N.Y. Laws » CHAPTER Penal / PART General Provisions / TITLE Principles of Criminal Liability / ARTICLE Culpability
New York Consolidated Laws

N.Y. Penal Law § 15.05 (2026)

Culpability; definitions of culpable mental states

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section NY-LEGnysenate.gov Justiaon Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar 
§ 15.05 Culpability; definitions of culpable mental states.
  The following definitions are applicable to this chapter:
  1. "Intentionally." A person acts intentionally with respect to a
result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense when his
conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such
conduct.
  2. "Knowingly." A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to
a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is
aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance
exists.
  3. "Recklessly." A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or
to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is
aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk
must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person
would observe in the situation.  A person who creates such a risk but is
unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts
recklessly with respect thereto.
  4. "Criminal negligence." A person acts with criminal negligence with
respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining
an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The
risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the situation.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 637 cases (64 in the last 5 years), 1976–2026 · leading case: People v. Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 2002).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
People v. Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 2002). · cites it 16× “, that defendant's "conscious objective [was] to cause [Range's death]" (Penal Law § 15.05 [1]). The two men were friends, had engaged in activities together and socialized because of their intimate relationships with the sisters.”
People v. Feingold, 852 N.E.2d 1163 (N.Y. 2006). · cites it 6× “Here the Legislature used the term "recklessly" to define the mens rea element of first-degree reckless endangerment ( see Penal Law § 15.05 [3]; § 120.25). A defendant thus must act "recklessly.”
People v. Suarez, 844 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2005). · cites it 6× “A murder is intentional when the accused acts with the "conscious objective" to kill (Penal Law § 15.05 [1]). A lesser offense, manslaughter in the first degree, is committed when a person who intended to cause serious physical injury, causes death ( see Penal Law § 125.”
People v. Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d 909 (N.Y. 1987). · cites it 6× “One who acts intentionally in shooting a person to death— that is, with the conscious objective of bringing about that result (Penal Law § 15.05 [1]) — cannot at the same time act recklessly — that is, with conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such a…”
People v. Lewie, 953 N.E.2d 760 (N.Y. 2011). · cites it 6× “" "Recklessly" is defined in Penal Law § 15.05 (3), which says, in relevant part: "A person acts recklessly with respect to a result.”
People v. Hafeez, 792 N.E.2d 1060 (N.Y. 2003). · cites it 4× “After all, by acquitting of intentional murder they expressly found that defendant and codefendant did not have a "conscious objective * * * to cause" ( People v Sanchez, 98 NY2d at 377 , quoting Penal Law § 15.05 [1]) the victim's death.”
People v. Steinberg, 595 N.E.2d 845 (N.Y. 1992). · cites it 4× “Defendant contends that failure to obtain medical care for a child cannot, as a matter of law, support the mens rea element of first degree manslaughter — intent to cause serious physical injury —unless defendant has medical expertise, and would thereby know that serious injury…”
People v. Sullivan, 503 N.E.2d 74 (N.Y. 1986). · cites it 8× “Such conduct would support a finding of a "gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation” (Penal Law § 15.05 [3]). Thus, that evidence, " 'if unexplained and uncontradicted would warrant conviction by a trial jury’ ” (People…”
Lee Carrell v. United States (Revised Version), 165 A.3d 314 (D.C. 2017). · cites it 3× “§ 626:2 (2017); N.Y. Penal Law § 15.05 (McKinney 2017); N.”
People v. Butler, 644 N.E.2d 1331 (N.Y. 1994). · cites it 6× “15 [1]); that is, that the jury had no basis upon which to conclude that defendant's intoxication negated his specific intent to kill but did not negate his awareness and conscious disregard of the substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct would cause Anderson's death…”
People v. Kaplan, 556 N.E.2d 415 (N.Y. 1990). · cites it 5× “00 of the revised Penal Law, which specifies that an accomplice must have acted with the "mental culpability required for the *145 commission” of the particular crime.”
Turturro ex rel. Turturro v. City of New York, 68 N.E.3d 693 (N.Y. 2016). “Indeed, Pascarella ultimately pleaded guilty to criminally reckless assault for consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk of injury to another (see Penal Law §§ 15.05 [3]; 120.05 [4]), undercutting the plaintiffs’ argument that a traffic calming study could…”
Show all 637 citing cases →
N.Y. Penal Law § 15.05(1): 1 case
Howard v. McGinnis, 632 F. Supp. 2d 253 (W.D.N.Y. 2009).
N.Y. Penal Law § 15.05(3): 9 cases
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. v. Cole, 821 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Howard v. McGinnis, 632 F. Supp. 2d 253 (W.D.N.Y. 2009).
Willie Bethea v. Charles Scully, Superintendent, Greenhaven Corr. Facility, 834 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1987).
Jones v. Speckard, 827 F. Supp. 139 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
Pawlowski v. Kelly, 932 F. Supp. 475 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).
N.Y. Penal Law § 15.05(4): 2 cases
Ketchum v. Ward, 422 F. Supp. 934 (W.D.N.Y. 1976).
Walker v. Speckard, 806 F. Supp. 420 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.