A. Unless a written request has been determined to be excessively burdensome or
broad, a written request for inspection of public records that has not been permitted
within fifteen days of receipt by the office of the custodian may be deemed denied. The
person requesting the public records may pursue the remedies provided in the
Inspection of Public Records Act.
B. If a written request has been denied, the custodian shall provide the requester
with a written explanation of the denial. The written denial shall:
(1) describe the records sought;
(2) set forth the names and titles or positions of each person responsible for
the denial; and
(3) be delivered or mailed to the person requesting the records within fifteen
days after the request for inspection was received.
C. A custodian who does not deliver or mail a written explanation of denial within
fifteen days after receipt of a written request for inspection is subject to an action to
enforce the provisions of the Inspection of Public Records Act and the requester may be
awarded damages. Damages shall:
(1) be awarded if the failure to provide a timely explanation of denial is
determined to be unreasonable;
(2) not exceed one hundred dollars ($100) per day;
(3) accrue from the day the public body is in noncompliance until a written
denial is issued; and
(4) be payable from the funds of the public body.
History: Laws 1993, ch. 258, § 8.
ANNOTATIONS
In camera review. — When a public entity seeks to withhold public records, in camera
review is most efficient, if not imperative. The public entity must designate the sealed
records for review by the court. Board of Comm'rs v. Las Cruces Sun-News, 2003-
NMCA-102, 134 N.M. 283, 76 P.3d 36.
County not permitted to circumvent established procedure of in camera review.
— Where a county sought to circumvent the procedure outlined in State ex rel.
Newsome v. Alarid, 1977-NMSC-076, 90 N.M. 790, 568 P.2d 1236, for in camera
review of disputed documents by filing a motion for a protective order and asserting to
the district court that it could only consider the settlement records if the motion for
protective order was granted, the county’s decision to bypass established procedure
effectively obstructed full review by the district court and the court of appeals and the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for protective order.
Board of Comm’rs v. Las Cruces Sun-News, 2003-NMCA-102, 134 N.M. 283, 76 P.3d
36.
The threshold requirements for an in camera inspection are that the custodian of
the records must first determine whether the person requesting disclosure is a citizen
and whether the request is for a lawful purpose; second, the custodian must justify why
the records should not be furnished. State ex rel. Blanchard v. City Comm'rs, 1988-
NMCA-008, 106 N.M. 769, 750 P.2d 469.
Justification for refusing to release records. — Fact that information was obtained
under a promise of confidentiality, standing alone, would not suffice to preclude
disclosure. The promise would have to coincide with reasonable justification, based on
public policy, for refusing to release the records. Furthermore, the justification would
have to be articulated by the custodian for the record. State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid,
1977-NMSC-076, 90 N.M. 790, 568 P.2d 1236.
Duty of custodian to determine whether information can be justifiably withheld. —
There may be circumstances under which the information contained in the record can
be justifiably withheld. The custodian has the initial duty to make this determination as
to each record requested. He must first determine that the person requesting access is
a citizen and that he is requesting the information for a lawful purpose. The burden is
upon the custodian to justify why the records sought to be examined should not be
furnished. It shall then be the court's duty to determine whether the explanation of the
custodian is reasonable and to weigh the benefits to be derived from nondisclosure
against the harm which may result if the records are not made available. State ex rel.
Newsome v. Alarid, 1977-NMSC-076, 90 N.M. 790, 568 P.2d 1236.
The attorney general failed to establish a prima facie case for summary judgment
on the inspection of public records exception for attorney-client privilege, as
extended by the common interest doctrine. — Where plaintiff requested inspection
of common interest agreements entered into by the New Mexico office of the attorney
general (OAG) with other states' offices of the attorney general, as well as
correspondence and emails relating to the formation of these agreements, and where
the OAG responded to the requests by withholding some responsive documents
altogether, without disclosing that any documents were being withheld, producing some
documents with all but a "privileged or confidential" stamp redacted, and producing
other documents with multiple lengthy redactions, claiming that the redactions were
supported by the Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA) exception for law
enforcement records or because the redactions constituted confidential attorney-client
communications and protected attorney work-product, and where plaintiff challenged
both the withholding of some documents and the heavy redaction of the documents
provided, claiming that none of the cited IPRA exceptions supported the denial of
responsive information, and where the OAG filed a motion for summary judgment
arguing that its blanket assertion of attorney-client privilege and/or work-product,
together with its assertion of good faith, established a prima facie case justifying the
denial of inspection of unidentified, withheld documents, as well as the redactions it
made on the documents that were produced, the district court erred in granting the
OAG's motion for summary judgment, because the OAG failed to establish a prima facie
case for summary judgment on either the IPRA exception for attorney-client privilege, as
extended by the common interest doctrine, or the catchall exception for attorney work-
product. A generalized assertion of privilege or immunity, even if the public agency
asserts the privilege or immunity in good faith, is not sufficient to establish a prima facie
case of compliance with IPRA supporting summary judgment. Energy Pol'y Advoc. v.
Balderas, 2024-NMCA-081.
Denial of request to review applications for position of city manager. — A
municipality’s denial of a request to inspect applications received by the municipality for
the position of city manager on the grounds that disclosure of the applications would
deter potential applicants and reduce the quality and scope of the applicant pool was
insufficient, under the rule of reason, to outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure. City
of Farmington v. The Daily Times, 2009-NMCA-057, 146 N.M. 349, 210 P.3d 246.
The Inspection of Public Records Act provides for two separate remedies. — This
section and 14-2-12 NMSA 1978 create separate remedies depending on the stage of
the Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA) request. This section requires a public
entity to respond to a records request within fifteen days unless the request has been
determined to be excessively burdensome or broad. If the request is denied, the
custodian shall provide the requester with a written explanation of the denial. It is when
the custodian fails to respond to a request or deliver a written explanation of the denial
that the public entity is subject to damages pursuant to this section. The enforcement
and damages provisions of 14-2-12 NMSA 1978 apply in an action for the post-denial
enforcement of the IPRA request. Faber v. King, 2015-NMSC-015, rev’g 2013-NMCA-
080, 306 P.3d 519.
Where the attorney general’s office received a request for public records pursuant to the
Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA) and denied the request the next day, damages
pursuant to this section were not applicable because the attorney general’s office timely
answered the request with a denial by following the denial procedures set out in this
section. When the district court held that the attorney general’s office wrongfully
withheld the public records, the enforcement and damages provisions of 14-2-12(D)
NMSA 1978 applied. Faber v. King, 2015-NMSC-015, rev’g 2013-NMCA-080, 306 P.3d
519.
Separate remedies distinguished. — Section 14-2-11 NMSA 1978 is focused on
deterring nonresponsiveness and noncompliance by public bodies in the first instance,
while 14-2-12 NMSA 1978 is focused on making whole a person who, believing his or
her right of inspection has been impermissibly denied, brings a successful enforcement
action. Britton v. Office of the Att’y Gen., 2019-NMCA-002.
Incomplete or inadequate responses to IPRA requests. — Where plaintiff made a
request for documents from the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) pursuant to the
Inspection of Public Records Act, §§ 14-2-1 to -12 NMSA 1978, and where the AGO
incompletely and inadequately responded to the request, the district court erred in
concluding that plaintiff’s action is exclusively one that proceeds under 14-2-12 NMSA
1978 and limiting the damages plaintiff can recover to actual damages under
Subsection D of that provision, because a public body that permits only partial
inspection, that is inspection of some but not all nonexempt responsive records, has not
complied with its obligation to provide the greatest possible information regarding the
affairs of government. Britton v. Office of the Att’y Gen., 2019-NMCA-002.
Remedy for inadequate response to IPRA request. — Where plaintiff made a
request for documents from the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) pursuant to the
Inspection of Public Records Act, §§ 14-2-1 to -12 NMSA 1978, and where the AGO
failed to permit inspection of approximately 350 records that were responsive to
plaintiff’s request and for which no claim of exemption was ever asserted or written
explanation of denial issued, the district court erred in concluding that plaintiff’s action is
exclusively one that proceeds under 14-2-12 NMSA 1978 and limiting the damages
plaintiff can recover to actual damages under Subsection D of that provision, because
the AGO’s failure to either produce for inspection or deliver or mail a written explanation
of denial regarding the 350 documents is the type of wrong that 14-2-11 NMSA 1978’s
statutory penalty seeks to remedy. Britton v. Office of the Att’y Gen., 2019-NMCA-002.
Statutory damages were appropriate where denial of public records request was
unreasonable. — Where defendants received various IPRA requests from plaintiffs
regarding the abrupt and premature resignation of the superintendent of Albuquerque
public schools in late August and early September 2014, and where defendants'
responses to these requests were beyond IPRA's fifteen-day response deadline and
where, during litigation in the matter, an interlocutory appeal took over 1200 days during
which statutory damages accrued under 14-2-11(C) NMSA 1978, the district court did
not err in awarding over $400,000 in statutory damages, because a court may still
award statutory damages after a written denial is issued if the denial is deemed
unreasonable, and defendants in this case were deemed out of compliance with IPRA
regarding several of the requests they received up to the date of trial because their
written denials were unreasonable. Albuquerque Journal v. Bd. of Educ. of APS, 2025-
NMCA-020, cert. granted.
Pleading an action for enforcement of IPRA against a private entity. — To plead an
action for enforcement of the Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA), 14-2-1 to 14-2-12
NMSA 1978, against a private entity, a plaintiff must simply allege that the records
sought are public records arising out of the private entity's performance of a public
function and that the private entity has failed to comply with IPRA via the manner
outlined in either 14-2-11(C) NMSA 1978 or 14-2-12(D) NMSA 1978. Franklin v. Keefe
Commissary Network, 2024-NMCA-070.
Records arising out of a private entity's performance of a public function and on
behalf of a public entity are subject to IPRA. — Where plaintiff, a state inmate,
requested records regarding commissary prices for state prisoners, pursuant to the New
Mexico Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA), 14-2-1 to 14-2-12 NMSA 1978, from
defendant, a private corporation contracting with the New Mexico corrections
department (NMCD) to operate an inmate commissary program at New Mexico state
facilities, based on plaintiff's belief that prices were not set at fair market value, and
where, upon receiving no response from defendant, plaintiff filed a complaint to enforce
IPRA, and where defendant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss, arguing that defendant
was not subject to IPRA because it is a private entity, the district court erred in granting
defendant's motion to dismiss, because the records sought were public records arising
out of defendant's performance of a public function and on behalf of a public entity.
Plaintiff established under the facts of the complaint that defendant may be subject to
IPRA. Franklin v. Keefe Commissary Network, 2024-NMCA-070.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act is not an exception to disclosure of
public records. — Where the state ethics commission (commission) sent a public
records request to the New Mexico human services department [health care authority
department] (department), asking the department to provide copies of certain emails
from several named employees, and where the department denied the request claiming
that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), NMSA 1978, § 10-16F-1 to -6,
operates as an exception to disclosure through the Inspection of Public Records Act
(IPRA), NMSA 1978, §§ 14-2-1 to -12, because the commission may obtain the
requested records through a subpoena, the department erred in denying the
commission’s public records request, because the commission’s ability to obtain pubic
records through a subpoena does not mean that it is unable to seek the same records
through IPRA, and nothing in the ECPA’s text suggests that the legislature intended the
statute to operate as an exception to disclosure through IPRA. Public Records
Requests Made by the State Ethics Comm’n (10/27/21), Att’y Gen. Adv. Ltr. 2021-12.
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 37A Am. Jur. 2d Freedom of
Information Acts § 443 et seq.
What are "records" of agency which must be made available under Freedom of
Information Act (5 USCA § 552(a)(3)), 153 A.L.R. Fed. 571.
Notes of Decisions
Britton v. Off. of the Attorney Gen. of N.M., 433 P.3d 320 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 113× “" Thus, the district court ruled that Plaintiff is entitled only to actual damages, attorney fees, and costs under Section 14-2-12, and is foreclosed from recovering Section 14-2-11's statutory damages of up to $100 per day.”
Britton v. Off. of the Att'y Gen., 2019 NMCA 2 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 102× “” In addition to requesting attorney fees and costs under Section 14-2-12(D), Plaintiff sought statutory damages of up to $100 per day as provided for in Section 14-2-11 of IPRA. {13} In its response to Plaintiff’s motion, the AGO did not dispute that “the initial search to…”
Faber v. King, 2015 NMSC 015 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 63× “Second, IPRA allows a claimant to file an action to enforce the procedures of IPRA when a records request has been wrongfully denied through separate mechanisms: Section 14-2-11, entitled “Procedure for denied requests,” and Section 14-2-12, entitled “Enforcement.”
Derringer v. State, 68 P.3d 961 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 8× “not exceed one hundred dollars ($100) per day [and] accrue from the day the public body is in noncompliance until a written denial is issued[J NMSA 1978, § 14-2-11(0(2), (3) (1993). D.”
Energy Pol'y Advoc. v. Balderas, 560 P.3d 37 (N.M. Ct. App. 2024).
· cites it 19× “3d 173 (“Sections 14-2-11 and 14-2-12 create separate remedies depending on the stage of the IPRA request.”
Faber v. King, 2013 NMCA 80 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 28× “In the briefs to the district court on damages as well as the hearing, it is clear that all counsel and the court understood the distinction between Section 14-2-11 and Section 14-2-12. Faber never claimed that the $100 maximum in Section 14-2-11(C)(2) applied to his enforcement…”
San Juan Agric. Water Users Ass'n v. KNME-TV, 257 P.3d 884 (N.M. 2011).
· cites it 4× “If a records custodian fails to respond to a records request within fifteen days of receiving the request and a court concludes that the failure to respond was unreasonable, the court shall award the plaintiff damages not to exceed one hundred dollars a day. Section…”
Pacheco v. Hudson, 415 P.3d 505 (N.M. 2018).
· cites it 3× “The designated records custodian is the only official who is assigned IPRA compliance duties, see § 14-2-7, and is the only official who statutorily "is subject to an action to enforce" IPRA, see § 14-2-11(C). In our thirteen New Mexico judicial districts, the designated…”
Pacheco v. Hudson, 2018 NMSC 22 (N.M. 2018).
· cites it 2× “Section 14-2-11(C)(4) provides that “[a] custodian who does not” timely respond to an IPRA request “is subject to an action to enforce the provisions of the Inspection of Public Records Act and the requester may be awarded damages,” which shall “be payable from the funds of the…”
Jones v. N.M. Dep't of Pub. Saf., 2020 NMSC 013 (N.M. 2020).
“See Faber, 2015-NMSC-015, ¶ 12 (“[NMSA 1978,] Sections 14-2-11 [(1993)] and 14-2-12 [(1993)] create separate remedies depending on the stage of the IPRA request.”
Henry v. N.M. Livestock Bd., 538 P.3d 102 (N.M. Ct. App. 2023).
· cites it 20× “We address the claims of attorney-client privilege first, followed by the claim of exemption for IPRA Document No. 3. We then separately address Henry’s contention on cross-appeal that the district court erred in failing to award her per diem statutory damages, pursuant to…”
— N.M. Stat. § 14-2-11(A) — 13 cases
Faber v. King, 2015 NMSC 015 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
“Second, IPRA allows a claimant to file an action to enforce the procedures of IPRA when a records request has been wrongfully denied through separate mechanisms: Section 14-2-11, entitled “Procedure for denied requests,” and Section 14-2-12, entitled “Enforcement.”
Britton v. Off. of the Attorney Gen. of N.M., 433 P.3d 320 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018).
“" Thus, the district court ruled that Plaintiff is entitled only to actual damages, attorney fees, and costs under Section 14-2-12, and is foreclosed from recovering Section 14-2-11's statutory damages of up to $100 per day.”
Britton v. Off. of the Att'y Gen., 2019 NMCA 2 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018).
“” In addition to requesting attorney fees and costs under Section 14-2-12(D), Plaintiff sought statutory damages of up to $100 per day as provided for in Section 14-2-11 of IPRA. {13} In its response to Plaintiff’s motion, the AGO did not dispute that “the initial search to…”
Energy Pol'y Advoc. v. Balderas, 560 P.3d 37 (N.M. Ct. App. 2024).
“3d 173 (“Sections 14-2-11 and 14-2-12 create separate remedies depending on the stage of the IPRA request.”
— N.M. Stat. § 14-2-11(B) — 17 cases
Britton v. Off. of the Attorney Gen. of N.M., 433 P.3d 320 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018).
“" Thus, the district court ruled that Plaintiff is entitled only to actual damages, attorney fees, and costs under Section 14-2-12, and is foreclosed from recovering Section 14-2-11's statutory damages of up to $100 per day.”
Britton v. Off. of the Att'y Gen., 2019 NMCA 2 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018).
“” In addition to requesting attorney fees and costs under Section 14-2-12(D), Plaintiff sought statutory damages of up to $100 per day as provided for in Section 14-2-11 of IPRA. {13} In its response to Plaintiff’s motion, the AGO did not dispute that “the initial search to…”
Faber v. King, 2015 NMSC 015 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
“Second, IPRA allows a claimant to file an action to enforce the procedures of IPRA when a records request has been wrongfully denied through separate mechanisms: Section 14-2-11, entitled “Procedure for denied requests,” and Section 14-2-12, entitled “Enforcement.”
Energy Pol'y Advoc. v. Balderas, 560 P.3d 37 (N.M. Ct. App. 2024).
“3d 173 (“Sections 14-2-11 and 14-2-12 create separate remedies depending on the stage of the IPRA request.”
— N.M. Stat. § 14-2-11(B)(3) — 4 cases
Faber v. King, 2015 NMSC 015 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
“Second, IPRA allows a claimant to file an action to enforce the procedures of IPRA when a records request has been wrongfully denied through separate mechanisms: Section 14-2-11, entitled “Procedure for denied requests,” and Section 14-2-12, entitled “Enforcement.”
— N.M. Stat. § 14-2-11(C) — 35 cases
Britton v. Off. of the Attorney Gen. of N.M., 433 P.3d 320 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018).
“" Thus, the district court ruled that Plaintiff is entitled only to actual damages, attorney fees, and costs under Section 14-2-12, and is foreclosed from recovering Section 14-2-11's statutory damages of up to $100 per day.”
Britton v. Off. of the Att'y Gen., 2019 NMCA 2 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018).
“” In addition to requesting attorney fees and costs under Section 14-2-12(D), Plaintiff sought statutory damages of up to $100 per day as provided for in Section 14-2-11 of IPRA. {13} In its response to Plaintiff’s motion, the AGO did not dispute that “the initial search to…”
Faber v. King, 2015 NMSC 015 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
“Second, IPRA allows a claimant to file an action to enforce the procedures of IPRA when a records request has been wrongfully denied through separate mechanisms: Section 14-2-11, entitled “Procedure for denied requests,” and Section 14-2-12, entitled “Enforcement.”
Energy Pol'y Advoc. v. Balderas, 560 P.3d 37 (N.M. Ct. App. 2024).
“3d 173 (“Sections 14-2-11 and 14-2-12 create separate remedies depending on the stage of the IPRA request.”
Faber v. King, 2013 NMCA 80 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
“In the briefs to the district court on damages as well as the hearing, it is clear that all counsel and the court understood the distinction between Section 14-2-11 and Section 14-2-12. Faber never claimed that the $100 maximum in Section 14-2-11(C)(2) applied to his enforcement…”
— N.M. Stat. § 14-2-11(C)(1) — 9 cases
Britton v. Off. of the Attorney Gen. of N.M., 433 P.3d 320 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018).
“" Thus, the district court ruled that Plaintiff is entitled only to actual damages, attorney fees, and costs under Section 14-2-12, and is foreclosed from recovering Section 14-2-11's statutory damages of up to $100 per day.”
Britton v. Off. of the Att'y Gen., 2019 NMCA 2 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018).
“” In addition to requesting attorney fees and costs under Section 14-2-12(D), Plaintiff sought statutory damages of up to $100 per day as provided for in Section 14-2-11 of IPRA. {13} In its response to Plaintiff’s motion, the AGO did not dispute that “the initial search to…”
Faber v. King, 2013 NMCA 80 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
“In the briefs to the district court on damages as well as the hearing, it is clear that all counsel and the court understood the distinction between Section 14-2-11 and Section 14-2-12. Faber never claimed that the $100 maximum in Section 14-2-11(C)(2) applied to his enforcement…”
— N.M. Stat. § 14-2-11(C)(2) — 11 cases
Faber v. King, 2015 NMSC 015 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
“Second, IPRA allows a claimant to file an action to enforce the procedures of IPRA when a records request has been wrongfully denied through separate mechanisms: Section 14-2-11, entitled “Procedure for denied requests,” and Section 14-2-12, entitled “Enforcement.”
Faber v. King, 2013 NMCA 80 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
“In the briefs to the district court on damages as well as the hearing, it is clear that all counsel and the court understood the distinction between Section 14-2-11 and Section 14-2-12. Faber never claimed that the $100 maximum in Section 14-2-11(C)(2) applied to his enforcement…”
Henry v. N.M. Livestock Bd., 538 P.3d 102 (N.M. Ct. App. 2023).
“We address the claims of attorney-client privilege first, followed by the claim of exemption for IPRA Document No. 3. We then separately address Henry’s contention on cross-appeal that the district court erred in failing to award her per diem statutory damages, pursuant to…”
— N.M. Stat. § 14-2-11(C)(3) — 7 cases
Faber v. King, 2013 NMCA 80 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
“In the briefs to the district court on damages as well as the hearing, it is clear that all counsel and the court understood the distinction between Section 14-2-11 and Section 14-2-12. Faber never claimed that the $100 maximum in Section 14-2-11(C)(2) applied to his enforcement…”
— N.M. Stat. § 14-2-11(C)(4) — 2 cases
Pacheco v. Hudson, 415 P.3d 505 (N.M. 2018).
“The designated records custodian is the only official who is assigned IPRA compliance duties, see § 14-2-7, and is the only official who statutorily "is subject to an action to enforce" IPRA, see § 14-2-11(C). In our thirteen New Mexico judicial districts, the designated…”
Pacheco v. Hudson, 2018 NMSC 22 (N.M. 2018).
“Section 14-2-11(C)(4) provides that “[a] custodian who does not” timely respond to an IPRA request “is subject to an action to enforce the provisions of the Inspection of Public Records Act and the requester may be awarded damages,” which shall “be payable from the funds of the…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.