(A) Except when directed to proceed by a law enforcement officer, every driver of a vehicle or trackless trolley approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or, if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it. After having stopped, the driver shall yield the right-of- way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time the driver is moving across or within the intersection or junction of roadways.
(B) The driver of a vehicle or trackless trolley approaching a yield sign shall slow down to a speed reasonable for the existing conditions and, if required for safety to stop, shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or, if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it. After slowing or stopping, the driver shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle or trackless trolley in the intersection or approaching on another roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time the driver is moving across or within the intersection or junction of roadways. Whenever a driver is involved in a collision with a vehicle or trackless trolley in the intersection or junction of roadways, after driving past a yield sign without stopping, the collision shall be prima-facie evidence of the driver's failure to yield the right-of-way.
(C) Except as otherwise provided in this division, whoever violates this section is guilty of a minor misdemeanor. If, within one year of the offense, the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to one predicate motor vehicle or traffic offense, whoever violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. If, within one year of the offense, the offender previously has been convicted of two or more predicate motor vehicle or traffic offenses, whoever violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree.
If the offender commits the offense while distracted and the distracting activity is a contributing factor to the commission of the offense, the offender is subject to the additional fine established under section 4511.991 of the Revised Code.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 93
cases (23 in the last 5 years), 1956–2026 · leading case: State v. Miller, 2015 Ohio 3529 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015).
State v. Miller, 2015 Ohio 3529 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 34ד{¶6} In its assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting Miller’s motion to suppress because Trooper Beynon had a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Miller.”
State v. Tyson, 2015 Ohio 3530 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 32ד{¶6} In its first assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting Tyson’s motion to suppress because Trooper Beynon had a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle in which she was riding, which was operated by Miller.”
State v. Levine, 2019 Ohio 265 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 6ד13(F)(1) language closely resembles the R.C. 4511.43(A) language applicable to stop signs: Except when directed to proceed by a law enforcement officer, every driver of a vehicle * * * approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop sign, but if none, before entering…”
State v. Goss, 2017 Ohio 161 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 4ד19(a) reflects the language found in R.C 4511.43(A). Ashland County, Case No. 16 COA 023 5 3739, ¶ 25, citing Westlake v.”
State v. Deacey, 2017 Ohio 8102 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2ד{¶ 53} In Drushal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals upheld a trial court’s decision to suppress evidence, where the defendant’s rear wheels were behind a stop line, and the officer had interpreted the ordinance to mean that vehicles must stop “before” the line.”
United States v. Delano, 543 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2008). · cites it 7ד39, and he failed to stop before the stop sign in alleged violation of O.R.C. 4511.43. As the Court noted in its earlier order, Deputy Cleveland appears to be mistaken regarding Ohio law.”
State v. Collins, 616 N.E.2d 224 (Ohio 1993). · cites it 2ד” The underlying “misdemeanor” the jury found defendant committed was a violation of R.C. 4511.43, the failure to stop at a clearly marked stop sign.”
Middleton v. Holbrook, 2016 Ohio 3387 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016). “{¶25} It appears that multiple statutes might be applicable to the right-of- way determination in the factual scenario that occurred here, including but not limited to: R.C. 4511.43(A) (“After having stopped, the driver shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the…”
State v. Garland, 688 N.E.2d 557 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 2דFailure to stop a motor vehicle at a stop sign and yield the right of way in violation of R.C. 4511.43 continues to be a stop-sign violation as the driver proceeds through an intersection to the point of collision with a vehicle proceeding on a through highway.”
State v. Carpenter, 2023 Ohio 1702 (Ohio Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 3ד19(A)(1)(d) 1, and failing to properly stop at a “stop bar” in violation of R.C. 4511.43. Carpenter originally pled not guilty to the charges.”
State v. Six, 2023 Ohio 4361 (Ohio Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 3דWithin Title XLV of the Revised Code, R.C. 4511.43(A) “provides, in part, that after stopping at a stop sign, drivers must yield to the right of way of any vehicle that constitutes an immediate hazard.”
State v. Cline, 2015 Ohio 4036 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 4דCline, defendant-appellant, who was substituted for the original appellant, Carrie Jean Waters, now deceased, appeals from the judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court, in which the trial court, pursuant to a bench trial, found appellant guilty of R.C. 4511.43, failure to…”
State v. Miller, 2015 Ohio 3529 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015). “{¶6} In its assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting Miller’s motion to suppress because Trooper Beynon had a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Miller.”
State v. Tyson, 2015 Ohio 3530 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015). “{¶6} In its first assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting Tyson’s motion to suppress because Trooper Beynon had a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle in which she was riding, which was operated by Miller.”
State v. Levine, 2019 Ohio 265 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). “13(F)(1) language closely resembles the R.C. 4511.43(A) language applicable to stop signs: Except when directed to proceed by a law enforcement officer, every driver of a vehicle * * * approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop sign, but if none, before entering…”
State v. Goss, 2017 Ohio 161 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017). “19(a) reflects the language found in R.C 4511.43(A). Ashland County, Case No. 16 COA 023 5 3739, ¶ 25, citing Westlake v.”
State v. Deacey, 2017 Ohio 8102 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017). “{¶ 53} In Drushal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals upheld a trial court’s decision to suppress evidence, where the defendant’s rear wheels were behind a stop line, and the officer had interpreted the ordinance to mean that vehicles must stop “before” the line.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.43(C) — 3 cases
State v. Six, 2023 Ohio 4361 (Ohio Ct. App. 2023). “Within Title XLV of the Revised Code, R.C. 4511.43(A) “provides, in part, that after stopping at a stop sign, drivers must yield to the right of way of any vehicle that constitutes an immediate hazard.”
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