N.M. Stat. § 30-16-11 (2026)

A. Receiving stolen property means intentionally to receive, retain or dispose of
stolen property knowing that it has been stolen or believing it has been stolen, unless
the property is received, retained or disposed of with intent to restore it to the owner.

   B. The requisite knowledge or belief that property has been stolen is presumed in
the case of a dealer who:

      (1)   is found in possession or control of property stolen from two or more
persons on separate occasions;

      (2)    acquires stolen property for a consideration that the dealer knows is far
below the property's reasonable value. A dealer shall be presumed to know the fair
market value of the property in which the dealer deals; or

       (3)   is found in possession or control of five or more items of property stolen
within one year prior to the time of the incident charged pursuant to this section.

   C. For the purposes of this section:

    (1)     "dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods or
commercial merchandise; and
     (2)   "stolen property" means any property acquired by theft, larceny, fraud,
embezzlement, robbery or armed robbery.

   D. Whoever commits receiving stolen property when the value of the property is two
hundred fifty dollars ($250) or less is guilty of a petty misdemeanor.

    E. Whoever commits receiving stolen property when the value of the property is
over two hundred fifty dollars ($250) but not more than five hundred dollars ($500) is
guilty of a misdemeanor.

   F. Whoever commits receiving stolen property when the value of the property is
over five hundred dollars ($500) but not more than two thousand five hundred dollars
($2,500) is guilty of a fourth degree felony.

    G. Whoever commits receiving stolen property when the value of the property is
over two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) but not more than twenty thousand
dollars ($20,000) is guilty of a third degree felony.

   H. Whoever commits receiving stolen property when the value of the property
exceeds twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) is guilty of a second degree felony.

    I. Whoever commits receiving stolen property when the property is a firearm is
guilty of a fourth degree felony when its value is less than two thousand five hundred
dollars ($2,500).

History: 1953 Comp., § 40A-16-11, enacted by Laws 1963, ch. 303, § 16-11; 1969, ch.
171, § 2; 1972, ch. 77, § 1; 1975, ch. 232, § 1; 1983, ch. 253, § 1; 1987, ch. 121, § 5;
2006, ch. 29, § 7.

                                    ANNOTATIONS

Cross references. — For failure to show proper authority, hides and pelts of cattle or
sheep killed being evidence of larceny or receiving stolen property, see 77-17-14 NMSA
1978.

For evidentiary rule regarding presumptions in criminal cases, see Rule 11-302 NMRA.

The 2006 amendment, effective July 1, 2006, increased the value of the property in
Subsection D from $100 or less to $250 or less; increased the value of the property in
Subsection E from more than $100 but less than $250 to more than $250 but less than
$500; increased the value of the property in Subsection F from more than $250 to more
than $500.

The 1987 amendment, effective June 19, 1987, added present Subsections E and H,
while redesignating former Subsections E, F and G as present Subsections F, G and I.
The 1983 amendment, effective June 17, 1983, in Subsection C, divided the formerly
undivided language into an introductory paragraph and Paragraph (1), added "and" at
the end of Paragraph (1) and added Paragraph (2).

                                   I.     IN GENERAL.

Unit of prosecution. — A defendant’s possession of a stolen firearm is a separate
offense from simultaneous possession of other stolen items. State v. Watkins, 2008-
NMCA-060, 144 N.M. 66, 183 P.3d 951, cert. denied, 2008-NMCERT-003, 143 N.M.
681, 180 P.3d 1180.

The purpose of Subsection B was not to create a separate crime where several items of
property, including a firearm or firearms, were stolen or received together with other
stolen property, but was to increase the penalty for the offense where a firearm was the
subject of the theft or receiving of stolen property regardless of the value of the firearm.
State v. Smith, 1983-NMCA-077, 100 N.M. 352, 670 P.2d 963, overruled by State v.
Watkins, 2008-NMCA-060, 144 N.M. 66, 183 P.3d 951.

Evidence that a defendant was in possession of numerous items of recently stolen
personal property, wrongfully taken from different owners at different times, gives rise to
a reasonable inference that defendant knew the property was stolen. State v. Smith,
1983-NMCA-077, 100 N.M. 352, 670 P.2d 963, overruled by State v. Watkins, 2008-
NMCA-060, 144 N.M. 66, 183 P.3d 951.

Validity. — Even if Subsection B renders this section partially invalid, as trial court had
held, Subsection A is valid absent Subsection B. State v. Elam, 1974-NMCA-075, 86
N.M. 595, 526 P.2d 189, cert. denied, 86 N.M. 593, 526 P.2d 187.

Section inapplicable to embezzled property. — In the absence of a statutory
provision which expressly declares the offense of embezzlement to be embraced within
the offense of larceny, the crime of receiving stolen property, knowing it to have been
stolen, does not include property which was embezzled. State v. Bryant, 1982-NMCA-
178, 99 N.M. 149, 655 P.2d 161 (decided under prior law).

                          II.    MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS.

Multiple charges. — Even where only one building is burglarized, multiple burglary
charges are proper when the security interests of multiple victims are involved. State v.
Soto, 2001-NMCA-098, 131 N.M. 299, 35 P.3d 304, cert. denied, 131 N.M. 64, 33 P.3d
284.

Receiving not included in armed robbery. — Offense of receiving stolen property
cannot be included within the offense of armed robbery. State v. Mares, 1968-NMCA-
042, 79 N.M. 327, 442 P.2d 817.
Prosecution for armed robbery not barred. — Plaintiff who was convicted in a justice
of the peace court (now replaced by magistrate courts) of the petty misdemeanor of
receiving stolen property, and was later convicted in the district court of the second
degree felony of armed robbery, was not placed in double jeopardy, nor was the state
barred or estopped from prosecuting and convicting him for the armed robbery. State v.
Gleason, 1969-NMCA-054, 80 N.M. 382, 456 P.2d 215.

Conviction for receiving as bar to burglary prosecution. — New Mexico cannot
convict a person under one indictment or information of receiving stolen property, and
then subsequently convict him under another indictment or information of burglary, if the
burglary conviction is dependent upon a theft by him of the same property, and he is
shown to have been the person who actually took and asported the property during the
burglarious entry. State v. Gleason, 1969-NMCA-054, 80 N.M. 382, 456 P.2d 215.

Theft inconsistent with receiving. — The felonious receiving of stolen property,
knowing the same to have been stolen, was a substantive offense, and distinct from
larceny. Where evidence showed defendant guilty of the theft, he could not be convicted
of feloniously receiving it. Territory v. Graves, 1912-NMSC-027, 17 N.M. 241, 125 P.
604.

Disposition separate from larceny. — A thief who holds on to stolen property cannot
violate this section by receiving the stolen property because he cannot receive it from
himself, nor can the thief violate the statute by retaining the stolen property because
larceny is a continuing offense; the thief's disposition, however, is action separate from
the larceny, and it is neither absurd nor unreasonable to hold that the thief violates this
section when he disposes of the property that he stole. State v. Tapia, 1976-NMCA-042,
89 N.M. 221, 549 P.2d 636, cert. denied, 89 N.M. 206, 549 P.2d 284.

Principle that one who is a thief cannot be convicted of "receiving" property he stole
since the theft and receipt are the same act was inapplicable where defendant was
convicted of "disposing of" property which he may also have stolen although he was
acquitted of the theft. State v. Mitchell, 1974-NMCA-057, 86 N.M. 343, 524 P.2d 206.

Meaning of "disposing" shown by legislative history. — Since the legislature is
presumed to have known the law when it added the "disposing" provision by the 1972
amendment, and is presumed to have intended to change it, so that, even if prior law
prohibited conviction for both theft and disposing of the same property the legislative
history supports the view that the law has been changed. State v. Tapia, 1976-NMCA-
042, 89 N.M. 221, 549 P.2d 636, cert. denied, 89 N.M. 206, 549 P.2d 284.

Simultaneous possession of stolen items owned by different individuals is a
single act constituting one offense. Sanchez v. State, 1982-NMSC-012, 97 N.M. 445,
640 P.2d 1325.
Property taken from more than one owner or at more than one time cannot be
combined together into one count, thereby combining the values of the stolen items to
increase the penalty. Sanchez v. State, 1982-NMSC-012, 97 N.M. 445, 640 P.2d 1325.

The defendant may be charged with a separate count for each separate transaction of
disposal. Sanchez v. State, 1982-NMSC-012, 97 N.M. 445, 640 P.2d 1325.

Conviction for receipt back of property stolen. — If a thief steals property, turns that
property over to someone and subsequently receives the property back from that
person, a receiving conviction based on receipt of the stolen property by the thief would
not be prohibited. State v. Tapia, 1976-NMCA-042, 89 N.M. 221, 549 P.2d 636, cert.
denied, 89 N.M. 206, 549 P.2d 284.

Each separate "receiving" is a separate crime. State v. Bell, 1977-NMCA-014, 90
N.M. 160, 560 P.2d 951, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347.

If defendant received the stolen pistol at a time different from the time that he received
the other stolen properties, then there were two offenses for which two sentences would
be imposed even though at the time of discovery defendant possessed all the stolen
property involved. State v. Bell, 1977-NMCA-014, 90 N.M. 160, 560 P.2d 951, cert.
denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347.

Dual prosecutions alleging different ownership of same property. — A former
acquittal under an indictment for buying and receiving stolen property, charged to be the
property of A, was no bar to a prosecution for buying and receiving the same property
charged to be the property of B. This was true where difference in name of owner of
property was "railroad" and "railway." State v. Jacoby, 1919-NMSC-012, 25 N.M. 224,
180 P. 462.

                           III.   ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE.

Purpose. — An obvious purpose of this section was to inhibit the movement and
disposition of stolen property, and the holding that the section applies to a thief who
disposes of stolen property is consistent with that purpose. State v. Tapia, 1976-NMCA-
042, 89 N.M. 221, 549 P.2d 636, cert. denied, 89 N.M. 206, 549 P.2d 284.

Meaning of "dispose". — The ordinary meaning of the language "dispose of stolen
property" is to transfer, relinquish or get rid of stolen property, which language does not
show an intent to exclude the thief from the prohibition against disposing of stolen
property. State v. Tapia, 1976-NMCA-042, 89 N.M. 221, 549 P.2d 636, cert. denied, 89
N.M. 206, 549 P.2d 284.

The ordinary meaning of "dispose" is "to transfer, relinquish or get rid of;" thus, when the
defendant gave stolen money to friends, he transferred it to them. State v. Hernandez,
2003-NMCA-131, 134 N.M. 510, 79 P.3d 1118, cert. denied, 2003-NMCERT-002, 134
N.M. 723, 82 P.3d 533.
Money is "property". – The legislature intended that "property" include "anything of
value;" common sense supports the conclusion that "anything of value" includes money.
State v. Hernandez, 2003-NMCA-131, 134 N.M. 510, 79 P.3d 1118, cert. denied, 2003-
NMCERT-002, 134 N.M. 723, 82 P.3d 533.

Several methods of committing offense. — Prior to 1972 amendment, this section
provided four methods by which offense could be committed, namely, buying, procuring,
receiving or concealing stolen property; proof of any one of these methods, coupled with
requisite knowledge, was sufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Carlton, 1971-
NMCA-019, 82 N.M. 537, 484 P.2d 757, cert. denied, 82 N.M. 534, 484 P.2d 754.

This section contemplates that a person may commit "receiving stolen property" in one
of three ways. The property may be "received," or the property may be "retained," or the
property may be "disposed" of by a defendant. Proof of any one of these methods,
coupled with the requisite knowledge, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Sanchez v.
State, 1982-NMSC-012, 97 N.M. 445, 640 P.2d 1325.

Actual theft and knowledge thereof required. — To establish the crime of receiving
and concealing stolen property it is incumbent upon the state to prove that the property
in this case was stolen; and that the accused received the property with knowledge that
they were stolen. State v. Zarafonetis, 1970-NMCA-064, 81 N.M. 674, 472 P.2d 388,
cert. denied, 81 N.M. 669, 472 P.2d 383.

Knowledge required. — To constitute the crime of receiving stolen goods, it was
essential that accused have knowledge that goods were stolen. State v. Floyd, 1918-
NMSC-057, 24 N.M. 31, 172 P. 188.

Lost property not "stolen property". — Defendant could not be charged with
receiving stolen property based on his possession of a lost traveler's check. State v.
Carbajal, 2001-NMCA-015, 130 N.M. 284, 24 P.3d 316, rev'd on other grounds, 2002-
NMSC-019, 132 N.M. 326, 48 P.3d 64.

Specific intent is not essential element of the crime of receiving stolen property.
State v. Viscarra, 1972-NMCA-125, 84 N.M. 217, 501 P.2d 261.

"Dishonest intent" is not essential element. — "Dishonest intent" is not an element
of the statutory crime of receiving stolen property. State v. Viscarra, 1972-NMCA-125,
84 N.M. 217, 501 P.2d 261.

Nature of presumption herein. — Rule 303(c), N.M.R. Evid. (now Rule 11-302
NMRA), abolishes "true" presumptions in criminal cases and puts the presumptions
found in Subsection B of this section into the category of permissible inference, so that
that subsection must be read to say that requisite knowledge or belief that property has
been stolen may be, rather than is, presumed to exist upon proof of the basic facts.
State v. Jones, 1975-NMCA-078, 88 N.M. 110, 537 P.2d 1006, cert. denied, 88 N.M.
318, 540 P.2d 248.
                                    IV.    EVIDENCE.

Possession not inferred solely from access. — When persons other than the
defendant had equal or greater access to the place where the illicit goods were
discovered, possession may not be inferred solely from defendant's access. Something
more is necessary to establish a link between the items and the defendant before the
jury can properly infer that defendant could control the items. State v. Sizemore, 1993-
NMCA-079, 115 N.M. 753, 858 P.2d 420, cert. denied, 115 N.M. 709, 858 P.2d 85.

Circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge. — Guilty knowledge is rarely
susceptible of direct and positive proof and generally can be established only through
circumstantial evidence. State v. Zarafonetis, 1970-NMCA-064, 81 N.M. 674, 472 P.2d
388, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 669, 472 P.2d 383.

Unless a defendant admits knowledge of the fact that goods he has received are stolen,
this knowledge, of necessity, must be established by circumstantial evidence. State v.
Lindsey, 1969-NMCA-121, 81 N.M. 173, 464 P.2d 903, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 140, 464
P.2d 559, and cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904, 90 S. Ct. 1692, 26 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1970).

Exclusion of reasonable hypotheses of innocence. — Where circumstantial
evidence alone is relied upon for a conviction such evidence must be incompatible with
the innocence of the accused upon any rational theory and incapable of explanation
upon any reasonable hypothesis of the defendant's innocence. State v. Zarafonetis,
1970-NMCA-064, 81 N.M. 674, 472 P.2d 388, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 669, 472 P.2d 383.

Mere presence insufficient. — Although defendant was present in the house where
the stolen bits were found, his presence alone is insufficient evidence on which to base
a conviction. State v. Browder, 1971-NMCA-150, 83 N.M. 238, 490 P.2d 680.

Mere possession insufficient. — Mere possession of recently stolen property is not
sufficient to warrant conviction on a charge of receiving stolen property, but possession,
if not satisfactorily explained, is a circumstance to be taken into consideration with all of
the other facts and circumstances in the case in determining guilt or innocence. State v.
Follis, 1960-NMSC-074, 67 N.M. 222, 354 P.2d 521; State v. Olloway, 1980-NMCA-
119, 95 N.M. 167, 619 P.2d 843.

Inference of possession or knowlege. — Although knowledge that the property is
stolen may be circumstantially proved by unexplained possession, knowledge should
not be inferred from possession or possession from knowledge without having some
basis in fact for the initial inference. State v. Sizemore, 1993-NMCA-079, 115 N.M. 753,
858 P.2d 420, cert. denied, 115 N.M. 709, 858 P.2d 85.

Possession of stolen property is circumstance to be considered in determining
whether the offense has been committed. State v. Elam, 1974-NMCA-075, 86 N.M. 595,
526 P.2d 189, cert. denied, 86 N.M. 593, 526 P.2d 187.
False explanation of possession. — Any false explanation of possession of stolen
property is a circumstance indicative of guilt. State v. Elam, 1974-NMCA-075, 86 N.M.
595, 526 P.2d 189, cert. denied, 86 N.M. 593, 526 P.2d 187.

Manner of purchase and sale. — Evidence that defendant had the stolen goods in his
possession within a few days after the theft, and both purchased and sold them at
prices disproportionately low in comparison with their value, directing that the check in
payment of the goods be written so as to exclude his name from the transaction, met
the test of substantiality and justified the inference that the goods were received by
defendant with knowledge that they were stolen. State v. Zarafonetis, 1970-NMCA-064,
81 N.M. 674, 472 P.2d 388, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 669, 472 P.2d 383.

Concealment and falsifying. — Evidence that defendant used different names in
operating his business, that he used an embosser to obliterate the seals on the stolen
books and that he told different stories about his acquisition of the stolen property was
sufficient, even apart from evidence of possession, to sustain a conviction under this
section. State v. Elam, 1974-NMCA-075, 86 N.M. 595, 526 P.2d 189, cert. denied, 86
N.M. 593, 526 P.2d 187.

Evidence of value. — The victim’s testimony of the value of the stolen items, together
with photographic and physical exhibits of the items was sufficient to allow the jury to
conclude that the market value of the items possessed by defendant exceeded $500.
State v. Archuleta, 2012-NMCA-007, 269 P.3d 924, cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-012.

Motel manager's testimony that he was familiar with the value of the television sets that
are sold to motels and testified that a used set like the one involved was worth between
$150 and $200 was competent and meets the substantial evidence test. State v.
Williams, 1972-NMCA-011, 83 N.M. 477, 493 P.2d 962.

Facsimile of bill of sale. — Introduction of a photocopy of a bill of sale for an electric
typewriter sold by defendant to a witness, the original of which was claimed to have
been lost, was not error, despite fact that counsel for defendant speculated the original
might have been signed "(owner's name) by (defendant)." State v. Chacon, 1969-
NMCA-112, 80 N.M. 799, 461 P.2d 932.

Credibility and weight of evidence for jury. — The jury was not required to accept a
suggested source of acquisition of television set, disregarding all the evidence which
supported a finding that defendant knew the set was stolen, since it was for the jury to
weigh the evidence and pass on the credibility of the witness. State v. Lindsey, 1969-
NMCA-121, 81 N.M. 173, 464 P.2d 903, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 140, 464 P.2d 559, and
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904, 90 S. Ct. 1692, 26 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1970).

Review of evidence on appeal. — In considering the question whether defendant
knew property was stolen, the court will view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the state, resolving all conflicts therein and indulging all permissible inferences in favor
of the verdict of conviction of receiving and concealing stolen goods. State v.
Zarafonetis, 1970-NMCA-064, 81 N.M. 674, 472 P.2d 388, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 669,
472 P.2d 383.

                                  V.     PROCEDURE.

Venue proper. — Venue was properly laid in county where concealment of stolen riding
equipment occurred. State v. Carlton, 1971-NMCA-019, 82 N.M. 537, 484 P.2d 757,
cert. denied, 82 N.M. 534, 484 P.2d 754.

Allegation of ownership was essential in indictment for buying and receiving stolen
property, and a departure in the proof from the allegation in the indictment was
necessarily fatal to the proceedings. State v. Jacoby, 1919-NMSC-012, 25 N.M. 224,
180 P. 462.

Allegation of source unnecessary. — It was not necessary that indictment set out
from whom the stolen goods were received. Territory v. Claypool, 1903-NMSC-002, 11
N.M. 568, 71 P. 463.

Charging in alternative. — An indictment which charged buying, receiving or
concealing in the alternative, through the use of the word "or," was established by proof
of any one of them, although they were charged in a single count. Territory v.
Neatherlin, 1906-NMSC-023, 13 N.M. 491, 85 P. 1044.

Indictment adequate. — Where the indictment charged defendant with receiving and
concealing stolen property contrary to statutory provisions, further alleging that: "On
diverse dates between March 20, 1965, and the 19th day of March, 1968 . . . [the
defendant] did buy, procure, receive, or conceal things of value knowing the same to
have been stolen or acquired by fraud or embezzlement" the indictment was in
substantially the form prescribed by statute, and, insofar as form is concerned, no
greater degree of conformity was required. State v. Lindsey, 1969-NMCA-121, 81 N.M.
173, 464 P.2d 903, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 140, 464 P.2d 559, and cert. denied, 398 U.S.
904, 90 S. Ct. 1692, 26 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1970).

Unclear indictment to be dismissed. — Where the defendant cannot tell whether he
is being charged with "receiving," "retaining" or "disposing" of stolen property, nor can it
be determined whether the charges are being "stacked" to enhance the penalty, the
indictment is faulty and must be dismissed. Sanchez v. State, 1982-NMSC-012, 97 N.M.
445, 640 P.2d 1325.

Effect of variance. — In prosecution for receiving and concealing stolen property,
alleged variance between all the evidence and the indictment was not ground for
acquittal, as court could at any time cause the indictment to be amended, nor did
defense counsel's failure to object thereto establish his ineffectiveness. State v.
Chacon, 1969-NMCA-112, 80 N.M. 799, 461 P.2d 932.
Use of conjunctive rather than disjunctive. — Where, through error, the information
and the court's instructions defined the offense of buying, receiving or aiding in the
concealment of stolen property conjunctively rather than disjunctively as in the statute,
the defendant was not aided thereby since there was substantial evidence to show that
he was guilty of all three offenses. State v. Russell, 1933-NMSC-018, 37 N.M. 131, 19
P.2d 742.

Instruction regarding type of intent. — Where on appeal it was contended an error
occurred for the district court to give a general intent instruction without instructing the
jury that it did not apply to a specific intent crime, because the instruction substantially
followed the applicable law, there was no fundamental error. State v. Gee, 2004-NMCA-
042, 135 N.M. 408, 89 P.3d 80, cert. denied, 2004-NMCERT-003, 135 N.M. 261, 88
P.3d 261.

Intent-to-return defense. — For the intent-to-return defense to apply, the stolen goods
should never have been held for any purpose other than to return the goods to the
owner. State v. Lopez, 1990-NMCA-016, 109 N.M. 578, 787 P.2d 1261.

The prospect of a reward does not defeat the intent-to-return defense. State v. Lopez,
1990-NMCA-016, 109 N.M. 578, 787 P.2d 1261.

The Uniform Jury Instructions do not preclude an instruction on the intent-to-return
defense when appropriate. State v. Lopez, 1990-NMCA-016, 109 N.M. 578, 787 P.2d
1261.

Defendant was entitled to an instruction on the intent-to-return defense, where
reasonable doubt could arise from the possibility that defendant's involvement consisted
of only awareness of the burglary, knowledge of where the goods were being kept, use
of reward money from an investigator to purchase the goods from those holding them,
and delivery of the goods to the investigator. State v. Lopez, 1990-NMCA-016, 109 N.M.
578, 787 P.2d 1261.

Waiver of error in instruction. — Error committed by trial court in instructing the jury
that requisite knowledge must, rather than may, be presumed upon proof of basic facts,
which was not objected to, was waived and did not constitute fundamental error. State
v. Jones, 1975-NMCA-078, 88 N.M. 110, 537 P.2d 1006, cert. denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540
P.2d 248.

Law reviews. — For article, "The Confusing Law of Criminal Intent in New Mexico," see
5 N.M.L. Rev. 63 (1974).

For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to criminal law, see 12 N.M.L. Rev. 229
(1982).

For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to criminal law, see 13 N.M.L. Rev. 323
(1983).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 66 Am. Jur. 2d Receiving and
Transporting Stolen Property §§ 1 to 4.

Possession of recently stolen goods by one charged with receiving them as evidence on
question of guilty knowledge, 68 A.L.R. 187.

Thief as accomplice of one charged with receiving stolen property, or vice versa, within
rule requiring corroboration or cautionary instruction, 53 A.L.R.2d 817.

Receiving property stolen in another state or country as receiving stolen property, 67
A.L.R.2d 752.

Attempts to receive stolen property, 85 A.L.R.2d 259.

Indictment: sufficiency of description of stolen property in indictment or information for
receiving it, 99 A.L.R.2d 813.

Public documents: receipt of public documents taken by another as receipt of stolen
property, 57 A.L.R.3d 1211.

Accomplice: receiver of stolen goods as accomplice of thief for purposes of
corroboration, 74 A.L.R.3d 560.

What constitutes "recently" stolen property within rule inferring guilt from unexplained
possession of such property, 89 A.L.R.3d 1202.

What constitutes "constructive" possession of stolen property to establish requisite
element of possession supporting offense of receiving stolen property, 30 A.L.R.4th
488.

Conviction of receiving stolen property, or related offenses, where stolen property
previously placed under police control, 72 A.L.R.4th 838.

Possession of stolen property as continuing offense, 24 A.L.R.5th 132.

Participation in larceny or theft as precluding conviction for receiving or concealing the
stolen property, 29 A.L.R.5th 59.

76 C.J.S. Receiving Stolen Goods § 1 et seq.