N.M. Stat. » N.M. Stat. / Chapter 30 / Article 16D
New Mexico Statutes

N.M. Stat. § 30-16D-4 (2026)

1 NMSA 1978.

✓ current as of May 2026
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B. The consent of the owner of the vehicle or motor vehicle to its taking shall not in
any case be presumed or implied because of the owner's consent on a previous
occasion to the taking of the vehicle or motor vehicle by the same or a different person.

    C. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the holder of a lien duly
recorded with the motor vehicle division of the taxation and revenue department from
taking possession of a vehicle to which possession the lienholder is legally entitled
under the provisions of the instrument evidencing the lien. A holder of a duly recorded
lien who takes possession of a vehicle without the knowledge of the owner of the
vehicle shall immediately notify the local police authority of the fact that the holder has
taken possession of the vehicle.
History: 1953 Comp., § 64-3-504, enacted by Laws 1978, ch. 35, § 91; 1998, ch. 67, §
2; § 66-3-504 NMSA 1978 recompiled and amended as § 30-16D-1 by Laws 2009, ch.
253, § 1 and 2009, ch. 261, § 1; 2025, ch. 4, § 11.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

Recompilations. — Laws 2009, ch. 253, § 1 and Laws 2009, ch. 261, § 1 recompiled
and amended former 66-3-504 NMSA 1978, relating to unlawful taking of a vehicle or
motor vehicle, as 30-16D-1 NMSA 1978, effective July 1, 2009.

The 2025 amendment, effective June 20, 2025, increased penalties for repeat and
habitual vehicle theft offenders by allowing enhancements based on prior convictions for
any vehicle-related theft crimes rather than requiring multiple convictions for the same
specific charge; in Subsection A, deleted former Paragraphs A(1) through A(3) and
added "felony as provided in Section 30-16D-4.1 NMSA 1978".

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in Subsection A, at the beginning of the
sentence, deleted "Any person who" and added the language up to "any vehicle"; after
"motor vehicle", added "as defined by the Motor Vehicle Code" and added the language
at the beginning of the sentence up to "is", in Paragraph (8) of Subsection A, after
"fourth degree felony", deleted "if the vehicle or motor vehicle has a value of less than
two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500)" and added "for a first offense"; in
Paragraph (2) of Subsection, after "felony", deleted "if the vehicle or motor vehicle has a
value of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) or more"; and added "for a second
offense"; added Paragraph (3) of Subsection A; deleted former Subsection C, which
provided that district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over offenses prescribed in this
section; and in Subsection C, changed "division" to "motor vehicle division of the
taxation and revenue department".

Specification of "anything of value" resulted in double jeopardy. — Where the
child was charged with armed robbery for taking both an automobile and the keys to the
automobile in violation of Section 30-16-2 NMSA 1978 and for the unlawful taking of a
motor vehicle in violation of Section 30-16D-1 NMSA 1978, the child’s conduct
underlying both crimes was unitary; and both convictions required the same proof of the
theft of the automobile, the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle conviction was subsumed
by the robbery conviction and the child’s conviction for both resulted in double jeopardy.
State v. Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, 150 N.M. 232, 258 P.3d 1024.

Sufficient evidence to prove unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. — In delinquency
proceedings where the child was charged with unlawful taking of a motor vehicle and
reckless driving, there was sufficient evidence to support the jurors' reasonable
determination that the child committed the delinquent act of unlawful taking of a motor
vehicle where the state, in addition to presenting Facebook messages in which the child
apologized to the victim and claimed that she was intoxicated when she took the victim's
vehicle, presented testimony from the victim that after getting out of his vehicle to hug
the child goodbye, the child pushed him aside and took off in his vehicle without his
permission, and that she failed to stop even though he ran after her, banged on the
driver side window, and yelled for her to stop. State v. Jesenya O., 2021-NMCA-030,
493 P.3d 418, rev'd on other grounds by 2022-NMSC-014.

The general/specific rule of statutory interpretation does not limit prosecutorial
discretion to choose between prosecuting possession or taking of a motor
vehicle. — Where defendant was convicted of possession of a stolen motor vehicle,
and where defendant claimed, in a motion for directed verdict, that his conviction should
have been vacated because the general/specific rule of statutory construction required
the prosecutor to charge the more specific unlawful taking of a motor vehicle rather than
the more general possession of a stolen motor vehicle when there was evidence
supporting the violation of both statutes, the district court did not err in denying
defendant's motion, because there is a presumption that the legislature intended to
punish the two offenses separately based on the fact that each statute requires proof of
at least one element that the other does not, and therefore also intended to leave
prosecutorial charging discretion intact, and defendant did not present evidence of
legislative intent sufficient to overcome this presumption. State v. Carbajal, 2026-
NMCA-030, cert. denied.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 44 cases (23 in the last 5 years), 2010–2025 · leading case: State v. Bernard, 2015-NMCA-089, 8 N.M. Ct. App. 440.
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
State v. Bernard, 2015-NMCA-089, 8 N.M. Ct. App. 440. · cites it 49× “That language read: 9 Any person who, with intent to procure or pass title to a vehicle 10 or motor vehicle which he knows or has reason to believe has been 11 stolen or unlawfully taken, receives, or transfers possession of the same 12 from or to another, or who has in his…”
State v. Ortiz, 2017-NMCA-006, 10 N.M. 764. · cites it 2× “2 Defendant was also charged with receiving or transferring stolen motor vehicles contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-16D-4(A) (2009) and failure to give immediate notice of accident contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-206 (1991).”
State v. Aslin, 2020-NMSC-004, 457 P.3d 249. · cites it 2× “{6} On October 6, 2015, Defendant was arrested on new criminal charges of possessing a stolen vehicle, NMSA 1978, § 30-16D-4 (2009), and altering or changing a motor vehicle engine number or other number, NMSA 1978, § 30-16D-6 (2009).”
State v. Ford, 2019-NMCA-073, 453 P.3d 471. · cites it 2× “{1} Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-16D-4 (2009), and possession of burglary tools, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-16-5 (1963).”
State v. Montoya, 2021-NMCA-006, 482 P.3d 1285. · cites it 2× “{9} Defendant was charged with four crimes: receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-16D-4(A) (2009); possession of burglary tools, contrary to Section 30-16-5; possession of drug paraphernalia, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-25.”
State v. Williams, 2021-NMCA-021, 489 P.3d 949. · cites it 2× “BACKGROUND {2} Defendant pled guilty to residential burglary, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30- 16-3(A) (1971), two counts of receiving stolen property (over $2,500), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-16-11(G) (2006), receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, contrary…”
State v. Chavez, 2022-NMCA-007, 504 P.3d 541. · cites it 2× “lty of attempted robbery in violation of NMSA 1978, Sections 30-28-1(C) (1963) and 30-16-2 (1973); tampering with evidence in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-5(A), (B)(1) (2003); conspiracy to commit tampering with evidence in violation of Sections 30- 28-2(A), (B)(3)…”
State v. Brown, 2010-NMCA-079, 242 P.3d 455. · cites it 4× “See NMSA 1978, § 66-3-505 (1978) (current version at NMSA 1978, Section 30-16D-4 (2009)). 1 Defendant argues that the State failed to show how the vehicle arrived at the scene, a direct link between the vehicle and Defendant, or that he knew or had reason to know that the…”
State v. Bernard, 2015-NMCA-089, 355 P.3d 831. · cites it 50× “History and Plain Meaning of Section 30-16D-4 {7} Prior to 2009, the statute codifying the crime of receiving or transferring stolen vehicles or motor vehicles resided in the Motor Vehicle Code.”
State v. Flores, 430 P.3d 534 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 2× “another person; to wit, a white 2007 Nissan Murano, belonging to [another person], contrary to [ NMSA 1978, Section 30-16D-4 (2009) ]. Veretto confirmed that the name of the defendant on the indictment was his.”
State v. Benally, 448 P.3d 592 (N.M. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2× “1 (2001)); Bernard, 2015-NMCA-089, ¶¶ 18-19 (same with respect to the possession of a stolen vehicle statute, NMSA 1978, § 30-16D-4 (2009)). Section 30-22-16 Is Ambiguous as to the Applicable Unit of Prosecution {16} Here, the State concedes that the plain language of Section…”
State v. Garcia, 2020-NMCA-024, 463 P.3d 483. · cites it 2× “BACKGROUND {2} Defendant was arrested on charges1 of receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle, in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-16D-4 (2009), and went to trial before a jury in September 2016.”
Show all 44 citing cases →
N.M. Stat. § 30-16D-4(A): 24 cases
State v. Bernard, 2015-NMCA-089, 8 N.M. Ct. App. 440. “That language read: 9 Any person who, with intent to procure or pass title to a vehicle 10 or motor vehicle which he knows or has reason to believe has been 11 stolen or unlawfully taken, receives, or transfers possession of the same 12 from or to another, or who has in his…”
State v. Ortiz, 2017-NMCA-006, 10 N.M. 764. “2 Defendant was also charged with receiving or transferring stolen motor vehicles contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-16D-4(A) (2009) and failure to give immediate notice of accident contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-206 (1991).”
State v. Montoya, 2021-NMCA-006, 482 P.3d 1285. “{9} Defendant was charged with four crimes: receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-16D-4(A) (2009); possession of burglary tools, contrary to Section 30-16-5; possession of drug paraphernalia, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-25.”
State v. Williams, 2021-NMCA-021, 489 P.3d 949. “BACKGROUND {2} Defendant pled guilty to residential burglary, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30- 16-3(A) (1971), two counts of receiving stolen property (over $2,500), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-16-11(G) (2006), receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, contrary…”
State v. Chavez, 2022-NMCA-007, 504 P.3d 541. “lty of attempted robbery in violation of NMSA 1978, Sections 30-28-1(C) (1963) and 30-16-2 (1973); tampering with evidence in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-5(A), (B)(1) (2003); conspiracy to commit tampering with evidence in violation of Sections 30- 28-2(A), (B)(3)…”
N.M. Stat. § 30-16D-4(B): 1 case
State v. Juarez-Rocha, No. A-1-CA-40811 (N.M. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2024).
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