New Mexico Statutes

N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7 (2026)

Proceedings; spousal support; support of children; division

✓ current as of May 2026
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of property.
    A. In any proceeding for the dissolution of marriage, division of property, disposition
of children or spousal support, the court may make and enforce by attachment or
otherwise an order to restrain the use or disposition of the property of either party or for
the control of the children or to provide for the support of either party during the
pendency of the proceeding, as in its discretion may seem just and proper. The court
may make an order, relative to the expenses of the proceeding, as will ensure either
party an efficient preparation and presentation of his case.

   B. On final hearing, the court:

        (1)    may allow either party such a reasonable portion of the spouse's property
or such a reasonable sum of money to be paid by either spouse either in a single sum
or in installments, as spousal support as under the circumstances of the case may
seem just and proper, including a court award of:

          (a) rehabilitative spousal support that provides the receiving spouse with
education, training, work experience or other forms of rehabilitation that increases the
receiving spouse's ability to earn income and become self-supporting. The court may
include a specific rehabilitation plan with its award of rehabilitative spousal support and
may condition continuation of the support upon compliance with that plan;

           (b) transitional spousal support to supplement the income of the receiving
spouse for a limited period of time; provided that the period shall be clearly stated in the
court's final order;

          (c) spousal support for an indefinite duration;
         (d) a single sum to be paid in one or more installments that specifies definite
amounts, subject only to the death of the receiving spouse; or

         (e) a single sum to be paid in one or more installments that specifies definite
amounts, not subject to any contingencies, including the death of the receiving spouse;

       (2)      may:

          (a) modify and change any order in respect to spousal support awarded
pursuant to the provisions of Subparagraph (a), (b) or (c) of Paragraph (1) of this
subsection whenever the circumstances render such change proper; or

          (b) designate spousal support awarded pursuant to the provisions of
Subparagraph (a) or (b) of Paragraph (1) of this subsection as nonmodifiable with
respect to the amount or duration of the support payments;

       (3)     may set apart out of the property or income of the respective parties such
portion for the maintenance and education of:

             (a) their unemancipated minor children as may seem just and proper; or

         (b) their children until the children's graduation from high school if the children
are emancipated only by age, are under nineteen and are attending high school; and

       (4)    may make such an order for the guardianship, care, custody, maintenance
and education of the minor children, or with reference to the control of the property of
the respective parties to the proceeding, or with reference to the control of the property
decreed or fund created by the court for the maintenance and education of the minor
children, as may seem just and proper.

    C. The court may order and enforce the payment of support for the maintenance
and education after high school of emancipated children of the marriage pursuant to a
written agreement between the parties.

    D. An award of spousal support made pursuant to the provisions of Subparagraph
(a), (b), (c) or (d) of Paragraph (1) of Subsection B of this section shall terminate upon
the death of the receiving spouse, unless the court order of spousal support provides
otherwise.

   E. When making determinations concerning spousal support to be awarded
pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph (1) or (2) of Subsection B of this section, the
court shall consider:

      (1)       the age and health of and the means of support for the respective
spouses;
      (2)       the current and future earnings and the earning capacity of the respective
spouses;

      (3)   the good-faith efforts of the respective spouses to maintain employment or
to become self-supporting;

       (4)      the reasonable needs of the respective spouses, including:

             (a) the standard of living of the respective spouses during the term of the
marriage;

             (b) the maintenance of medical insurance for the respective spouses; and

           (c) the appropriateness of life insurance, including its availability and cost,
insuring the life of the person who is to pay support to secure the payments, with any
life insurance proceeds paid on the death of the paying spouse to be in lieu of further
support;

       (5)      the duration of the marriage;

      (6)       the amount of the property awarded or confirmed to the respective
spouses;

       (7)    the type and nature of the respective spouses' assets; provided that
potential proceeds from the sale of property by either spouse shall not be considered by
the court, unless required by exceptional circumstances and the need to be fair to the
parties;

       (8)      the type and nature of the respective spouses' liabilities;

       (9)      income produced by property owned by the respective spouses; and

       (10) agreements entered into by the spouses in contemplation of the
dissolution of marriage or legal separation.

   F. The court shall retain jurisdiction over proceedings involving periodic spousal
support payments when the parties have been married for twenty years or more prior to
the dissolution of the marriage, unless the court order or decree specifically provides
that no spousal support shall be awarded.

    G. The court may modify and change any order or agreement merged into an order
in respect to the guardianship, care, custody, maintenance or education of the children
whenever circumstances render such change proper. The district court shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of all matters pertaining to the guardianship, care, custody,
maintenance and education of the children until the parents' obligation of support for
their children terminates. The district court shall also have exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction with reference to the property decreed or funds created for the children's
maintenance and education.

History: Laws 1901, ch. 62, § 27; Code 1915, § 2778; C.S. 1929, § 68-506; 1941
Comp., § 25-706; Laws 1943, ch. 46, § 1; 1953 Comp., § 22-7-6; Laws 1973, ch. 319, §
7; 1993, ch. 144, § 1; 1997, ch. 56, § 1.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

Cross references. — For provisions pertaining to a supervised visitation program, see
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 145 cases (9 in the last 5 years), 1979–2025 · leading case: Garcia v. Jeantette, 82 P.3d 947 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003).
Garcia v. Jeantette, 82 P.3d 947 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 33× “We hold that Section 40-4-7 does not authorize an award of attorney fees under these circumstances.”
Pruyn v. LAM, 216 P.3d 804 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 53× “In the findings and conclusions, the court ruled only on the statutory basis for modification pursuant to Section 40-4-7(B). In the conclusions of law, the court specifically stated, “The [spousal support] award contained in the [MSA] does not qualify as a single[-]sum award and…”
Galassi v. Galassi, 203 P.3d 161 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 37× “] Section 40-4-7(B). {9} Apart from changing nomenclature (“spousal support” for “alimony”) Subsection (B)(1) remained essentially unchanged.”
Edens v. Edens, 109 P.3d 295 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 16× “The referenced sections permit awards of rehabilitative spousal support, § 40-4-7(B)(l)(a), transitional support, § 40-4-7(B)(l)(b), and support for an indefinite duration, § 40-4-7(B)(1)(c). But the statute’s provision permitting modification does not apply to lump sum awards…”
Rhinehart v. Nowlin, 805 P.2d 88 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 18× “NMSA 1978, Section 40-10-3(B) (Repl.Pamp.1985) differentiates custody and visitation by including visitation rights within custody determinations.”
Ottino v. Ottino, 21 P.3d 37 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 11× “The central question concerns the effect NMSA 1978, § 40-4-7 (1901, as amended through 1993) has on the district court's original jurisdiction.”
Weddington v. Weddington, 86 P.3d 623 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 14× “3d 37 (“We are bound to apply the statute in effect at the time of the divoi’ce, even though [Section 40-4-7] was amended in 1997 to allow distx'ict courts to order and enforce the payment of support for the maintenance and education after high school of emancipated children of…”
D'Avignon v. Graham, 823 P.2d 929 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 18× “Spingola ; see also NMSA 1978, § 40-4-7 (Repl.Pamp. 1989). This discretion includes the statutory authority to either reduce the amount of child support obligation or to order a stay of execution of a lien based on child support arrearages.”
Muse v. Muse, 200 P.3d 104 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 4× “He also contends that the court unlawfully delegated to the special master final decision-making authority in awarding fees and thereby engaged in an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority.”
Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 12× “We reverse the decision in favor of wife on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.”
Michaluk v. Burke, 735 P.2d 1176 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 14× “1986) provides the trial court the option of awarding “a reasonable sum of money * * * either in a single sum, or in installments, as alimony, as under the circumstances of the case may seem just and proper[.”
Rhoades v. Rhoades, 85 P.3d 246 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 16× “” Thus, due to a misunderstanding of the effective date of the controlling language of the statute, the court did not rule based on Section 40-4-7. Rather, the court invoked “its equity powers” under Rule 1-060B(5) and (6), and “grant[ed] relief from judgment with respect to…”
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(1)(b): 1 case
Esparza v. Esparza (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(A): 46 cases
Garcia v. Jeantette, 82 P.3d 947 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003). “We hold that Section 40-4-7 does not authorize an award of attorney fees under these circumstances.”
Muse v. Muse, 200 P.3d 104 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). “He also contends that the court unlawfully delegated to the special master final decision-making authority in awarding fees and thereby engaged in an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority.”
Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). “We reverse the decision in favor of wife on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.”
Monsanto v. Monsanto, 894 P.2d 1034 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).
Bursum v. Bursum, 102 P.3d 651 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(B): 12 cases
Chatterjee v. King, 2011 NMCA 12 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010).
Rhinehart v. Nowlin, 805 P.2d 88 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990). “NMSA 1978, Section 40-10-3(B) (Repl.Pamp.1985) differentiates custody and visitation by including visitation rights within custody determinations.”
Galassi v. Galassi, 203 P.3d 161 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). “] Section 40-4-7(B). {9} Apart from changing nomenclature (“spousal support” for “alimony”) Subsection (B)(1) remained essentially unchanged.”
DeTevis v. Aragon, 727 P.2d 558 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
Pruyn v. LAM, 216 P.3d 804 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). “In the findings and conclusions, the court ruled only on the statutory basis for modification pursuant to Section 40-4-7(B). In the conclusions of law, the court specifically stated, “The [spousal support] award contained in the [MSA] does not qualify as a single[-]sum award and…”
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(B)(1): 9 cases
Hurley v. Hurley, 615 P.2d 256 (N.M. 1980).
Michaluk v. Burke, 735 P.2d 1176 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). “1986) provides the trial court the option of awarding “a reasonable sum of money * * * either in a single sum, or in installments, as alimony, as under the circumstances of the case may seem just and proper[.”
Clark v. Clark, 2014 NMCA 30 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
Galassi v. Galassi, 203 P.3d 161 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). “] Section 40-4-7(B). {9} Apart from changing nomenclature (“spousal support” for “alimony”) Subsection (B)(1) remained essentially unchanged.”
Sheets v. Sheets, 744 P.2d 924 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(B)(1)(a): 4 cases
Alverson v. Harris, 935 P.2d 1165 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
Chase v. Chase (N.M. Ct. App. 2021).
Baca v. Baca (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
Esparza v. Esparza (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(B)(1)(b): 1 case
Galassi v. Galassi, 203 P.3d 161 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). “] Section 40-4-7(B). {9} Apart from changing nomenclature (“spousal support” for “alimony”) Subsection (B)(1) remained essentially unchanged.”
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(B)(1)(c): 2 cases
Edens v. Edens, 109 P.3d 295 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005). “The referenced sections permit awards of rehabilitative spousal support, § 40-4-7(B)(l)(a), transitional support, § 40-4-7(B)(l)(b), and support for an indefinite duration, § 40-4-7(B)(1)(c). But the statute’s provision permitting modification does not apply to lump sum awards…”
Feinberg v.Feinberg (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(B)(1)(d): 3 cases
Edens v. Edens, 109 P.3d 295 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005). “The referenced sections permit awards of rehabilitative spousal support, § 40-4-7(B)(l)(a), transitional support, § 40-4-7(B)(l)(b), and support for an indefinite duration, § 40-4-7(B)(1)(c). But the statute’s provision permitting modification does not apply to lump sum awards…”
Pruyn v. LAM, 216 P.3d 804 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). “In the findings and conclusions, the court ruled only on the statutory basis for modification pursuant to Section 40-4-7(B). In the conclusions of law, the court specifically stated, “The [spousal support] award contained in the [MSA] does not qualify as a single[-]sum award and…”
Chase v. Chase (N.M. Ct. App. 2021).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(B)(1)(e): 1 case
Chase v. Chase (N.M. Ct. App. 2021).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(B)(2): 11 cases
Michaluk v. Burke, 735 P.2d 1176 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). “1986) provides the trial court the option of awarding “a reasonable sum of money * * * either in a single sum, or in installments, as alimony, as under the circumstances of the case may seem just and proper[.”
Cherpelis v. Cherpelis, 914 P.2d 637 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
Ruggles v. Ruggles, 860 P.2d 182 (N.M. 1993).
Deeds v. Deeds, 848 P.2d 1119 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
Hall v. Hall, 838 P.2d 995 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(B)(2)(a): 8 cases
Pruyn v. LAM, 216 P.3d 804 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). “In the findings and conclusions, the court ruled only on the statutory basis for modification pursuant to Section 40-4-7(B). In the conclusions of law, the court specifically stated, “The [spousal support] award contained in the [MSA] does not qualify as a single[-]sum award and…”
Edens v. Edens, 109 P.3d 295 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005). “The referenced sections permit awards of rehabilitative spousal support, § 40-4-7(B)(l)(a), transitional support, § 40-4-7(B)(l)(b), and support for an indefinite duration, § 40-4-7(B)(1)(c). But the statute’s provision permitting modification does not apply to lump sum awards…”
Galassi v. Galassi, 203 P.3d 161 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). “] Section 40-4-7(B). {9} Apart from changing nomenclature (“spousal support” for “alimony”) Subsection (B)(1) remained essentially unchanged.”
Martinez v. Martinez (N.M. Ct. App. 2016).
E Fox v. R Radwanski (N.M. Ct. App. 2009).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(B)(2)(b): 1 case
Galassi v. Galassi, 203 P.3d 161 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). “] Section 40-4-7(B). {9} Apart from changing nomenclature (“spousal support” for “alimony”) Subsection (B)(1) remained essentially unchanged.”
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(B)(3): 4 cases
D'Avignon v. Graham, 823 P.2d 929 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). “Spingola ; see also NMSA 1978, § 40-4-7 (Repl.Pamp. 1989). This discretion includes the statutory authority to either reduce the amount of child support obligation or to order a stay of execution of a lien based on child support arrearages.”
Blake v. Blake, 695 P.2d 838 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).
Henderson v. Lekvold, 621 P.2d 505 (N.M. 1980).
Diamond v. Diamond, 245 P.3d 578 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(B)(3)(b): 3 cases
Marquez v. Copeland (N.M. Ct. App. 2010).
State of New Mexico v. Lachey (N.M. Ct. App. 2018).
N.M. Hum. Servs. Dep't v. Huffman (N.M. Ct. App. 2021).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(B)(4): 4 cases
Vest v. State Ex Rel. New Mexico Human Servs. Dep't, 866 P.2d 1175 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
Tue Thi Tran v. Bennett, 411 P.3d 345 (N.M. 2018).
Matter of Guardianship Petition of Lupe C., 812 P.2d 365 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
Bravo v. Bravo (N.M. Ct. App. 2021).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(B)(l): 9 cases
Hertz v. Hertz, 657 P.2d 1169 (N.M. 1983).
Michaluk v. Burke, 735 P.2d 1176 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). “1986) provides the trial court the option of awarding “a reasonable sum of money * * * either in a single sum, or in installments, as alimony, as under the circumstances of the case may seem just and proper[.”
Dydek v. Dydek, 2012 NMCA 88 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012).
Foutz v. Foutz, 798 P.2d 592 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).
Bustos v. Bustos, 673 P.2d 1289 (N.M. 1983).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(B)(l)(a): 3 cases
Edens v. Edens, 109 P.3d 295 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005). “The referenced sections permit awards of rehabilitative spousal support, § 40-4-7(B)(l)(a), transitional support, § 40-4-7(B)(l)(b), and support for an indefinite duration, § 40-4-7(B)(1)(c). But the statute’s provision permitting modification does not apply to lump sum awards…”
Galassi v. Galassi, 203 P.3d 161 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). “] Section 40-4-7(B). {9} Apart from changing nomenclature (“spousal support” for “alimony”) Subsection (B)(1) remained essentially unchanged.”
Pruyn v. LAM, 216 P.3d 804 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). “In the findings and conclusions, the court ruled only on the statutory basis for modification pursuant to Section 40-4-7(B). In the conclusions of law, the court specifically stated, “The [spousal support] award contained in the [MSA] does not qualify as a single[-]sum award and…”
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(B)(l)(b): 1 case
Edens v. Edens, 109 P.3d 295 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005). “The referenced sections permit awards of rehabilitative spousal support, § 40-4-7(B)(l)(a), transitional support, § 40-4-7(B)(l)(b), and support for an indefinite duration, § 40-4-7(B)(1)(c). But the statute’s provision permitting modification does not apply to lump sum awards…”
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(B)(l)(d): 3 cases
Pruyn v. LAM, 216 P.3d 804 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). “In the findings and conclusions, the court ruled only on the statutory basis for modification pursuant to Section 40-4-7(B). In the conclusions of law, the court specifically stated, “The [spousal support] award contained in the [MSA] does not qualify as a single[-]sum award and…”
Galassi v. Galassi, 203 P.3d 161 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). “] Section 40-4-7(B). {9} Apart from changing nomenclature (“spousal support” for “alimony”) Subsection (B)(1) remained essentially unchanged.”
Edens v. Edens, 109 P.3d 295 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005). “The referenced sections permit awards of rehabilitative spousal support, § 40-4-7(B)(l)(a), transitional support, § 40-4-7(B)(l)(b), and support for an indefinite duration, § 40-4-7(B)(1)(c). But the statute’s provision permitting modification does not apply to lump sum awards…”
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(B)(l)(e): 2 cases
Edens v. Edens, 109 P.3d 295 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005). “The referenced sections permit awards of rehabilitative spousal support, § 40-4-7(B)(l)(a), transitional support, § 40-4-7(B)(l)(b), and support for an indefinite duration, § 40-4-7(B)(1)(c). But the statute’s provision permitting modification does not apply to lump sum awards…”
Pruyn v. LAM, 216 P.3d 804 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). “In the findings and conclusions, the court ruled only on the statutory basis for modification pursuant to Section 40-4-7(B). In the conclusions of law, the court specifically stated, “The [spousal support] award contained in the [MSA] does not qualify as a single[-]sum award and…”
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(C): 16 cases
Weddington v. Weddington, 86 P.3d 623 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004). “3d 37 (“We are bound to apply the statute in effect at the time of the divoi’ce, even though [Section 40-4-7] was amended in 1997 to allow distx'ict courts to order and enforce the payment of support for the maintenance and education after high school of emancipated children of…”
Dillard v. Dillard, 727 P.2d 71 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
Ottino v. Ottino, 21 P.3d 37 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001). “The central question concerns the effect NMSA 1978, § 40-4-7 (1901, as amended through 1993) has on the district court's original jurisdiction.”
Jeantete v. Jeantete, 806 P.2d 66 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).
Matter of Adoption of John Doe, 648 P.2d 798 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(D): 1 case
Martinez v. Martinez, 1997 NMCA 125 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(E): 12 cases
Rhoades v. Rhoades, 85 P.3d 246 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003). “” Thus, due to a misunderstanding of the effective date of the controlling language of the statute, the court did not rule based on Section 40-4-7. Rather, the court invoked “its equity powers” under Rule 1-060B(5) and (6), and “grant[ed] relief from judgment with respect to…”
Comstock v. Rodriguez (In Re Rodriguez), 465 B.R. 882 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2012).
Chase v. Chase (N.M. Ct. App. 2021).
E Fox v. R Radwanski (N.M. Ct. App. 2009).
Argant v. Argant (N.M. Ct. App. 2025).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(E)(1): 1 case
Baca v. Baca (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(E)(2): 6 cases
Clark v. Clark, 2014 NMCA 30 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
Clark v. Clark, 2014 NMCA 030 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
Clark v. Clark (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
Martinez v. Martinez, 2017 NMCA 32 (N.M. Ct. App. 2016).
Martinez v. Martinez (N.M. Ct. App. 2016).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(E)(3): 1 case
Feinberg v.Feinberg (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(E)(4): 1 case
Argant v. Argant (N.M. Ct. App. 2025).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(E)(4)(a): 1 case
Trinosky v. Johnstone (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(E)(6): 1 case
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(F): 9 cases
Edens v. Edens, 109 P.3d 295 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005). “The referenced sections permit awards of rehabilitative spousal support, § 40-4-7(B)(l)(a), transitional support, § 40-4-7(B)(l)(b), and support for an indefinite duration, § 40-4-7(B)(1)(c). But the statute’s provision permitting modification does not apply to lump sum awards…”
Ottino v. Ottino, 21 P.3d 37 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001). “The central question concerns the effect NMSA 1978, § 40-4-7 (1901, as amended through 1993) has on the district court's original jurisdiction.”
Galassi v. Galassi, 203 P.3d 161 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). “] Section 40-4-7(B). {9} Apart from changing nomenclature (“spousal support” for “alimony”) Subsection (B)(1) remained essentially unchanged.”
Rhoades v. Rhoades, 85 P.3d 246 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003). “” Thus, due to a misunderstanding of the effective date of the controlling language of the statute, the court did not rule based on Section 40-4-7. Rather, the court invoked “its equity powers” under Rule 1-060B(5) and (6), and “grant[ed] relief from judgment with respect to…”
Chase v. Chase (N.M. Ct. App. 2021).
N.M. Stat. § 40-4-7(G): 11 cases
Hopkins v. Wollaber, 458 P.3d 583 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018).
Dugie v. Cameron, 971 P.2d 390 (N.M. 1998).
Diamond v. Diamond, 2011 NMCA 2 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010).
Rochester v. Rochester, 1998 NMCA 100 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998).
Diamond v. Diamond, 245 P.3d 578 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.