(A) No person employed or engaged as a teacher, principal, administrator, nonlicensed school employee, or bus driver in a public school may inflict or cause to be inflicted corporal punishment as a means of discipline upon a pupil attending such school.
(B) A person employed or otherwise engaged as a teacher, principal, or administrator by a nonpublic school, except as otherwise provided by the governing authority of the nonpublic school, may inflict or cause to be inflicted reasonable corporal punishment upon a pupil attending the school to which the person is assigned whenever such punishment is reasonably necessary in order to preserve discipline while the student is subject to school authority.
(C) Persons employed or engaged as teachers, principals, or administrators in a school, whether public or private, and nonlicensed school employees and school bus drivers may, within the scope of their employment, use and apply such amount of force and restraint as is reasonable and necessary to quell a disturbance threatening physical injury to others, to obtain possession of weapons or other dangerous objects upon the person or within the control of the pupil, for the purpose of self-defense, or for the protection of persons or property.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1974–2024 · leading case: Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). · cites it 2ד§ 115-146 (1975); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3319.41 (1972); Okla.”
State v. Hoover, 450 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982). · cites it 7ד” R.C. 3319.41, enacted in 1965, provides, in part, as follows: “A person employed or engaged as a teacher, principal, or administrator in a school, whether public or private, may inflict or cause to be inflicted, reasonable corporal punishment upon a pupil attending such school…”
H.M. ex rel. M.M. v. Bd. of Educ., 117 F. Supp. 3d 992 (S.D. Ohio 2015). · cites it 2ד1987); see also Ohio Rev.Code § 3319.41. More specifically, the Sixth Circuit has held that school corporal punishment may violate a substantive due process right when the force applied caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired…”
Sims v. Waln, 388 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Ohio 1974). · cites it 6דA student to whom corporal punishment had once been administered in accordance with Ohio Rev.Code § 3319.41 with consent of her parent and who is threatened with a second administration of such corporal punishment does not establish, without more, a violation of 42 U.”
State v. Cox, 2014 Ohio 2201 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014). “She also advanced a second argument, that her use of force was permitted under R.C. 3319.41, which is not pertinent to this appeal.”
Rinehart v. W. Local Sch. Dist., 621 N.E.2d 1365 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). “]” The use of corporal punishment on pupils is provided for in R.C. 3319.41, which reads, in part, as follows: “(A) Except as otherwise provided by rule of the board of education adopted pursuant to section 3313.”
State v. Cortner, 602 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 8ד*651 R.C. 3319.41 allows teachers to use force on pupils in certain circumstances.”
Smith v. Columbus City Schs. Bd. of Edn., 2017 Ohio 2870 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 3דSimilarly, she argues in her second assignment of error that the trial court erred by not applying R.C. 3319.41(C) because her use of force to quell a disturbance that threatened physical injury to Kulewicz was reasonable and necessary.”
State v. Albert, 456 N.E.2d 594 (1983). · cites it 3דR.C. 3319.41 provides: “A person employed or engaged as a teacher, principal, or administrator in a school, whether public or private, may inflict or cause to be inflicted, reasonable corporal punishment upon a pupil attending such school whenever such punishment is reasonably…”
Chrysinger v. Decatur, 445 N.E.2d 260 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982). “The applicable statute, R.C. 3319.41, provides in pertinent part: “A person employed or engaged as a teacher, principal, or administrator in a school, whether public or private, may inflict or cause to be inflicted, reasonable corporal punishment upon a pupil attending such…”
Henderson v. Cook (N.D. Ohio 2024). · cites it 6ד73-129, in which the Attorney General opined that boards of education could not adopt rules or regulations prohibiting teachers, administrators, and principals from inflicting corporal punishment pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 3319.41; (2) No. 2001-039, in which the Attorney…”
Henderson v. Cook (N.D. Ohio 2024). “73-129, in which the Attorney General opined that boards of education could not adopt rules or regulations prohibiting teachers, administrators, and principals from inflicting corporal punishment pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 3319.41; (2) No. 2001-039, in which the Attorney…”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 3319.41(C) — 1 case
Smith v. Columbus City Schs. Bd. of Edn., 2017 Ohio 2870 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017). “Similarly, she argues in her second assignment of error that the trial court erred by not applying R.C. 3319.41(C) because her use of force to quell a disturbance that threatened physical injury to Kulewicz was reasonable and necessary.”
Henderson v. Cook (N.D. Ohio 2024). “73-129, in which the Attorney General opined that boards of education could not adopt rules or regulations prohibiting teachers, administrators, and principals from inflicting corporal punishment pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 3319.41; (2) No. 2001-039, in which the Attorney…”
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