New Mexico Statutes

N.M. Stat. § 56-10-18 (2026)

Transfer or obligation voidable as to present or future

✓ current as of May 2026
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creditor. A. A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:

(1) with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or

(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor:

(a) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or

(b) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor's ability to pay as they became due.

B. In determining actual intent under Paragraph (1) of Subsection A of this section, consideration may be given, among other factors, to whether:

(1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;

(2) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer;

(3) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;

(4) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor has been sued or threatened with suit;

(5) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;

(6) the debtor absconded;

(7) the debtor removed or concealed assets; (8) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;

(9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;

(10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; and

(11) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.

C. A creditor making a claim for relief under Subsection A of this section has the burden of proving the elements of the claim for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.

History: Laws 1989, ch. 382, § 5; 2015, ch. 54, § 13.

ANNOTATIONS

The 2015 amendment, effective January 1, 2016, changed "fraudulent" transfers to "voidable" transfers, as used in the Voidable Transactions Act; in the catchline, changed "Transfers fraudulent as to present and future creditors" to "Transfer or obligation voidable as to present or future creditor"; in Subsection A, after "debtor is", deleted "fraudulent" and added "voidable"; in Subsection A, Paragraph (2)(b), after "that", deleted "he" and added "the debtor", and after "beyond", deleted "his" and added "the debtor’s"; and added Subsection C.

Burden of proof. — The creditor bears the burden of proof to establish that the transferee did not pay reasonably equivalent value to the debtor in exchange for the transfer of property to the transferee. Ellen Equip. Corp. v. C.V. Consultants & Assocs., 2008-NMCA-057, 144 N.M. 55, 183 P.3d 940.

No intent to hinder, delay or defraud. — Where the transferee guaranteed a loan so that the debtor could purchase and develop property; the debtor transferred the property to the transferee when the debtor could not pay the loan; the debtor was released from liability on the loan; and the transferee gave a mortgage on the property to the bank to secure his obligation to pay the loan, substantial evidence supported the finding that the debtor did not transfer the property to the transferee with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud the creditor. Ellen Equip. Corp. v. C.V. Consultants & Assocs., 2008-NMCA- 057, 144 N.M. 55, 183 P.3d 940.

Setting aside conveyance of radio license subject to FCC approval. — In an action to set aside the transfer of a radio license as a fraudulent conveyance, the trial court's order that the conveyance be set aside subject to FCC approval did not infringe FCC jurisdiction to make radio license determinations. Beagles v. Espinoza, 1990-NMCA- 121, 111 N.M. 206, 803 P.2d 1111.

Factors in determining voidable transfers. — The noninclusive enumeration of factors contained in this section and 56-10-19 NMSA 1978 are to be considered when determining whether the funds that ordinarily would be exempt from attachment under 42-10-2 and 42-10-3 NMSA 1978 should be set aside as the result of a voidable transfer. Dona Ana Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dofflemeyer, 1993-NMSC-031, 115 N.M. 590, 855 P.2d 1054.

Bankruptcy trustee met burden as to actual fraud. Mazer v. Jones, 184 Bankr. 377 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1995).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 26 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1993–2025 · leading case: Ellen Equip. Corp. v. C v. Consultants & Assocs., Inc., 2008-NMCA-057, 183 P.3d 940.
Ellen Equip. Corp. v. C v. Consultants & Assocs., Inc., 2008-NMCA-057, 183 P.3d 940. · cites it 21× “In relevant part, Section 56-10-18 provides that a transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor if the debtor made the transfer (1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor or (2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in…”
Wagner v. Cunningham (In re Vaughan Co., Realtors), 481 B.R. 752 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2012). · cites it 10× “1978 § 56-10-18(A)(1) includes the requirement that the debtor made the transfer “with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor.”
Skyline Potato Co. v. Tan-O-On Mktg., Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (D.N.M. 2012). · cites it 12× “§ 56-10-18 provides: A. A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: (1)with…”
Wagner v. Pruett (In re Vaughan Co., Realtors), 477 B.R. 206 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2012). · cites it 6× “§ 56-10-18(A)(2) based on alleged transfers to William Pruett made within four years of the date of the filing of the VCR bankruptcy case Count 12 Constructive Fraud under state law, N.”
Dona Ana Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dofflemeyer, 855 P.2d 1054 (N.M. 1993). · cites it 6× “The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is a revision of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act [1] with "conveyance" being replaced with "transfer" in recognition of the Act's applicability to transfers of personal property as well as real property.”
Miller v. Triad Adoption & Counseling Servs., Inc., 2003-NMCA-055, 65 P.3d 1099. · cites it 3× “The complaint alleged that Triad fraudulently transferred its assets to Choices with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the Millers of their judgment, contrary to NMSA 1978, §§ 56-10-18 and - 19(A) (1989).”
In Re Channon, 424 B.R. 895 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2010). · cites it 6× “Channon’s claimed exemption in his Roth IRA, asserting that the UFTA prohibits the allowance of the exemption as fraudulent and that the “factors” contained in NMSA § 56-10-18 should be considered. 13 Messrs.”
Wagner v. Oliva (In re Vaughan Co. Realtors), 500 B.R. 778 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013). · cites it 11× “1978 §§ 56-10-18 and 19. In her Motion for Summary Judgment, she argues that: (1) VCR’s Note Program operated as a Ponzi scheme since 1994 and the transfers made pursuant to the scheme were made with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors; (2) VCR was insolvent…”
Mannick v. Wakeland, 2005-NMCA-098, 138 N.M. 113. · cites it 2× “Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions {21} Wakeland argues that there are no findings to support the decision to void the Declaration under the Act, Sections 56-10-14 to -25.”
Mannick v. Wakeland, 117 P.3d 919 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 2× “Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions {21} Wakeland argues that there are no findings to support the decision to void the Declaration under the Act, Sections 56-10-14 to -25.”
Wagner v. Ultima Homes, Inc. (In re Vaughan Co.), 498 B.R. 297 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013). · cites it 2× “1978 § 56-10-18 (describing transfers that are fraudulent as to present and future creditors) (emphasis added); N.”
Wagner v. Galbreth, 500 B.R. 42 (D.N.M. 2013). · cites it 3× “§ 56-10-18(A)(1) and/or 11 U.S.C. § 544 based on alleged transfers to Galbreth Defendants made within four years of the date of the filing of the VCR bankruptcy case; Count 14 Undiscovered fraudulent transfers pursuant to state and federal law; and *46 Count 15 Disallowance of…”
N.M. Stat. § 56-10-18(A): 6 cases
Mannick v. Wakeland, 2005-NMCA-098, 138 N.M. 113. “Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions {21} Wakeland argues that there are no findings to support the decision to void the Declaration under the Act, Sections 56-10-14 to -25.”
Mannick v. Wakeland, 117 P.3d 919 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005). “Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions {21} Wakeland argues that there are no findings to support the decision to void the Declaration under the Act, Sections 56-10-14 to -25.”
Skyline Potato Co. v. Tan-O-On Mktg., Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (D.N.M. 2012). “§ 56-10-18 provides: A. A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: (1)with…”
Riasati v. Salim (D.N.M. 2022).
Montoya v. Ferguson (Bankr. D.N.M. 2022).
N.M. Stat. § 56-10-18(A)(1): 6 cases
Wagner v. Galbreth, 500 B.R. 42 (D.N.M. 2013). “§ 56-10-18(A)(1) and/or 11 U.S.C. § 544 based on alleged transfers to Galbreth Defendants made within four years of the date of the filing of the VCR bankruptcy case; Count 14 Undiscovered fraudulent transfers pursuant to state and federal law; and *46 Count 15 Disallowance of…”
Wagner v. Cunningham (In re Vaughan Co., Realtors), 481 B.R. 752 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2012). “1978 § 56-10-18(A)(1) includes the requirement that the debtor made the transfer “with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor.”
Skyline Potato Co. v. Tan-O-On Mktg., Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (D.N.M. 2012). “§ 56-10-18 provides: A. A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: (1)with…”
Montoya v. Ferguson (Bankr. D.N.M. 2022).
Riasati v. Salim (D.N.M. 2022).
N.M. Stat. § 56-10-18(A)(2): 8 cases
Wagner v. Cunningham (In re Vaughan Co., Realtors), 481 B.R. 752 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2012). “1978 § 56-10-18(A)(1) includes the requirement that the debtor made the transfer “with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor.”
Wagner v. Pruett (In re Vaughan Co., Realtors), 477 B.R. 206 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2012). “§ 56-10-18(A)(2) based on alleged transfers to William Pruett made within four years of the date of the filing of the VCR bankruptcy case Count 12 Constructive Fraud under state law, N.”
Wagner v. Oliva (In re Vaughan Co. Realtors), 500 B.R. 778 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013). “1978 §§ 56-10-18 and 19. In her Motion for Summary Judgment, she argues that: (1) VCR’s Note Program operated as a Ponzi scheme since 1994 and the transfers made pursuant to the scheme were made with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors; (2) VCR was insolvent…”
Mazer v. Jones (In Re Jones), 184 B.R. 377 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1995).
Wagner v. Galbreth, 500 B.R. 42 (D.N.M. 2013). “§ 56-10-18(A)(1) and/or 11 U.S.C. § 544 based on alleged transfers to Galbreth Defendants made within four years of the date of the filing of the VCR bankruptcy case; Count 14 Undiscovered fraudulent transfers pursuant to state and federal law; and *46 Count 15 Disallowance of…”
N.M. Stat. § 56-10-18(A)(2)(a): 1 case
Wagner v. Oliva (In re Vaughan Co. Realtors), 500 B.R. 778 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013). “1978 §§ 56-10-18 and 19. In her Motion for Summary Judgment, she argues that: (1) VCR’s Note Program operated as a Ponzi scheme since 1994 and the transfers made pursuant to the scheme were made with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors; (2) VCR was insolvent…”
N.M. Stat. § 56-10-18(A)(2)(b): 1 case
Wagner v. Oliva (In re Vaughan Co. Realtors), 500 B.R. 778 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013). “1978 §§ 56-10-18 and 19. In her Motion for Summary Judgment, she argues that: (1) VCR’s Note Program operated as a Ponzi scheme since 1994 and the transfers made pursuant to the scheme were made with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors; (2) VCR was insolvent…”
N.M. Stat. § 56-10-18(A)(l): 6 cases
Wagner v. Pruett (In re Vaughan Co., Realtors), 477 B.R. 206 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2012). “§ 56-10-18(A)(2) based on alleged transfers to William Pruett made within four years of the date of the filing of the VCR bankruptcy case Count 12 Constructive Fraud under state law, N.”
Wagner v. Ultima Homes, Inc. (In re Vaughan Co.), 498 B.R. 297 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013). “1978 § 56-10-18 (describing transfers that are fraudulent as to present and future creditors) (emphasis added); N.”
Wagner v. Cunningham (In re Vaughan Co., Realtors), 481 B.R. 752 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2012). “1978 § 56-10-18(A)(1) includes the requirement that the debtor made the transfer “with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor.”
Montoya v. Sasso (In re Sasso), 550 B.R. 550 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2016).
Wagner v. Ultima Homes, Inc. (In re Vaughan Co. Realtors), 493 B.R. 597 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013).
N.M. Stat. § 56-10-18(B): 7 cases
Ellen Equip. Corp. v. C v. Consultants & Assocs., Inc., 2008-NMCA-057, 183 P.3d 940. “In relevant part, Section 56-10-18 provides that a transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor if the debtor made the transfer (1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor or (2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in…”
Skyline Potato Co. v. Tan-O-On Mktg., Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (D.N.M. 2012). “§ 56-10-18 provides: A. A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: (1)with…”
In Re Channon, 424 B.R. 895 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2010). “Channon’s claimed exemption in his Roth IRA, asserting that the UFTA prohibits the allowance of the exemption as fraudulent and that the “factors” contained in NMSA § 56-10-18 should be considered. 13 Messrs.”
Wagner v. Oliva (In re Vaughan Co. Realtors), 500 B.R. 778 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013). “1978 §§ 56-10-18 and 19. In her Motion for Summary Judgment, she argues that: (1) VCR’s Note Program operated as a Ponzi scheme since 1994 and the transfers made pursuant to the scheme were made with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors; (2) VCR was insolvent…”
Riasati v. Salim (D.N.M. 2022).
N.M. Stat. § 56-10-18(B)(2): 2 cases
Ellen Equip. Corp. v. C v. Consultants & Assocs., Inc., 2008-NMCA-057, 183 P.3d 940. “In relevant part, Section 56-10-18 provides that a transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor if the debtor made the transfer (1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor or (2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in…”
Imming v. De La Vega (D.N.M. 2025).
N.M. Stat. § 56-10-18(B)(3): 1 case
Imming v. De La Vega (D.N.M. 2025).
N.M. Stat. § 56-10-18(B)(4): 1 case
Ellen Equip. Corp. v. C v. Consultants & Assocs., Inc., 2008-NMCA-057, 183 P.3d 940. “In relevant part, Section 56-10-18 provides that a transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor if the debtor made the transfer (1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor or (2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in…”
N.M. Stat. § 56-10-18(B)(5): 2 cases
Ellen Equip. Corp. v. C v. Consultants & Assocs., Inc., 2008-NMCA-057, 183 P.3d 940. “In relevant part, Section 56-10-18 provides that a transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor if the debtor made the transfer (1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor or (2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in…”
Imming v. De La Vega (D.N.M. 2025).
N.M. Stat. § 56-10-18(B)(6): 1 case
Ellen Equip. Corp. v. C v. Consultants & Assocs., Inc., 2008-NMCA-057, 183 P.3d 940. “In relevant part, Section 56-10-18 provides that a transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor if the debtor made the transfer (1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor or (2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in…”
N.M. Stat. § 56-10-18(B)(7): 1 case
Skyline Potato Co. v. Tan-O-On Mktg., Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (D.N.M. 2012). “§ 56-10-18 provides: A. A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: (1)with…”
N.M. Stat. § 56-10-18(B)(9): 5 cases
Ellen Equip. Corp. v. C v. Consultants & Assocs., Inc., 2008-NMCA-057, 183 P.3d 940. “In relevant part, Section 56-10-18 provides that a transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor if the debtor made the transfer (1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor or (2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in…”
Skyline Potato Co. v. Tan-O-On Mktg., Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (D.N.M. 2012). “§ 56-10-18 provides: A. A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: (1)with…”
Wagner v. Oliva (In re Vaughan Co. Realtors), 500 B.R. 778 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013). “1978 §§ 56-10-18 and 19. In her Motion for Summary Judgment, she argues that: (1) VCR’s Note Program operated as a Ponzi scheme since 1994 and the transfers made pursuant to the scheme were made with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors; (2) VCR was insolvent…”
Imming v. De La Vega (D.N.M. 2025).
Cardrew v. Jones (N.M. Ct. App. 2010).
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