The average weekly wage of an injured employee at the time of the injury or at the time disability due to the occupational disease begins is the basis upon which to compute benefits.
In cases of temporary total disability the compensation for the first twelve weeks for which compensation is payable shall be based on the full weekly wage of the claimant at the time of the injury or at the time of the disability due to occupational disease begins; when a factory, mine, or other place of employment is working short time in order to divide work among the employees, the bureau of workers' compensation shall take that fact into consideration when determining the wage for the first twelve weeks of temporary total disability.
Compensation for all further temporary total disability shall be based as provided for permanent disability claims.
In death, permanent total disability claims, permanent partial disability claims, and impairment of earnings claims, the claimant's or the decedent's average weekly wage for the year preceding the injury or the date the disability due to the occupational disease begins is the weekly wage upon which compensation shall be based. In ascertaining the average weekly wage for the year previous to the injury, or the date the disability due to the occupational disease begins any period of unemployment due to sickness, industrial depression, strike, lockout, or other cause beyond the employee's control shall be eliminated.
In cases where there are special circumstances under which the average weekly wage cannot justly be determined by applying this section, the administrator of workers' compensation, in determining the average weekly wage in such cases, shall use such method as will enable the administrator to do substantial justice to the claimants, provided that the administrator shall not recalculate the claimant's average weekly wage for awards for permanent total disability solely for the reason that the claimant continued working and the claimant's wages increased following the injury.
The 20 cases that cite Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.61 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment.RelevanceNewestTreatment
“Tantarelli twice moved appellee Industrial Commission to dispense with the standard statutory formula and to instead calculate his AWW using a method that would do him "substantial justice," as R.C. 4123.61 permits in cases of "special circumstances.”
Later courts cite it for
“the commission must both identify and explain the prerequisite on which it relies.” · 3 citing courts
“This AWW was calculated on the basis of Price’s earnings for the year preceding his injury (1968), in accordance with the standard method for calculating a claimant’s AWW under R.C. 4123.61. Price eventually returned to his employment and continued working at higher salaries for…”
“This AWW was calculated on the basis of Price’s earnings for the year preceding his injury (1968), in accordance with the standard method for calculating a claimant’s AWW under R.C. 4123.61. Price SUPREME COURT OF OHIO eventually returned to his employment and continued working…”
“19AP-871 2 {¶ 3} On May 30, 2018, a district hearing officer ("DHO"), denied relator's request finding that such benefits are not wages for the purposes of calculating AWW pursuant to R.C. 4123.61. Relator appealed this decision to a staff hearing officer ("SHO"), who held a…”
“As “the basis upon which to compute benefits,” R.C. 4123.61, average weekly wage “is designed to ‘find a fair basis for award for the loss of future compensation.”
The case’s holding
The industrial commission abuses its discretion when it fails to use an alternative wage calculation method to achieve substantial justice in cases involving special circumstances.
Later courts cite it for
“obviously an unjust barometer of clark's prospective future average wages that would be lost if she could not work.” · 2 citing courts
“{¶ 1} We are once again asked to consider whether a natural increase in earnings over the course of time is a “special circumstance” under R.C. 4123.61 that is sufficient to justify recalculation of an individual’s average weekly wage.”
“R.C. 4123.61 provides, as pertinent, as follows: “The average weekly wage of an injured employee at the time of the injury * * * shall be taken as the basis upon which to compute benefits.”
The case’s holding
The commission must use a method that enables substantial justice when special circumstances prevent a just determination of wages through standard calculation.
Later courts cite it for
“obviously an unjust barometer of relator's prospective future average wages that would be lost if he could not work.” · 2 citing courts
“The appellate court correctly observed that R.C. 4123.61 mandates *288 omission of any period of unemployment beyond the employee’s control, not any week.”
The case’s holding
The average weekly wage calculation must find a fair basis for compensation awards and achieve substantial justice without providing a windfall.
Later courts cite it for
“is designed to find a fair basis for award for the loss of future compensation.” · 3 citing courts
“R.C. 4123.61 provides in relevant part: “* * * In ascertaining the average weekly wage for the year previous to the injury, or the date the disability due to the occupational disease begins any period of unemployment due to sickness, industrial depression, strike, lockout, or…”
Later courts cite it for
“lopsided alteration of the average weekly wage calculation produced the type of inequitable result which the legislature sought to avoid through the inclusion of the 'special circumstances' provision in r.c. 4123.61.” · 2 citing courts
“” R.C. 4123.61. The “standard formula for establishing [average weekly wage] is to divide claimant’s earnings for the year preceding injury by fifty-two weeks.”
The case’s holding
Income is broader than wages or earnings and cannot be used interchangeably, so a workers' compensation average weekly wage excludes non-wage income such as expense reimbursements not shown to be gainful remuneration.
Later courts cite it for
“income is a much broader term than 'earnings' or 'wages,' and cannot, therefore, be used interchangeably.” · 2 citing courts
“R.C. 4123.61. Therefore, like the tort verdict, the subrogation amount for future benefits is based on reasonable assumptions that, although inherently uncertain, provide for a final resolution.”
The case’s holding
An injured worker has a constitutionally protected property interest in their tort recovery from a third party.
Later courts cite it for
“it is constitutionally permissible for the state to prevent a tort victim from recovering twice for the same item of loss or type of damage, once from the collateral source and again from the tortfeasor.” · 3 citing courts
“60 in accordance with R.C. 4123.61. This action was referred to a referee pursuant to Civ.”
Later courts cite it for
“the average weekly wage should approximate the average amount that the claimant would have received had he continued working after the injury as he had before the injury.” · 2 citing courts
“Under R.C. 4123.61, permanent total disability compensation (“PTD”) for an occupational disease must be based on the employee’s average weekly wage (“AWW”) for the year before the disability began, unless “special circumstances” justify another basis.”
The case’s holding
An employee who perseveres for many years while suffering from an insidious occupational disease must be compensated equitably using an average weekly wage reflecting their final earnings.
Later courts cite it for
“an employee who is able to earn a living only by persevering for more than eighteen years while losing ground to insidious occupational disease should be compensated equitably for his or her disability.” · 3 citing courts
“R.C. 4123.61, at the time of the initial injury herein, read: “ * * * [T]he claimant’s or the decedent’s average weekly wage for the year preceding the injury or the date the disability due to the occupational disease begins shall be the weekly wage upon which compensation shall…”
The case’s holding
Special circumstances may be invoked under the workers' compensation statute only if the standard average weekly wage calculation yields a result that is substantially unjust.
Later courts cite it for
“provides standard aww computation that is to be used in all but the most exceptional cases.” · 2 citing courts
“In ascertaining the average weekly wage for the year previous to the injury * * * any period of unemployment due to sickness, industrial depression, strike, lockout, or other cause beyond the employee’s control shall be eliminated.”
“Second, relator argues the magistrate erred in not following R.C. 4123.61 and 4123.95 by not eliminating relator's 49 weeks of unemployment in the year preceding the injury.”
“) The SHO further stated that "[i]n order to do substantial justice to the Injured Worker, as set forth in R.C. 4123.61," the SHO was excluding 46 weeks from the AWW divisor.”
Later courts cite it for
“the standard formula for calculating the aww 'is to divide claimant's earnings for the year preceding the injury by fifty-two weeks.” · 1 citing court
“One question is before us: Is the rate of death benefits so substantially unjust as to merit a departure from R.C. 4123.61’s standard AWW formula because “special circumstances” are found to exist? Upon review, we answer that question in the negative.”
Later courts cite it for
“in cases where there are special circumstances under which the average weekly wage cannot justly be determined by applying this section, the administrator of workers' compensation, in determining the average weekly wage in such cases, shall use such method as will enable him to do substantial justice to the claimants.” · 2 citing courts
The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.
Citing cases by year
196319932023
One bar per year. Tallest: 6 cases in 2006. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.
By court
Ohio41Ohio Ct. App.20
By subsection
Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.
Sections that the same cases cite. The first number is counted among the 100 cases that cite § 4123.61 most heavily: how many of them are also among the other section’s own 20 leading cases.