N.M. Stat. § 31-20-8 (2026)

revocation of order.
   Whenever the period of suspension expires without revocation of the order, the
defendant is relieved of any obligations imposed on him by the order of the court and
has satisfied his criminal liability for the crime. He shall thereupon be entitled to a
certificate from the court so reciting such facts, and upon presenting the same to the
governor, the defendant may, in the discretion of the governor, be granted a pardon or a
certificate restoring such person to full rights of citizenship.

History: 1953 Comp., § 40A-29-21, enacted by Laws 1963, ch. 303, § 29-21; and
recompiled as 1953 Comp., § 40A-29-44, by Laws 1977, ch. 216, § 16.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

Lack of jurisdiction to deny credit for time served on probation. — Where
defendant, who was convicted of DWI, violated probation and the district court did not
revoke defendant’s probation before the probationary period expired, the court lost
jurisdiction under Section 31-20-8 NMSA 1978 to deny defendant credit for time served
on probation as provided in Subsection S of Section 66-8-102 NMSA 1978. State v.
Ordunez, 2010-NMCA-095, 148 N.M. 620, 241 P.3d 621, cert. granted, 2010-NMCERT-
010, 49 N.M. 64, 243 P.3d 1146, aff'd by 2012-NMSC-024.

Order of unsatisfactory completion not authorized. — A trial court is without
jurisdiction to enter an order of unsatisfactory completion after the probation period
ends. State v. Lara, 2000-NMCA-073, 129 N.M. 391, 9 P.3d 74.

A trial court is not deprived of jurisdiction to revoke probation if a defendant’s
original probationary period expires while the defendant is an absconder. —
Where defendant was convicted of battery in magistrate court, received a suspended
sentence, was placed on probation in lieu of serving a prison sentence, violated the
terms of his probation and could not be located to answer for this violation until after the
period of his suspended sentence expired, the magistrate court had the authority to
issue its order revoking defendant’s original probationary sentence and imposing a new
sentence, because defendant’s probationary period did not run from the date the
magistrate court issued the bench warrant to the date of defendant’s arrest. The phrase
“whenever the period of suspension expires” cannot be read to include those instances
when a probationary period expires while a defendant has absconded after allegedly
violating probation. State v. Begay, 2017-NMSC-009, rev’g 2016-NMCA-039, 368 P.3d
1246.

Difference between suspension and deferral is that suspension involves a sentence
imposed while deferral does not. With suspension, the sentence having been imposed,
the court cannot later alter the sentence upwards. With deferral, no sentence having
been imposed, the court may give any sentence it could originally have given. State v.
Kenneman, 1982-NMCA-145, 98 N.M. 794, 653 P.2d 170, cert. denied, 99 N.M. 47, 653
P.2d 878.

Defendant’s probation could not be revoked after it had expired. — Where, in
2004, defendant pleaded guilty to a fourth-degree aggravated DWI; in 2007, defendant
was arrested for another DWI in violation of the 2004 probation conditions; on
September 7, 2007, the State filed a petition to revoke defendant probation; the district
court scheduled a probation revocation hearing for October 25, 2007 and later reset the
hearing for December 20, 2007; and the applicable statutory provisions of Section 66-8-
102 NMSA 1978 governing sentence credit for time served on probation were those in
effect in 2004, which gave defendant full credit for time served on probation, not those
in effect in 2007, which gave defendant no credit for time served on probation; and
under the 2004 version of the statute, defendant’s probation was scheduled to expire on
October 19, 2007, defendant’s probation had expired before the probation revocation
hearing and the district court did not have authority to revoke defendant’s probation.
State v. Ordunez, 2012-NMSC-024, 283 P.3d 282.

The district court is divested of jurisdiction when a probation term expires, and
the expiration of jurisdiction cannot be waived. — This section divests the district
court of jurisdiction to revoke a defendant’s probation when a probation term expires,
and this loss of jurisdiction is unaffected by a defendant’s waiver of the time limits within
which a revocation hearing must be held after a violation of probation is alleged, and
staying revocation proceedings to determine the defendant’s competency likewise does
not toll the district court’s loss of jurisdiction. State v. Godkin, 2015-NMCA-114.

Where defendant appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
following remand from a prior appeal in which the New Mexico court of appeals
remanded the case for a competency evaluation and for a new revocation hearing, the
district court was without jurisdiction to revoke defendant’s probation when the probation
period expired prior to the revocation hearing, and the stay of proceedings to determine
competency likewise did not toll defendant’s probation. State v. Godkin, 2015-NMCA-
114.

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — Right to assistance of counsel at
proceedings to revoke probation, 44 A.L.R.3d 306.

Loss of jurisdiction by delay in imposing sentence, 98 A.L.R.3d 605.
Pardoned or expunged conviction as "prior offense" under state statute or regulation
enhancing punishment for subsequent conviction, 97 A.L.R.5th 293.