New York Consolidated Laws
N.Y. General Business Law § 340 (2026)
Contracts or agreements for monopoly or in restraint of trade illegal and void
✓ current as of May 2026
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§ 340. Contracts or agreements for monopoly or in restraint of trade illegal and void. 1. Every contract, agreement, arrangement or combination whereby A monopoly in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state, is or may be established or maintained, or whereby Competition or the free exercise of any activity in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state is or may be restrained or whereby For the purpose of establishing or maintaining any such monopoly or unlawfully interfering with the free exercise of any activity in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state any business, trade or commerce or the furnishing of any service is or may be restrained, is hereby declared to be against public policy, illegal and void. 2. Subject to the exceptions hereinafter provided in this section, the provisions of this article shall apply to licensed insurers, licensed insurance agents, licensed insurance brokers, licensed independent adjusters and other persons and organizations subject to the provisions of the insurance law, to the extent not regulated by provisions of article twenty-three of the insurance law; and further provided, that nothing in this section shall apply to the marine insurances, including marine protection and indemnity insurance and marine reinsurance, exempted from the operation of article twenty-three of the insurance law. 3. The provisions of this article shall not apply to cooperative associations, corporate or otherwise, of farmers, gardeners, or dairymen, including live stock farmers and fruit growers, nor to contracts, agreements or arrangements made by such associations, nor to bona fide labor unions. 4. The labor of human beings shall not be deemed or held to be a commodity or article of commerce as such terms are used in this section and nothing herein contained shall be deemed to prohibit or restrict the right of workingmen to combine in unions, organizations and associations, not organized for the purpose of profit. 5. An action to recover damages caused by a violation of this section must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. The state, or any political subdivision or public authority of the state, or any person who shall sustain damages by reason of any violation of this section, shall recover three-fold the actual damages sustained thereby, as well as costs not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and reasonable attorneys' fees. At or before the commencement of any civil action by a party other than the attorney-general for a violation of this section, notice thereof shall be served upon the attorney-general. Where the aggrieved party is a political subdivision or public authority of the state, notice of intention to commence an action under this section must be served upon the attorney-general at least ten days prior to the commencement of such action. This section shall not apply to any action commenced prior to the effective date of this act. 6. In any action pursuant to this section, the fact that the state, or any political subdivision or public authority of the state, or any person who has sustained damages by reason of violation of this section has not dealt directly with the defendant shall not bar or otherwise limit recovery; provided, however, that in any action in which claims are asserted against a defendant by both direct and indirect purchasers, the court shall take all steps necessary to avoid duplicate liability, including but not limited to the transfer and consolidation of all related actions. In actions where both direct and indirect purchasers are involved, a defendant shall be entitled to prove as a partial or complete defense to a claim for damages that the illegal overcharge has been passed on to others who are themselves entitled to recover so as to avoid duplication of recovery of damages.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 179
cases (12 in the last 5 years), 1941–2025 · leading case: Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012 (NY 2007).
Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012 (NY 2007). “Because we conclude that the treble damages provision in General Business Law § 340 serves as a penalty for purposes of CPLR 901 (b), such damages are not recoverable in a class action.”
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Abrams, 520 N.E.2d 535 (NY 1988). “The Attorney-General contends that, although such vertical restraints are not per se illegal under New York’s antitrust law (the Donnelly Act; General Business Law § 340 et seq.), they may be found to be illegal if, under all the circumstances, they impose an unreasonable…”
Borden v. 400 East 55th Street Assocs., L.P., 23 N.E.3d 997 (NY 2014). “They contend that unless the landlord proves the overcharges were not willful, treble damages must be assessed, and this lack of discretion implies that no party may waive treble damages. However, the RSL’s treble damages are only applied where defendant fails to disprove…”
Benjamin of Forest Hills Realty, Inc. v. Austin Sheppard Realty, Inc., 34 A.D.3d 91 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). “In this case we are called upon to decide whether the practice of a cooperative building which, in effect, allows purchases of its shares only through one specific real estate broker, constitutes a violation of General Business Law § 340 et seq. Under the circumstances of this…”
Progressive Milk Co. v. Luna, 126 A.D.2d 247 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). “We hold that a requirements contract, by which the buyer is required to buy all of its particular needs in certain prod *249 ucts from one supplier, is not a per se violation of the Donnelly Act, General Business Law § 340. 1 For the agreement to be illegal, there must be…”
Lennon v. Philip Morris Companies, 189 Misc. 2d 577 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001). “Plaintiffs, Virginia Lennon, Joseph Nierman, and Dorothy Sylvester, claim that defendants have violated General Business Law § 340 (6), commonly referred to as the Donnelly Act *579 (the Act), by engaging in price fixing and other anticompetitive activities.”
Walton v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 863 N.E.2d 1001 (NY 2007). “[3] They argued that DOCS, through the agreement with MCI, infringed upon their rights to due process, freedom of speech and equal protection, imposed an unlawful tax and/or regulatory fee, violated General Business Law §§ 340 and 349, and tortiously interfered with their rights…”
Thome v. Alexander & Louisa Calder Found., 70 A.D.3d 88 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). “On appeal, plaintiff also alleges that the cause of action is supported by General Business Law § 340 et seq., known as the Donnelly Act, which is New York’s antitrust statute.”
Abe's Rooms, Inc. v. Space Hunters, Inc., 38 A.D.3d 690 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). “*691 In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for violation of the Donnelly Act (General Business Law § 340), common-law unfair competition, tortious interference with contract, slander per se, and libel per se, the defendants Space Hunters, Inc.”
Cox v. Microsoft Corp., 290 A.D.2d 206 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). “), entered on or about November 29, 2000, which, in an action under General Business Law § 340 (the Donnelly Act), granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the class allegations of the complaint as barred by CPLR 901 (b) and to stay the action during the pendency of certain federal…”
Shaw v. Club Managers Ass'n of Am., Inc., 84 A.D.3d 928 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). “In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for a violation of the Donnelly Act (General Business Law § 340), the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Bucaria, J.”
Neri's Land Improvement, LLC v. J.J. Cassone Bakery, Inc., 65 A.D.3d 1312 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). “Neri commenced this action against Cassone, inter alia, for a judgment declaring that the restrictive covenant is unenforceable and should be extinguished pursuant to RPAPL 1951, as well as for injunctive relief and to recover damages based on Cassone’s alleged violation of…”
— N.Y. General Business Law § 340(7) — 1 case
In Re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 756 F. Supp. 2d 670 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
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