New York Consolidated Laws

N.Y. Penal Law § 15.10 (2026)

Requirements for criminal liability in general and for offenses of strict liability and mental culpability

✓ current as of May 2026
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§ 15.10 Requirements for criminal liability in general and for offenses
          of strict liability and mental culpability.
  The minimal requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a
person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to
perform an act which he is physically capable of performing. If such
conduct is all that is required for commission of a particular offense,
or if an offense or some material element thereof does not require a
culpable mental state on the part of the actor, such offense is one of
"strict liability." If a culpable mental state on the part of the actor
is required with respect to every material element of an offense, such
offense is one of "mental culpability."
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 43 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1985–2022 · leading case: United States v. Bonilla, 524 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2008).
United States v. Bonilla, 524 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2008). · cites it 2× “" N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.10 (McKinney 2008). This suggests that if an act intended to cause a miscarriage results in a female's death, a defendant could be prosecuted under subsection (2) irrespective of the defendant's mental state towards the risk of death posed by his behavior.”
People v. Miller, 661 N.E.2d 1358 (N.Y. 1995). · cites it 4× “The robber's conduct is rendered criminal by the forcible taking — or attempted forcible taking — not by an unintended result, as distinguished from Campbell ( see also , Penal Law § 15.10). In Campbell , we reversed defendant's conviction for attempted assault in the second…”
People v. Ryan, 626 N.E.2d 51 (N.Y. 1993). · cites it 2× “If any material element of an offense lacks a mens rea requirement, it is a strict liability crime (Penal Law § 15.10). Conversely, a crime is one of "mental culpability” only when a mental state "is required with respect to every material element of an offense” (id.”
Policano v. Herbert, 859 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 2006). “We first noted that although “[t]he Penal Law does not expressly define the term ‘element,’ ” it “set[s] forth what the ‘elements’ of an offense are and identifies them, as does the common law, as a culpable mental state (mens rea) and a voluntary act (actus reus),” citing Penal…”
People v. Byrne, 570 N.E.2d 1066 (N.Y. 1991). · cites it 3× “A crime of strict liability is one that does not require proof of a culpable mental state (Penal Law § 15.10; see, e.g., People v Munoz, 9 NY2d 51 ).”
People v. Patterson, 185 Misc. 2d 519 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2000). · cites it 2× “” *527 (ii) Does Correction Law § 168-t, the “Failure-to-Register” Statute, Create a Strict Liability Crime? Penal Law § 15.10 explains the difference between strict liability crimes and crimes of mental culpability under New York law, and further sets forth the minimal…”
People v. Wood, 58 A.D.3d 242 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008). · cites it 2× “The source of the voluntary possession requirement is article 15 of the Penal Law, which sets out the minimum requirements for criminal liability and guidelines for determining whether an offense includes an element of mental culpability.”
United States v. Scott, 954 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2020). “See N.Y. Penal Law § 15.10 (equating “omission to perform an act which [person] is physically capable of performing” with “voluntary act” in identifying minimal conduct required for criminal culpability).”
People v. Anyakora, 162 Misc. 2d 47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993). · cites it 2× “Accordingly, with this interpretation, paragraph (b) meets the Penal Law’s minimum requirements for imposing criminal liability on individuals because it requires "the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act which he is…”
People v. Coe, 522 N.E.2d 1039 (N.Y. 1988). “Moreover, the Legislature has demonstrated in other sections of the Public Health Law that when it intends to impose strict criminal liability, it does so clearly (see, Public Health Law § 2805-b [2] [a] [general hospital’s failure to render emergency medical care and treatment…”
People v. Nemadi, 140 Misc. 2d 712 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1988). · cites it 2× “) Indeed, Penal Law §§ 15.10 and 15.15 recognize that strict liability offenses may be created by the Penal Law.”
People v. Mitchell, 571 N.E.2d 701 (N.Y. 1991). “The offense at issue thus plainly contains two culpable mental states — "knowingly” which is tied to the possession of stolen property, and "intent” which modifies "to benefit” or "to impede” (Penal Law §§ 15.10, 15.15). Neither of these culpable mental states, by law or syntax,…”
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