N.M. Stat. § 40-13-6 (2026)

A. An order of protection granted under the Family Violence Protection Act shall be
filed with the clerk of the court, and a copy shall be sent by the clerk to the local law
enforcement agency. The order shall be personally served upon the restrained party,
unless the restrained party or the restrained party's attorney was present at the time the
order was issued. The order shall be filed and served without cost to the protected
party.

   B. A local law enforcement agency receiving an order of protection from the clerk of
the court that was issued under the Family Violence Protection Act shall have the order
entered in the national crime information center's order of protection file within seventy-
two hours of receipt. This does not include temporary orders of protection entered
pursuant to the provisions of Section 40-13-4 NMSA 1978.

    C. An order of protection granted by the court involving custody or support shall be
effective for a fixed period of time not to exceed six months. The order may be extended
for good cause upon motion of the protected party for an additional period of time not to
exceed six months. Injunctive orders shall continue until modified or rescinded upon
motion by either party or until the court approves a subsequent consent agreement
entered into by the parties.

    D. A peace officer may arrest without a warrant and take into custody a restrained
party whom the peace officer has probable cause to believe has violated an order of
protection that is issued pursuant to the Family Violence Protection Act or entitled to full
faith and credit.
   E. A restrained party convicted of violating an order of protection granted by a court
under the Family Violence Protection Act is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be
sentenced in accordance with Section 31-19-1 NMSA 1978. Upon a second or
subsequent conviction, an offender shall be sentenced to a jail term of not less than
seventy-two consecutive hours that shall not be suspended, deferred or taken under
advisement.

    F. In addition to any other punishment provided in the Family Violence Protection
Act, the court shall order a person convicted to make full restitution to the party injured
by the violation of an order of protection and shall order the person convicted to
participate in and complete a program of professional counseling, at the person's own
expense, if possible.

    G. In addition to charging the person with violating an order of protection, a peace
officer shall file all other possible criminal charges arising from an incident of domestic
abuse when probable cause exists.

   H. The remedies provided in the Family Violence Protection Act are in addition to
any other civil or criminal remedy available to the protected party or the state.

History: Laws 1987, ch. 286, § 6; 1993, ch. 109, § 4; 1995, ch. 176, § 3; 1997, ch. 59, §
1; 1999, ch. 48, § 1; 2007, ch. 81, § 1; 2008, ch. 40, § 8; 2013, ch. 47, § 10.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, deleted provisions that provided for the
enforcement of orders of protection issued by tribal courts and courts of other states; in
Subsection D, after "A peace officer", deleted "shall" and added "may"; and deleted
former Subsection E, which required state courts to give full faith and credit to protection
orders issued by tribal courts and courts in other states, unless the protection order was
not based on a pleading seeking a protection order or findings that each party was
entitled to a protection order.

The 2008 amendment, effective July 1, 2008, changed "petitioner" to "protected party"
and "respondent" to "restrained party".

The 2007 amendment, effective June 15, 2007, adds a new Subsection B to require
local law enforcement agencies to enter orders of protection in the national crime
information center’s order of protection file within 72 hours of receipt.

The 1999 amendment, effective July 1, 1999, in Subsection D added "and orders of
protection issued by the courts and other states" at the end of the first sentence, added
the second sentence, and added Paragraphs (1) and (2).

The 1997 amendment, effective June 20, 1997, inserted "filed and" preceding "served"
in the last sentence of Subsection A.
The 1995 amendment, effective July 1, 1995, deleted the first part of the last sentence
of Subsection A which read, "If the petitioner has been found by the court to be unable
to pay court costs", and substituted "abuse" for "violence" in Subsection G.

The 1993 amendment, effective June 18, 1993, in Subsection A, substituted "local law
enforcement agency" for "to the state police or to the municipal police of the city in
which the court is located" in the first sentence; in Subsection B, in the first sentence,
inserted "involving custody or support" and substituted "six" for "three", substituted "six"
for "three" in the second sentence, and added the third sentence; added Subsections D
through G and redesignated former Subsection D as present Subsection H.

Knowledge is an element of the crime of violating an order of protection which
requires the state to prove knowledge of the protective order and the presence of the
protected person within the protected zone. State v. Ramos, 2013-NMSC-031.

Where defendant was tried for violating a protection order; the district court refused
defendant’s jury instruction that required the jury to find that defendant "knowingly"
violated the protection order; and the district court granted defendant’s alternative
request to give the jury the general criminal intent instruction consistent with UJI 14-141
NMRA, the general criminal intent instruction was insufficient because knowledge and
intent are separate, not synonymous, elements and the district court erred in failing to
instruct the jury of a knowing violation. State v. Ramos, 2013-NMSC-031.

Sufficient evidence of knowledge of order of protection. — Where defendant was
arrested for violating an order of protection against him held by his ex-wife, and where
defendant argued that he never receive the requisite notice of the protective order and
therefore insufficient evidence of knowledge existed, there was sufficient evidence to
establish that defendant knew of and knowingly violated the order of protection based
on evidence that the protective order was mailed to defendant, that defendant fled the
vicinity of the victim's home upon seeing an officer's car, that defendant tried to hide in a
backyard despite police yelling commands for him to come out, and an unsolicited
comment that defendant made to police officers that he never received the order of
protection, suggesting an awareness of the protective order. State v. Haagenson,
2026-NMCA-052, cert. denied.

Jury instruction that omitted notice provisions did not confuse or mislead the
jury. — Where defendant was convicted of violating an order of protection against him
held by his ex-wife, and where defendant argued that the jury instruction at issue was
confusing and misleading for the jury because it did not accurately convey the law when
it omitted certain notice provisions set forth in 40-13-6(A) NMSA 1978, there was no
error in instructing the jury, because knowledge, not notice, is the element of the crime
of violating an order of protection. When at least one notice provision set forth in 40-13-
6(A) NMSA 1978 is satisfied, knowledge is imputed as a matter of law, but the two
notice provisions in the statute are not the only ways to prove knowledge. State v.
Haagenson, 2026-NMCA-052, cert. denied.
Double jeopardy. — Where defendant had been convicted of contempt, a
misdemeanor, for violating a domestic violence protective order and sentenced to jail
time, double jeopardy did not bar prosecution of defendant for the offenses of stalking
and harassment stemming from the same conduct that gave rise to the contempt
adjudication. State v. Gonzales, 1997-NMCA-039, 123 N.M. 337, 940 P.2d 185.

Because the crimes of kidnapping and attempted criminal sexual penetration contain
elements not contained in the order prohibiting domestic violence (OPDV) obtained by
victim against defendant, defendant's double jeopardy rights were not violated by his
conviction for those crimes following his conviction for contempt for violating the OPDV.
State v. Powers, 1998-NMCA-133, 126 N.M. 114, 967 P.2d 454, cert. denied, 127 N.M.
392, 981 P.2d 1210.

Where the order of protection clearly and unambiguously ordered defendant not to
"contact" victim, each and every time defendant called victim on two separate dates in
the same year, he made a "contact" with victim in violation of the order of protection.
Because the legislature has made its intent clear that each violation will be punished
separately, defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy in sentencing was not
violated. State v. McGee, 2004-NMCA-014, 135 N.M. 73, 84 P.3d 690, cert denied,
2004-NMCERT-001 135 N.M. 160, 85 P.3d 802.

Intent of act. — The Family Violence Protection Act clearly reflects its intent that each
violation shall be subject to a separate prosecution and punishment. State v. McGee,
2004-NMCA-014, 135 N.M. 73, 84 P.3d 690, cert denied, 2004-NMCERT-001 135 N.M.
160, 85 P.3d 802.

Law reviews. — For article, "The New Mexico Law Review Presents a Symposium on
Enforcing the Judgments of Tribal Courts: A Different Kind of Symmetry," see 34 N.M.L.
Rev. 263 (2004).