N.M. Stat. § 30-24-3 (2026)

witness.
   A. Bribery or intimidation of a witness consists of any person knowingly:

        (1)   giving or offering to give anything of value to any witness or to any person
likely to become a witness in any judicial, administrative, legislative or other official
cause or proceeding to testify falsely or to abstain from testifying to any fact in such
cause or proceeding;

        (2)     intimidating or threatening any witness or person likely to become a
witness in any judicial, administrative, legislative or other official cause or proceeding for
the purpose of preventing such individual from testifying to any fact, to abstain from
testifying or to testify falsely; or

       (3)    intimidating or threatening any person or giving or offering to give anything
of value to any person with the intent to keep the person from truthfully reporting to a
law enforcement officer or any agency of government that is responsible for enforcing
criminal laws information relating to the commission or possible commission of a felony
offense or a violation of conditions of probation, parole or release pending judicial
proceedings.

    B. Retaliation against a witness consists of any person knowingly engaging in
conduct that causes bodily injury to another person or damage to the tangible property
of another person, or threatening to do so, with the intent to retaliate against any person
for any information relating to the commission or possible commission of a felony
offense or a violation of conditions of probation, parole or release pending judicial
proceedings given by a person to a law enforcement officer.

    C. Whoever commits bribery or intimidation of a witness is guilty of a third degree
felony.
    D. Whoever commits retaliation against a witness is guilty of a second degree
felony.

History: 1953 Comp., § 40A-24-3, enacted by Laws 1963, ch. 303, § 24-3; 1987, ch.
227, § 1; 1991, ch. 84, § 1; 1997, ch. 208, § 1.

                                      ANNOTATIONS

Cross references. — For perjury, see 30-25-1 NMSA 1978.

The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "is guilty of a third degree
felony" for "or retaliation against a witness is guilty of a fourth degree felony" at the end
of Subsection C, and added Subsection D.

The 1991 amendment, effective April 2, 1991, redesignated former Subsections A and
C as Paragraphs (1) and (2) of Subsection A and former Subsection D as Subsections
B and C; deleted "and maliciously" following "knowingly" in the introductory phrase of
Subsection A; deleted former Subsection B which read "who is a witness or is likely to
become a witness, receiving or agreeing to receive any bribe or anything of value to
testify falsely or to abstain from testifying to any fact in any cause in any judicial,
administrative, legislative or other official cause or proceeding"; added Paragraph (3) of
Subsection A; substituted "engaging in conduct that causes" for "and maliciously
engaging in any conduct and thereby causing" near the beginning of Subsection B; and
made related stylistic changes.

The 1987 amendment, effective June 19, 1987, rewrote the catchline, which read
"Bribery of witness," substituted "or intimidation of a witness consists of any person
knowingly and maliciously" for "of witness consists of any person" in the introductory
language, deleted "pending or about to be brought" preceding "to testify" in Subsection
A, added "or" at the end of Subsection A, deleted "pending or about to be brought in this
state or" at the end of Subsection B and "pending or about to be brought" following
"proceeding" in Subsection C, inserted Subsection D and substituted "or intimidation of
a witness or retaliation against a witness" for "of witness" in the last undesignated
paragraph.

Constitutionality. — The phrase "possible commission of a felony" was not shown to
be unconstitutionally vague with respect to the defendant, who held a knife to the
victim's throat and committed other violent acts, taunted the victim to call the police, and
told her that he would kill her before they arrived. State v. Perea, 1999-NMCA-138, 128
N.M. 263, 992 P.2d 276, cert. denied, 128 N.M. 149, 990 P.2d 823.

Strict construction. — This section is criminal in nature and must be construed strictly.
State v. Bell, 1967-NMSC-184, 78 N.M. 317, 431 P.2d 50.

Elements of offense. — In a prosecution for intimidation of a witness, the state is not
required to prove that defendant knew that he committed certain acts that under the law
amounted to a felony. State v. Perea, 1999-NMCA-138, 128 N.M. 263, 992 P.2d 276,
cert. denied, 128 N.M. 149, 990 P.2d 823.

Conviction of crime charged not required. — A defendant may be convicted of
bribery or intimidation of witness even if the defendant is acquitted of any crime
associated with the actions relating to "the commission or possible commission of a
felony." State v. Perea, 1999-NMCA-138, 128 N.M. 263, 992 P.2d 276, cert. denied,
128 N.M. 149, 990 P.2d 823.

Nature of offense. — Liability for retaliation against a witness may be imposed even if
the threat is communicated to a person other than the witness, so long as it is
reasonable to expect that the person who receives the threat would inform the victim,
and liability does not depend on whether defendant intended to carry out his threat.
State v. Warsop, 1998-NMCA-033, 124 N.M. 683, 954 P.2d 748, cert. denied, 124 N.M.
589, 953 P.2d 1087.

Juvenile offender. — A juvenile may be convicted of intimidation of a witness even
though he may only be found delinquent in the underlying offense. In re Gabriel M.,
2002-NMCA-047, 132 N.M. 124, 45 P.3d 64, cert. denied, 132 N.M. 193, 46 P.3d 100.

Cause not pending. — Where alleged acts of bribery of witnesses in a homicide case
took place after the death of defendant's wife but long before any final decision was
made concerning the holding of an inquest or the filing of a criminal complaint against
the defendant no proceeding was pending or about to be brought within the meaning of
this section at the time of those alleged acts of bribery. State v. Bell, 1967-NMSC-184,
78 N.M. 317, 431 P.2d 50, superseded by statute, State v. Clements, 2009-NMCA-85,
146 N.M. 745, 215 P.3d 54.

Allegation of knowledge or intent. — In prosecution for intimidating witness,
indictment was not defective for failing to charge that accused knowingly committed the
act or that he did it with corrupt intent. State v. Lazarovich, 1921-NMSC-071, 27 N.M.
282, 200 P. 422.

Jury instructions. — Giving of instruction that allowed the jury to convict defendant of
intimidation of a witness without making the requisite finding that the information related
to "the commission or possible commission of a felony" as opposed to a misdemeanor
was reversible error. State v. Perea, 1999-NMCA-138, 128 N.M. 263, 992 P.2d 276,
cert. denied, 128 N.M. 149, 990 P.2d 823.

Lesser included offenses. — Under the State v. Meadors , 1995-NMSC-073, 121
N.M. 38, 908 P.2d 731, analysis because retaliation against a witness did not subsume
the elements of the crime of intimidation of a witness nor was the defendant provided
notice, defendant was erroneously convicted of intimidation of a witness as an
uncharged lesser included offense of retaliation. State v. McGee, 2002-NMCA-090, 132
N.M. 537, 51 P.3d 1191, cert. denied, 132 N.M. 551, 52 P.3d 411.
Circumstantial evidence. — Because proof of intent is rarely provable by direct
evidence, circumstantial evidence must often be relied upon for its proof. Thus,
circumstantial evidence, like direct evidence, will support a jury's finding of specific
intent. State v. McGee, 2004-NMCA-014, 135 N.M. 73, 84 P.3d 690, cert. denied, 2004-
NMCERT-001, 135 N.M. 160, 85 P.3d 802.

Sufficient evidence. — Where a witness had testified at defendant’s trial which
resulted in defendant’s conviction for three charges and when defendant encountered
the witness after the trial, defendant said "There’s the son of a bitch. I’ll kill that mother
fucker", the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for retaliating
against a witness. State v. Estrada, 2001-NMCA-034, 130 N.M. 358, 24 P.3d 793, cert.
denied, 130 N.M. 459, 26 P.3d 163.

Where defendant had telephone conversations with a murder suspect during which they
agreed that defendant would attend the murder suspect’s trial because defendant’s
presence might intimidate a key witness into not testifying against the murder suspect,
the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to
intimidate a witness. State v. Martinez, 2008-NMCA-019, 143 N.M. 428, 176 P.3d 1160,
cert. denied, 2008-NMCERT-001, 143 N.M. 397, 176 P.3d 1129.

Where a police officer charged defendant, who was a county commissioner, with DWI
and defendant, in defendant’s capacity as chairperson of the county commission, wrote
the officer a letter stating that defendant had received information indicating that the
officer and the officer’s spouse were violating the guidelines of a federal food
commodities program, there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction
for intimidation of a witness. State v. Fernandez, 1994-NMCA-056, 117 N.M. 673, 875
P.2d 1104, cert. denied, 117 N.M. 744, 877 P.2d 44.

Sufficient evidence of intimidation of a witness. — In defendant’s trial for criminal
sexual contact of a minor and intimidation of a witness, where, in response to the
prosecutor’s leading questions, the nine-year-old child testified that defendant told the
child not to tell anyone what happened, that defendant said that if the child told
someone, defendant would take the child far away and leave him there, and that the
child was afraid of defendant, there was a factual basis upon which the jury could
conclude that defendant threatened the child, and the jury could reasonably infer that
defendant intimidated the child with the intent to keep him from reporting the incident to
law enforcement. State v. Luna, 2018-NMCA-025, cert. denied.

Sufficient evidence to identify the defendant. — Where defendant was charged with
use of a telephone to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy or offend, and bribery or
intimidation of a witness, and where, at trial, the victim testified that defendant was her
husband, that they had been married for many years but that they had been separated
since 2010, that in December 2016, defendant appeared at the victim's home and
started an altercation, during which defendant broke the windshield on the victim's car,
that later that same day, defendant left two voicemails on the victim's phone threatening
to kill her for calling the police, that she was familiar with defendant's voice from the
many years that they had been married, that she recognized defendant's voice and cell
phone number from the voicemails, and that the day before a magistrate court trial on a
domestic violence charge related to the broken windshield, defendant called the victim
and threatened to hurt her if she showed up to court, and where the state presented to
the jury recordings of the voicemails, the evidence was sufficient to identify defendant
as the person who left the voicemails and called the victim directly, and was sufficient to
support defendant's convictions. State v. Vigil, 2021-NMCA-024, cert. denied.

Insufficient evidence. — Where the witness told police that the witness suspected that
defendant had burned down one of defendant’s houses and that the witness had
observed defendant attempt to set fire to another of defendant’s houses; two years
later, defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor charge of criminal damage to
property; the witness testified at defendant’s trial, and two days after the trial, the
witness received a threatening letter from defendant, there was insufficient evidence to
support defendant’s conviction for retaliating against a witness because the letter was
sent in retaliation for the witness’ misdemeanor trial testimony, not in retaliation for the
witness’ arson report. Torres v. Lytle, 461 F. 3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2006).

Insufficient evidence of intimidation or threatening of a witness. — Where
defendant was charged with criminal sexual penetration of a minor and intimidation or
threatening of a witness, and where the state relied on testimony elicited from the victim
that defendant's son called her on the telephone after the incident and threatened her,
there was insufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for intimidation or
threatening of a witness, because the state did not present any evidence that defendant
helped or encouraged his son to intimidate or threaten the victim, nor did it establish
that defendant requested his son place the call to the victim or was even aware that his
son had called the victim. State v. Garcia, 2019-NMCA-056, cert. denied.

Sufficient evidence of bribery of a witness. — Where defendant was charged with
criminal sexual penetration of a minor and bribery of a witness, and where the state
relied on testimony elicited from the victim that after the assault, defendant threw her
pants at her, instructed her to put them on, and stated, "remember, if you say anything,
I'll get you again," there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant intended to keep the victim from truthfully reporting to a law enforcement
officer or any agency of governing information relating to the commission of the felony
of criminal sexual penetration. State v. Garcia, 2019-NMCA-056, cert. denied.

Evidence sufficient. — Where defendant assaulted defendant’s spouse; defendant
was aware of and afraid that defendant might go to jail because of the assault; and
before the police arrived to investigate the incident, defendant told the spouse that
defendant would kill the spouse and the spouse’s children if the spouse said anything,
there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for intimidation. State v.
Clements, 2009-NMCA-085,146 N.M. 745, 215 P.3d 54, cert. denied, 2009-NMCERT-
007, 147 N.M. 362, 223 P.3d 359.
Testimony from witness that the defendant ordered him to "keep his mouth shut" and
offered to buy the witness an airline ticket to get out of town was sufficient for a rational
jury to find each element of the crime of bribery of a witness beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, 128 N.M. 192, 991 P.2d 477.

Defendant's conviction for intimidation of a witness was time-barred. — Where
defendant was charged with numerous counts of criminal sexual penetration of a minor
(CSPM), one count of attempt to commit CSPM, and one count of intimidation of a
witness, a third-degree felony, and where defendant's intimidation of the victim occurred
in 2008 and defendant was not charged or indicted until 2016, defendant's conviction for
intimidation of a witness was time-barred because the defendant's prosecution for that
charge exceeded the applicable limitations period of five years, pursuant to 30-1-8(B)
NMSA 1978, between when the crime was committed in August 2008 and when the
information was filed in March 2016. State v. Costillo, 2020-NMCA-051.

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d Obstructing Justice §§
46, 47, 64 to 66.

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes imposing criminal penalties for
influencing, intimidating, or tampering with witness, 8 A.L.R.4th 769.

Admonitions against perjury or threats to prosecute potential defense witness, inducing
refusal to testify, as prejudicial error, 88 A.L.R.4th 388.

67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice §§ 16 to 18.