New York Consolidated Laws
N.Y. Labor Law § 194 (2026)
Differential in rate of pay because of protected class status prohibited
✓ current as of May 2026
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§ 194. Differential in rate of pay because of protected class status prohibited. 1. No employee with status within one or more protected class or classes shall be paid a wage at a rate less than the rate at which an employee without status within the same protected class or classes in the same establishment is paid for: (a) equal work on a job the performance of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which is performed under similar working conditions, or (b) substantially similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions; except where payment is made pursuant to a differential based on: (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a bona fide factor other than status within one or more protected class or classes, such as education, training, or experience. Such factor: (A) shall not be based upon or derived from a differential in compensation based on status within one or more protected class or classes and (B) shall be job-related with respect to the position in question and shall be consistent with business necessity. Such exception under this paragraph shall not apply when the employee demonstrates (1) that an employer uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of status within one or more protected class or classes, (2) that an alternative employment practice exists that would serve the same business purpose and not produce such differential, and (3) that the employer has refused to adopt such alternative practice. 2. For the purpose of subdivision one of this section: (a) "business necessity" shall be defined as a factor that bears a manifest relationship to the employment in question, and (b) "protected class" shall include age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, familial status, marital status, or domestic violence victim status, and any employee protected from discrimination pursuant to paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of subdivision one of section two hundred ninety-six and any intern protected from discrimination pursuant to section two hundred ninety-six-c of the executive law. 3. For the purposes of subdivision one of this section, employees shall be deemed to work in the same establishment if the employees work for the same employer at workplaces located in the same geographical region, no larger than a county, taking into account population distribution, economic activity, and/or the presence of municipalities. 4. (a) No employer shall prohibit an employee from inquiring about, discussing, or disclosing the wages of such employee or another employee. (b) An employer may, in a written policy provided to all employees, establish reasonable workplace and workday limitations on the time, place and manner for inquires about, discussion of, or the disclosure of wages. Such limitations shall be consistent with standards promulgated by the commissioner and shall be consistent with all other state and federal laws. Such limitations may include prohibiting an employee from discussing or disclosing the wages of another employee without such employee's prior permission. (c) Nothing in this subdivision shall require an employee to disclose his or her wages. The failure of an employee to adhere to such reasonable limitations in such written policy shall be an affirmative defense to any claims made against an employer under this subdivision, provided that any adverse employment action taken by the employer was for failure to adhere to such reasonable limitations and not for mere inquiry, discussion or disclosure of wages in accordance with such reasonable limitations in such written policy. (d) This prohibition shall not apply to instances in which an employee who has access to the wage information of other employees as a part of such employee's essential job functions discloses the wages of such other employees to individuals who do not otherwise have access to such information, unless such disclosure is in response to a complaint or charge, or in furtherance of an investigation, proceeding, hearing, or action under this chapter, including an investigation conducted by the employer. (e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the rights of an employee provided under any other provision of law or collective bargaining agreement.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 52
cases (28 in the last 5 years), 1986–2025 · leading case: Eisenhauer v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 84 F.4th 507 (2d Cir. 2023).
Eisenhauer v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 84 F.4th 507 (2d Cir. 2023). “89 N.Y. Lab. Law § 194 (1) (2016) (effective until Oct.”
Isbell v. City of N.Y., 316 F. Supp. 3d 571 (S.D. Ill. 2018). “§ 206 (d) and the New York Labor Law, (the "New York Equal Pay Act"), N.Y. Labor Law § 194 , against the City of New York and Patricia Le Goff ("Defendants"); and discrimination on the basis of sex and race, including by creating a hostile work environment, and retaliatory…”
Kent v. Papert Companies, Inc., 309 A.D.2d 234 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). “On or about January 13, 1999, plaintiff commenced this action, alleging that PCI and the Paperts had discriminated against her on the basis of sex by failing to pay her a salary equal to the salaries they had paid to male employees for allegedly comparable work in violation of…”
Wheeler v. Citizens Telecomm. Co. of New York, Inc., 18 A.D.3d 1002 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). “Plaintiff sued, alleging that defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her gender in violation of Executive Law § 296 and that defendant violated New York’s Equal Pay Law (see Labor Law § 194) by paying her less than it paid Bentley for substantially similar work.”
Pachter v. Bernard Hodes, 891 N.E.2d 279 (NY 2008). “In addition, under the interpretation of "employee" proposed by Hodes, Labor Law § 194 would not prohibit employers from paying similarly situated executives at different rates of compensation solely on account of their genderan absurd proposition that the Legislature surely…”
Moccio v. Cornell Univ., 889 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). “N.Y. Labor Law § 194 . “Claims for violations of the Equal Pay Act and the New York State Equal Pay Act may be evaluated under the same standard.”
Chiaramonte v. Animal Med. Ctr., 677 F. App'x 689 (2d Cir. 2017). “§ 206 (d)(1) [hereinafter the EPA], and New York Labor Law, N.Y. Lab. Law § 194 [hereinafter the NYLL], 1 as well as her pendent state-law claims.”
Rose v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). “; the New York State Equal Pay Law, N.Y. Labor Law § 194 (1); and the New York City Administrative Code § 8-101, et seq.”
Fraser v. MTA Long Island Rail Rd., 307 F. Supp. 3d 105 (E.D.N.Y 2018). “The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the two causes of action *108 brought under the NYEPL and NYCHRL, which were dismissed without prejudice to pursuing them in State court.”
Lapidus v. New York City Chapter of New York State Ass'n for Retarded Child., Inc., 118 A.D.2d 122 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). “Plaintiff distinguishes Patrowich by noting that Goldfarb was personally charged with hiring and firing and thus did more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.”
Pfeiffer v. Lewis Cnty., 308 F. Supp. 2d 88 (N.D.N.Y. 2004). “§ 206 , et seq: (the “Equal Pay Act” or “EPA”), N.Y. Labor Law § 194 (the “New York Equal Pay Act”) and N.”
Calibuso v. Bank of Am. Corp., 299 F.R.D. 359 (E.D.N.Y 2014). “See New York Equal Pay Act, N.Y. Lab. Law §§ 194 et seq.; New York State Human Rights Law, N.”
— N.Y. Labor Law § 194(1) — 1 case
Eisenhauer v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 84 F.4th 507 (2d Cir. 2023). “89 N.Y. Lab. Law § 194 (1) (2016) (effective until Oct.”
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