If when the cause of action accrues or judgment is rendered or docketed against a person, he is out of the State, action may be commenced, or judgment enforced within the times herein limited after the return of the person into this State, and if, after such cause of action accrues or judgment is rendered or docketed, such person departs from and resides out of this State, or remains continuously absent therefrom for one year or more, the time of his absence shall not be a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action or the enforcement of the judgment. Provided, that where a cause of action arose outside of this State and is barred by the laws of the jurisdiction in which it arose, no action may be maintained in the courts of this State for the enforcement thereof, except where the cause of action originally accrued in favor of a resident of this State.
The provisions of this section shall not apply to the extent that a court of this State has or continues to have jurisdiction over the person under the provisions of G.S. 1-75.4. (C.C.P., s. 41; 1881, c. 258, ss. 1, 2; Code, s. 162; Rev., s. 366; C.S., s. 411; 1955, c. 544; 1979, c. 525, s. 1.)
Notes of Decisions
Merchants & Planters Nat'l Bank of Sherman v. Appleyard, 77 S.E.2d 783 (N.C. 1953).
· cites it 38× “The Court, in considering the statute, said: "The purpose is to prevent defendants from having the benefit of the lapse of time (the statute of limitation) while they permit debts against them past due to remain unpaid, or other causes of action against them to remain…”
Laurent v. Usair, Inc., 476 S.E.2d 443 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
· cites it 31× “Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for defendant because plaintiffs claim is not barred by virtue of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-21 (1983). Plaintiff contends that N.”
Glynn v. Stoneville Furniture Co., Inc., 354 S.E.2d 552 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 16× “The issue is whether the North Carolina “borrowing statute,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-21 , applies to plaintiffs action and requires the use of the applicable California statute of limitations to bar plaintiffs action in the courts of North Carolina.”
Duke Univ. v. Chestnut, 221 S.E.2d 895 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976).
· cites it 8× “G.S. 1-21, in pertinent part, is as follows: “If when the cause of action accrues .”
Sunamerica Fin. Corp. v. Bonham, 400 S.E.2d 435 (N.C. 1991).
· cites it 3× “Plaintiffs affidavits do not even suggest that defendant left the State of North Carolina at any time; thus N.C.G.S. § 1-21 cannot apply in the instant case.”
Tierney v. Garrard, 477 S.E.2d 73 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
· cites it 21× “The only issue for our review is plaintiffs’ first assignment of error, which addresses whether N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-21 (1983) operates to toll the statutes of limitations applicable to their claims, and in turn whether the trial court correctly dismissed the action.”
Snyder v. Wylie, 239 F. Supp. 999 (W.D.N.C. 1965).
· cites it 20× “Ic is urged by defendant Wylie that the italicized portion is, in effect, a general “borrowing” statute and that it is of no consequence or meaning that it was enacted in form as a proviso to former N.C.G.S. § 1-21. Except for the circumstances of its enactment, discussed herein…”
Little v. Stevens, 148 S.E.2d 201 (N.C. 1966).
· cites it 7× “544, it amended G.S. 1-21. This statute, with the 1955 amendment italicized, is as follows: “Defendant out of State; when action begun or judgment enforced.”
Marshall Garber v. Heriberto Menendez, M.D., 888 F.3d 839 (6th Cir. 2018).
“Some state legislatures as a result amended their tolling statutes to apply only if their long-arm statute-usually construed to extend as far as the Due Process Clause permitted-could not reach the out-of-state defendant.”
Broadfoot v. Everett, 154 S.E.2d 522 (N.C. 1967).
· cites it 6× “Prior to the enactment of the proviso to G.S. 1-21 (N. C. Pub. Laws 1955, ch. 544), plaintiff’s right to maintain this action would, under the decision in Bank v.”
Burkhimer v. Gealy, 250 S.E.2d 678 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
· cites it 2× “G.S. 1-21. From the evidence produced by plaintiff at trial, he did not meet this burden.”
Deadwyler v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 134 F.R.D. 128 (W.D.N.C. 1991).
· cites it 6× “They further contend that the North Carolina borrowing statute, N.C.G.S. § 1-21, as amended in 1979, is inapplicable because this Court sitting as a North Carolina court, would have had “jurisdiction over the person under the provisions of G.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.