New York Consolidated Laws

N.Y. Workers' Compensation Law § 11 (2026)

Alternative remedy

✓ current as of May 2026
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§ 11. Alternative remedy. 1. The liability of an employer prescribed
by the last preceding section shall be exclusive and in place of any
other liability whatsoever, to such employee, his or her personal
representatives, spouse, parents, dependents, distributees, or any
person otherwise entitled to recover damages, contribution or indemnity,
at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury or death or
liability arising therefrom, except that if an employer fails to secure
the payment of compensation for his or her injured employees and their
dependents as provided in section fifty of this chapter, an injured
employee, or his or her legal representative in case of death results
from the injury, may, at his or her option, elect to claim compensation
under this chapter, or to maintain an action in the courts for damages
on account of such injury; and in such an action it shall not be
necessary to plead or prove freedom from contributory negligence nor may
the defendant plead as a defense that the injury was caused by the
negligence of a fellow servant nor that the employee assumed the risk of
his or her employment, nor that the injury was due to the contributory
negligence of the employee. The liability under this chapter of The New
York Jockey Injury Compensation Fund, Inc. created under section two
hundred twenty-one of the racing, pari-mutuel wagering and breeding law
shall be limited to the provision of workers' compensation coverage to
jockeys, apprentice jockeys, exercise persons, and at the election of
the New York Jockey Injury Compensation Fund, Inc., with the approval of
the New York state gaming commission, employees of licensed trainers or
owners licensed under article two or four of the racing, pari-mutuel
wagering and breeding law and any statutory penalties resulting from the
failure to provide such coverage.
  For purposes of this section the terms "indemnity" and "contribution"
shall not include a claim or cause of action for contribution or
indemnification based upon a provision in a written contract entered
into prior to the accident or occurrence by which the employer had
expressly agreed to contribution to or indemnification of the claimant
or person asserting the cause of action for the type of loss suffered.
  An employer shall not be liable for contribution or indemnity to any
third person based upon liability for injuries sustained by an employee
acting within the scope of his or her employment for such employer
unless such third person proves through competent medical evidence that
such employee has sustained a "grave injury" which shall mean only one
or more of the following: death, permanent and total loss of use or
amputation of an arm, leg, hand or foot, loss of multiple fingers, loss
of multiple toes, paraplegia or quadriplegia, total and permanent
blindness, total and permanent deafness, loss of nose, loss of ear,
permanent and severe facial disfigurement, loss of an index finger or an
acquired injury to the brain caused by an external physical force
resulting in permanent total disability.
  For purposes of this section "person" means any individual, firm,
company, partnership, corporation, joint venture, joint-stock
association, association, trust or legal entity.
  The liability under this chapter of the New York black car operators'
injury compensation fund, inc. shall be limited to: (i) securing the
payment of workers' compensation in accordance with article six-F of the
executive law to black car operators, as defined in such article, whose
injury arose out of and in the course of providing services for a
central dispatch facility, as defined in such article, that is a
registered member of such fund, and (ii) any statutory penalty resulting
from the failure to secure such payment. The liability under this
chapter of a central dispatch facility, as defined in article six-F of
the executive law, that is a registered member of the New York black car
operators' injury compensation fund, inc. that shall be limited to
remaining a registered member in good standing of such fund and any
statutory penalty, including loss of immunity provided by this section,
resulting from the failure to become or remain a registered member in
good standing of such fund, except, however, that such central dispatch
facility shall be subject to the provisions of section one hundred
thirty-one of this chapter and shall be liable for any payments for
which it may become responsible pursuant to such section or pursuant to
section fourteen-a of this article.
  The liability under this chapter of the New York independent livery
driver benefit fund, inc. shall be limited to: (i) securing the payment
of workers' compensation coverage to cover those matters required by
article six-G of the executive law for independent livery drivers, as
defined in such article, whose injury arose out of and in the course of
providing covered services for a livery base, as defined in such
article, that is a registered member of such fund, and (ii) any
statutory penalty resulting from the failure to secure such payment.
  2. Determination by the board shall not be given collateral estoppel
effect in any other action or proceeding arising out of the same
occurrence, other than the determination of the existence of an employer
employee relationship.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 200 cases (124 in the last 5 years), 1992–2026 · leading case: Rubies v. Aqua Club, Inc., 821 N.E.2d 530 (NY 2004).
Rubies v. Aqua Club, Inc., 821 N.E.2d 530 (NY 2004). · cites it 7× “In the three actions before us, we are again asked to define the scope of an enumerated "grave injury" in Workers' Compensation Law § 11 — this time "an acquired injury to the brain caused by an external physical force resulting in permanent total disability.”
Rodrigues v. N & S Bldg. Contractors, Inc., 839 N.E.2d 357 (NY 2005). · cites it 5× “Workers' Compensation Law § 11 prohibits third-party *430 indemnification or contribution claims against employers, except where the employee sustained a "grave injury," or the claim is "based upon a provision in a written contract entered into prior to the accident or…”
Naula v. Utokilen, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 1355 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020). · cites it 7× “Specialized Dental moved for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint, invoking its affirmative defense based on the exclusivity provisions of Workers' Compensation Law § 11, and further arguing that it cannot be held liable in common-law contribution or indemnity…”
Gen. Star Nat'l Ins. v. Universal Fabricators, Inc., 585 F.3d 662 (2d Cir. 2009). · cites it 2× “CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment, and remand the cause with instructions for the court to decide, inter alia, whether UFI was legally liable to Ernish such as to give rise to a liability on the part of General Star.”
People v. McKinnon, 937 N.E.2d 524 (NY 2010). “But in Fleming v Graham ( 10 NY3d 296 [2008]), we considered the meaning of "severe facial disfigurement" as used in Workers' Compensation Law § 11. There, we approved the following definition of "disfigurement": "that which impairs or injures the beauty, symmetry or appearance…”
Mauro v. Zorn Realties, Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 03509 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022). · cites it 3× “The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, contending that this action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law ( see Workers' Compensation Law §§ 11, 29[6]) because it and the plaintiff's employer were alter egos or…”
Lorica v. Krug, 2021 NY Slip Op 03642 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021). · cites it 2× “Supreme Court, among other things, dismissed the cause of action for common-law indemnification, but partially denied the motion by finding that questions of fact exist as to contractual indemnification.”
Everett v. CMI Servs. Corp., 2022 NY Slip Op 03497 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022). · cites it 2× “Contrary to the appellants' contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that they failed to establish, prima facie, that the Omni defendants were entitled to the protections of Workers' Compensation Law § 11. "The protection against lawsuits brought by injured workers…”
Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 99 N.E.3d 867 (2018). “We then extended the rationale in Shaw to hold that Workers' Compensation Law § 11 does not bar an employee from recovering uninsured motorist benefits from his self-insured employer in connection with an accident that occurred while the employee was driving the employer's…”
Hill v. Delta Int'l Mach. Corp., 386 F. Supp. 2d 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). “See also N.Y. Workers' Comp. Law § 11 ("The liability of an employer [under Workers’ Compensation Law] .”
Fuller v. KFG Land I, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 07998 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020). “The majority disagrees and finds that defendant and plaintiff's employer should be treated as one employer for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Law. This finding gives defendant the benefit of a complete defense against plaintiff's claims for damages, i.”
Williams v. Beth Israel Hosp. Assn., 2022 NY Slip Op 00027 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022). “, 78 NY2d 553, 557 [1991]; see Workers' Compensation Law §§ 11, 29[6]; compare Warner v Continuum Health Care Partners, Inc.”
— N.Y. Workers' Compensation Law § 11(1) — 5 cases
NGM Ins. Co. v. MGC Design & Constr. Corp., 2025 NY Slip Op 02215 (N.Y. App. Div. 2025).
Macropoulos v. City of New York, 2024 NY Slip Op 50899(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. 2024).
Macropoulos v. City of New York, 2024 NY Slip Op 50899(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. 2024).
Velazquez-Guadalupe v. Ideal Bldrs. & Constr. Servs., Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 02025 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023).
Hart v. Theatre Three Prods., Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 01187 (N.Y. App. Div. 2026).
— N.Y. Workers' Compensation Law § 11(2) — 1 case
Velazquez-Guadalupe v. Ideal Bldrs. & Constr. Servs., Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 02025 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023).
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