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. City of
Aztec, 1967-NMSC-046, 77 N.M. 524, 424 P.2d 801.

Duty of court to declare intent of amendment. — It is the duty of the court to search
out and declare the true meaning and intent of any constitutional amendment adopted
by the people, and this duty is no different in considering the constitution itself. State ex
rel. Chavez v. Evans, 1968-NMSC-167, 79 N.M. 578, 446 P.2d 445.

Amendments valid unless illegal beyond reasonable doubt. — Whenever a
constitutional amendment is attacked as not constitutionally adopted, the question
presented is, not whether it is possible to condemn, but whether it is possible to uphold;
every reasonable presumption, both of law and fact, is to be indulged in favor of the
legality of the amendment, which will not be overthrown, unless illegality appears
beyond a reasonable doubt. City of Raton v. Sproule, 1967-NMSC-141, 78 N.M. 138,
429 P.2d 336.

The constitution must be construed as a whole and the court held that the two
sections, N.M. Const., art. V, § 3 and art. VII, § 2, should be read together, thereby
requiring that in order to hold the office of governor, a person must be a citizen of the
United States, at least 30 years of age, who has been a resident continuously for five
years preceding his election and who is a qualified elector in New Mexico. State ex rel.
Chavez v. Evans, 1968-NMSC-167, 79 N.M. 578, 446 P.2d 445.

Liberal construction of certain provisions. — Constitutional provision (N.M. Const.,
art. XIX, § 1) that electors be enabled to vote on amendments separately should receive
a liberal, rather than a narrow or technical construction, especially where the legislature
obviously considered the problem carefully, and the amendment has been submitted to
the people for their vote thereon. City of Raton v. Sproule, 1967-NMSC-141, 78 N.M.
138, 429 P.2d 336.

Supplementary legislation may supply details to constitutional provisions. —
Although a self-executing constitutional provision has full force on its own, the
legislature may protect or further it through supplementary legislation. That is to say, a
legislature may supply details relative to the constitutional provision. 1962 Op. Att'y
Gen. No. 62-149.
No construction when intention clear. — The constitution was written to be
understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary
as distinguished from technical meaning; where the intention is clear there is no room
for construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition. 1960 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 60-
205.

If meaning of statute doubtful, consequences are considered in construction.
1953 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 53-5878.

Rule of employment security commission construed same as statute. — Rule
legally promulgated by employment security commission (now employment security
division) has the same force as a statute and is therefore subject to the same
construction. 1947 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 47-5115.

Law reviews. — For article, "Approaching Statutory Interpretation in New Mexico," see
8 Nat. Resources J. 689 (1968).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 142 et seq.;
74 Am. Jur. 2d Time §§ 15, 16.

Supplying omitted words in statute, 3 A.L.R. 404, 126 A.L.R. 1325.

"Devise" or "devisee" in statute as including "legacy" or "legatee," or vice versa, 4 A.L.R.
246.

Statute requiring filing of formal notice of lis pendens in certain classes of cases as
affecting common-law doctrine of lis pendens in other cases, 10 A.L.R. 306.

Meaning of "by" as fixing time for performance of an act or happening of an event, 12
A.L.R. 1168, 21 A.L.R. 1543.

Effect of mistake in reference in statute to another statute, constitution, public
document, record or the like, 14 A.L.R. 274.

Retroactive effect of statute in relation to presentation of notice of claim for personal
injury against municipality, 14 A.L.R. 710.

"Until" as word of inclusion or exclusion, 16 A.L.R. 1094.

"Similar," construed, 17 A.L.R. 94.

Act done on same day as, but before another act or event, as satisfying a statutory
requirement that the former must precede the latter, 21 A.L.R. 1216.

Title of statutes as an element bearing upon their construction, 37 A.L.R. 927.
Retroactive effect of provision for reduction or increase of award under workmen's
compensation law, 40 A.L.R. 1473.

Signing or endorsing bill or note by printing or stamping, 46 A.L.R. 1498.

Declaratory judgment construing statute, 50 A.L.R. 42, 68 A.L.R. 110, 87 A.L.R. 1205,
114 A.L.R. 1361.

Implied abrogation of state's prerogative right of preference at common law, 51 A.L.R.
1355, 65 A.L.R. 1331, 90 A.L.R. 184, 167 A.L.R. 640.

Computation of time allowed for approval or disapproval of bill by governor, 54 A.L.R.
339.

Resort to constitutional or legislative debates, committee reports and journals as aid in
construction of statute, 70 A.L.R. 5

Amendments as aid in construction of statute, 70 A.L.R. 22.

Inclusion of Sunday in computation of time within which bill must be presented to
governor, 71 A.L.R. 1363.

Stipulation of parties as to construction and effect of statute, 92 A.L.R. 663.

"And/or," 118 A.L.R. 1367, 154 A.L.R. 866.

Retroactive application of repeal of statute which operated as limitation of or exception
to a substantive right of action in tort otherwise arising at common law, 120 A.L.R. 943.

Inclusion or exclusion of first or last day in computing period of time prescribed by
insurance contract, 137 A.L.R. 1155.

Construction and application of statutory and constitutional provisions exempting
property of persons in military service, or formerly in such service, from taxation, 149
A.L.R. 1485.

Removal or suspension of constitutional limitation as affecting construction of statute
previously enacted, 171 A.L.R. 1070.

Constitutional requirement that repealing or amendatory statute refer to statute repealed
or amended, to repeal or amendment by implication, 5 A.L.R.2d 1270.

Meaning of term "radius" employed in statute as descriptive area, location or distance,
10 A.L.R.2d 605.
Validity, construction, and application of statute limiting damages recoverable for
defamation, 13 A.L.R.2d 285.

Simultaneous repeal and reenactment of all, or part, of legislative act, 77 A.L.R.2d 336.

What 12-month period constitutes "year" or "calendar year" as used in public
enactment, contract or other written instrument, 5 A.L.R.3d 584.

82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 330, 337, 338, 358; 86 C.J.S. Time § 13(1).