N.C. Gen. Stat. » Chapter 41
NC General Statutes

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-5 (2026)

Unborn infant may take by deed or writing

✓ current as of July 2026
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An infant unborn, but in esse, shall be deemed a person capable of taking by deed or other writing any estate whatever in the same manner as if he were born. (R.C., c. 43, s. 4; Code, s. 1328; Rev., s. 1582; C.S., s. 1738.)

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases, 1949–2016 · leading case: DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1987).
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DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1987). · cites it 6× “The public policy of this state as expressed by the legislature in our statutes recognizes that an unborn infant is a person.”
Stam v. State, 267 S.E.2d 335 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980). · cites it 2× “In discussing the modern successor to that statute, G.S. 41-5, our Supreme Court stated: *216 It seems clear to us that G.”
West v. G. D. Reddick, Inc., 248 S.E.2d 112 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978). “Civil Practice and Procedure, § 41-5. In King v. Lee, supra, our Supreme Court remanded the case to permit a motion for voluntary dismissal.”
Byerly v. Tolbert, 108 S.E.2d 29 (N.C. 1959). · cites it 2× “G.S. 41-5 provides: “An infant unborn, but in esse, shall be deemed a person ctapalble of taking by deed or other writing any ©state whatever in the same manner as if he were ¡bom.”
Fort Dearborn Life Ins. v. Turner ex rel. A.R.Y., 521 F. Supp. 2d 499 (E.D.N.C. 2007). · cites it 6× “” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 41-5 (2007). In Mackie v.”
United Carolina Bank v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 426 S.E.2d 462 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 2× “In ruling on a Rule 41(b) motion, the trial court must determine “whether the plaintiffs evidence, taken as true, would support findings upon which the trier of facts could properly base a judgment for the plaintiff.” Howell at § 41-5.”
Bowen Ex Rel. Bowen v. Hodge Motor Co., 224 S.E.2d 699 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976). “Civil Practice and Procedure, at § 41-5 states: “In attempting to obtain a second chance by means of a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a) (2), the plaintiff must convince the judge that he has a meritorious claim and that his evidence was insufficient without…”
Fort Dearborn Life Ins. Co. v. Turner, 521 F. Supp. 2d 499 (E.D.N.C. 2007). · cites it 6× “" N.C. Gen.Stat. § 41-5 (2007). In Mackie v.”
Goodwin, by & Through Hales v. Four Cnty. Elec. Care Trust, Inc., 795 S.E.2d 590 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016). “Moreover, "[d]ismissal with prejudice ends the lawsuit and precludes subsequent litigation on the same controversy between the parties under the doctrine of res judicata.”
Mackie v. Mackie, 52 S.E.2d 352 (N.C. 1949). · cites it 2× “G.S. 41-5 provides : “An infant unborn, but in esse, shall be deemed a person capable of taking by deed or other writing any estate whatever in tbe same manner as if be were born.”
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