(A) In any action that is commenced or attempted to be commenced, if in due time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed or if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff or, if the plaintiff dies and the cause of action survives, the plaintiff's representative may commence a new action within one year after the date of the reversal of the judgment or the plaintiff's failure otherwise than upon the merits or within the period of the original applicable statute of limitations, whichever occurs later. This division applies to any claim asserted in any pleading by a defendant.
(B) If the defendant in an action described in division (A) of this section is a foreign or domestic corporation, and whether its charter prescribes the manner or place of service of process on the defendant, and if it passes into the hands of a receiver before the expiration of the one year period or the period of the original applicable statute of limitations, whichever is applicable, as described in that division, then service to be made within one year following the original service or attempt to begin the action may be made upon that receiver or the receiver's cashier, treasurer, secretary, clerk, or managing agent, or if none of these officers can be found, by a copy left at the office or the usual place of business of any of those agents or officers of the receiver with the person having charge of the office or place of business. If that corporation is a railroad company, summons may be served on any regular ticket or freight agent of the receiver, and if there is no regular ticket or freight agent of the receiver, then upon any conductor of the receiver, in any county in the state in which the railroad is located. The summons shall be returned as if served on that defendant corporation.
Wilson v. Durrani (Slip Opinion), 2020-Ohio-6827, 173 N.E.3d 448. · cites it 58דUnless R.C. 2305.19 operates as an exception to the statute of repose, appellees’ refiled claims, like the claims in Antoon, are time- barred.”
Portee v. Cleveland Clinic Found. (Slip Opinion), 2018-Ohio-3263, 118 N.E.3d 214. · cites it 62ד] Statutes of limitations—R.C. 2305.19 (saving statute)—If an action is commenced in another state in either a state or federal court and fails otherwise than upon the merits and the statute of limitations for commencement of the action has expired, R.”
Allen v. McBride, 2004-Ohio-7112, 821 N.E.2d 1001. · cites it 62ד76 — Saving statute — R.C. 2305.19, the saving statute, applies to will-contest actions.”
Eppley v. Tri-Valley Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2009-Ohio-1970, 908 N.E.2d 401. · cites it 20ד{¶ 4} Eppley responded that the general saving statute, R.C. 2305.19, rather than the wrongful death saving statute, R.”
Moore v. Mount Carmel Health Sys., 2018-Ohio-2831, 117 N.E.3d 89. · cites it 44דHumphreys until March 2017, and that the savings statute in R.C. 2305.19 did not apply. {¶ 17} Additionally, the court held that Mount Carmel could not be held liable because Dr.”
Moore v. Mt. Carmel Health Sys. (Slip Opinion), 2020-Ohio-4113, 164 N.E.3d 376. · cites it 13ד{¶ 43} R.C. 2305.19, the savings statute, insulates a plaintiff’s claim from a statute-of-limitations defense when a complaint is filed, dismissed, and then refiled after the statute-of-limitations period has run.”
Underwood v. Mercy Health Partners N., L.L.C., 2022-Ohio-4313, 203 N.E.3d 36. · cites it 35דShe claimed that “[i]n accordance with R.C. 2305.19,” her state claims were not expired and were “valid and effective at the moment they were refiled with the federal court on August 8, 2018.”
LaBarbera v. Batsch, 227 N.E.2d 55 (Ohio 1967). · cites it 28דBroadly stated, the issue in this case concerns the relationship between the saving statute, Section 2305.19, Revised Code, and the principle of res judicata.”
Elliot v. Durrani, 2021-Ohio-3055, 178 N.E.3d 977. · cites it 13דTherein, the court held that the saving statute, R.C. 2305.19, does not permit the refiling of actions beyond expiration of the medical statute of repose, R.”
Fowee v. Wesley Hall, Inc., 108 Ohio St. 3d 533 (2006). · cites it 15ד{¶ 1} We are asked to consider whether the saving statute, R.C. 2305.19, which permits refiling within one year after dismissal of a case that failed otherwise than on the merits, applies to employee-claimant dismissals of employer-initiated appeals from orders of the Industrial…”
Wilson v. Durrani (Slip Opinion), 2020-Ohio-6827, 173 N.E.3d 448. “Unless R.C. 2305.19 operates as an exception to the statute of repose, appellees’ refiled claims, like the claims in Antoon, are time- barred.”
Eppley v. Tri-Valley Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2009-Ohio-1970, 908 N.E.2d 401. “{¶ 4} Eppley responded that the general saving statute, R.C. 2305.19, rather than the wrongful death saving statute, R.”
Underwood v. Mercy Health Partners N., L.L.C., 2022-Ohio-4313, 203 N.E.3d 36. “She claimed that “[i]n accordance with R.C. 2305.19,” her state claims were not expired and were “valid and effective at the moment they were refiled with the federal court on August 8, 2018.”
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