New York Consolidated Laws

N.Y. Penal Law § 140.17 (2026)

Criminal trespass in the first degree

✓ current as of May 2026
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§ 140.17. Criminal trespass in the first degree.
  A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree when he
knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building, and when, in the
course of committing such crime, he:
  1. Possesses, or knows that another participant in the crime
possesses, an explosive or a deadly weapon; or
  2. Possesses a firearm, rifle or shotgun, as those terms are defined
in section 265.00, and also possesses or has readily accessible a
quantity of ammunition which is capable of being discharged from such
firearm, rifle or shotgun; or
  3. Knows that another participant in the crime possesses a firearm,
rifle or shotgun under circumstances described in subdivision two.
  Criminal trespass in the first degree is a class D felony.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13 cases, 1987–2015 · leading case: People v. Jimenez, 8 N.E.3d 831 (N.Y. 2014).
People v. Jimenez, 8 N.E.3d 831 (N.Y. 2014). “03 [3]) and criminal trespass in the first degree (Penal Law § 140.17 [1]) after the search of her purse incident to an arrest for trespassing resulted in the discovery of a loaded handgun.”
People v. Moore, 833 N.E.2d 192 (N.Y. 2005). “05), the crimes become progressively more serious as they approach criminal trespass in the first degree (see Penal Law § 140.17). Since the violation of trespass requires only that a person “knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises” (Penal Law § 140.”
People v. Cruz, 272 A.D.2d 922 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). · cites it 2× “Penal Law § 140.17 (3) requires, in relevant part, that a defendant know that another participant in the crime possesses “a firearm, rifle or shotgun under circumstances described in subdivision two.”
People v. Wilson, 252 A.D.2d 241 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). “35 [2]; see also, Penal Law § 140.17 [2], which, although not expressly incorporating Penal Law § 265.”
People v. Davis, 193 A.D.2d 954 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). “As to defendant’s conviction of criminal trespass in the first degree, a person is guilty of that offense "when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building, and when, in the course of committing such crime, he: * * * (2) Possesses a firearm * * * and also possesses…”
People v. Llewelyn, 136 Misc. 2d 525 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). · cites it 3× “02 [4]) and criminal trespass in the first degree (Penal Law § 140.17 [2]). An earlier motion to inspect the Grand Jury minutes and dismiss the indictment on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence was denied (Coffinas, J.”
People v. Norman, 128 A.D.3d 1418 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). “Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree (Penal Law § 140.17 [2]), defendant contends that the plea allocution was factually insufficient because he did not admit a necessary element of the crime, i.”
People v. Boyd, 27 A.D.3d 1124 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). “Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a jury verdict, of criminal trespass in the first degree (Penal Law § 140.17 [2], assault in the second degree (§ 120.”
People v. White, 31 A.D.3d 273 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). · cites it 3× “The trial court charged, as a lesser included offense, criminal trespass in the first degree under Penal Law § 140.17 (2). However, as to criminal trespass in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.”
People v. Calandrillo, 134 A.D.2d 271 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). “Criminal trespass in the first degree (Penal Law § 140.17) requires proof of possession of a firearm or deadly weapon, or proof that the defendant had an accomplice who the defendant knew had a deadly weapon.”
Norman, Marcus a., People v. (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). “Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree (Penal Law § 140.17 [2]), defendant contends that the plea allocution was factually insufficient because he did not admit a necessary element of the crime, i.”
People v. Norman, 128 A.D.3d 1418 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). “Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree (Penal Law § 140.17 [2]), defendant contends that the plea allocution was factually insufficient because he did not admit a necessary element of the crime, i.”
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