N.Y. Laws » CHAPTER Real Property / ARTICLE Conveyances and Mortgages
New York Consolidated Laws

N.Y. Real Property Law § 245 (2026)

Estate which passes by grant or devise

✓ current as of May 2026
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§ 245. Estate which passes by grant or devise. A grant or devise of
real property passes all the estate or interest of the grantor or
testator unless the intent to pass a less estate or interest appears by
the express terms of such grant or devise or by necessary implication
therefrom. A greater estate or interest does not pass by any grant or
conveyance, than the grantor possessed or could lawfully convey, at the
time of the delivery of the deeds; except that every grant is conclusive
against the grantor and his heirs claiming from him by descent, and as
against a subsequent purchaser or incumbrancer from such grantor, or
from such heirs claiming as such, other than a subsequent purchaser or
incumbrancer in good faith and for a valuable consideration, who
acquires a superior title by a conveyance that has been first duly
recorded.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 17 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1987–2021 · leading case: Lurie v. Lurie, 94 A.D.3d 1376 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
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Lurie v. Lurie, 94 A.D.3d 1376 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). “If not, the grantors were incapable of transferring the property again, as plaintiff was the only valid title holder (see Real Property Law § 245; Robbins v Whitesell, 128 AD2d 764, 764 [1987]).”
Gilliland v. Acquafredda Enter., LLC, 92 A.D.3d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). “However, as plaintiffs point out, the September 9, 1993 deed, which originally granted defendants title to their property, described their property as beginning at “the northerly side” of Casler Place, and did not include any of the street itself. Of course, a grantor cannot…”
Town of Fowler v. Parow, 144 A.D.3d 1444 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016). “Although the VanValkenburgs purported to convey fee title to plaintiff in 1977, they could not convey a greater interest than they possessed (see Real Property Law § 245; City of Kingston v Knaust, 287 AD2d 57, 60 [2001]).”
Staine v. Summit Place, Inc., 40 A.D.3d 330 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). “It is well settled that, “title and estate which passes under a grant or conveyance, is commensurate only with that existing in the grantor, although he may undertake to convey, and the deed purports to convey a larger estate” (Thompson v Simpson, 128 NY 270, 285 [1891]; Real…”
Rivera v. Bruzzese, 93 A.D.3d 1124 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). “They instead argue — and Supreme Court held — that the Ross deed did not reserve the right to use the common driveway and, thus, Del-View was powerless to thereafter convey that right to plaintiff (see Real Property Law § 245; Simone v Heidelberg, 9 NY3d 177, 182 [2007]).”
Race v. Meyer, 219 A.D.2d 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). “"A grant * * * of real property passes all the * * * interest of the grantor * * * unless the intent to pass a less * * * interest appears by the express terms of such grant * * * or by necessary implication therefrom” (Real Property Law § 245). There is no evidence in the…”
O'Brien v. Town of Huntington, 66 A.D.2d 160 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). ““A greater estate or interest does not pass by any grant or conveyance, than the grantor possessed or could lawfully convey, at the time of the delivery of the deed” (Real Property Law § 245). Thus, conveyances of land to which the grantors had no title convey no interest to the…”
Turiano v. State, 136 Misc. 2d 596 (1987). “1 [a] [2]). 3 By statute, a grantor is presumed to convey its entire interest unless the contrary is expressly provided by or necessarily implied from the terms of the grant.”
THTML LLC v. Trust for Architectural Easements, 2020 NY Slip Op 07518 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020). “, LLC , 92 AD3d 19, 25 [1st Dept 2011]; Real Property Law § 245). We also find that, contrary to plaintiff's contention, this case is not analogous to Orange & Rockland Util.”
O'Reilly v. Keene, 136 A.D.3d 482 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016). “, LLC, 92 AD3d 19, 25 [1st Dept 2011]; Real Property Law § 245). In any event, Tribeca’s interest in the property, as a bona fide encumbrancer, is protected against plaintiff’s claim (Real Property Law § 266; Miller-Francis v Smith-Jackson, 113 AD3d 28, 34 [1st Dept 2013]).”
THTML LLC v. Trust for Architectural Easements, 2020 NY Slip Op 07518 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020). “, LLC , 92 AD3d 19, 25 [1st Dept 2011]; Real Property Law § 245). We also find that, contrary to plaintiff's contention, this case is not analogous to Orange & Rockland Util.”
Town of Fowler v. Parow, 144 A.D.3d 1444 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016). “Although the VanValkenburgs purported to convey fee title to plaintiff in 1977, they could not convey a greater interest than they possessed (see Real Property Law § 245; City of Kingston v Knaust, 287 AD2d 57, 60 [2001]).”
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