Ohio Rev. Code » Chapter 4928
Ohio Revised Code

Ohio Rev. Code § 4928.02 (2026)

State policy

✓ current as of May 2026
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Effective:
October 17, 2019
Latest Legislation:
House Bill 166 - 133rd General Assembly
PDF:
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It is the policy of this state to do the following throughout this state:

(A) Ensure the availability to consumers of adequate, reliable, safe, efficient, nondiscriminatory, and reasonably priced retail electric service;

(B) Ensure the availability of unbundled and comparable retail electric service that provides consumers with the supplier, price, terms, conditions, and quality options they elect to meet their respective needs;

(C) Ensure diversity of electricity supplies and suppliers, by giving consumers effective choices over the selection of those supplies and suppliers and by encouraging the development of distributed and small generation facilities;

(D) Encourage innovation and market access for cost-effective supply- and demand-side retail electric service including, but not limited to, demand-side management, time-differentiated pricing, waste energy recovery systems, smart grid programs, and implementation of advanced metering infrastructure;

(E) Encourage cost-effective and efficient access to information regarding the operation of the transmission and distribution systems of electric utilities in order to promote both effective customer choice of retail electric service and the development of performance standards and targets for service quality for all consumers, including annual achievement reports written in plain language;

(F) Ensure that an electric utility's transmission and distribution systems are available to a customer-generator or owner of distributed generation, so that the customer-generator or owner can market and deliver the electricity it produces;

(G) Recognize the continuing emergence of competitive electricity markets through the development and implementation of flexible regulatory treatment;

(H) Ensure effective competition in the provision of retail electric service by avoiding anticompetitive subsidies flowing from a noncompetitive retail electric service to a competitive retail electric service or to a product or service other than retail electric service, and vice versa, including by prohibiting the recovery of any generation-related costs through distribution or transmission rates;

(I) Ensure retail electric service consumers protection against unreasonable sales practices, market deficiencies, and market power;

(J) Provide coherent, transparent means of giving appropriate incentives to technologies that can adapt successfully to potential environmental mandates;

(K) Encourage implementation of distributed generation across customer classes through regular review and updating of administrative rules governing critical issues such as, but not limited to, interconnection standards, standby charges, and net metering;

(L) Protect at-risk populations, including, but not limited to, when considering the implementation of any new advanced energy or renewable energy resource;

(M) Encourage the education of small business owners in this state regarding the use of, and encourage the use of, energy efficiency programs and alternative energy resources in their businesses;

(N) Facilitate the state's effectiveness in the global economy.

(O) Encourage cost-effective, timely, and efficient access to and sharing of customer usage data with customers and competitive suppliers to promote customer choice and grid modernization.

(P) Ensure that a customer's data is provided in a standard format and provided to third parties in as close to real time as is economically justifiable in order to spur economic investment and improve the energy options of individual customers.

In carrying out this policy, the commission shall consider rules as they apply to the costs of electric distribution infrastructure, including, but not limited to, line extensions, for the purpose of development in this state.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 19 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 2004–2025 · leading case: In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., for Approval of its Fourth Amended Corp. Separation Plan (Slip Opinion), 2016 Ohio 7535 (Ohio 2016).
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In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., for Approval of its Fourth Amended Corp. Separation Plan (Slip Opinion), 2016 Ohio 7535 (Ohio 2016). · cites it 34× “17(C), the commission’s discretion is limited only by the ‘good cause’ standard and the requirement that the commission find that ‘such alternative plan will provide for ongoing compliance with the policy specified in’ R.C. 4928.02”). {¶ 28} Given that discretion, we are…”
Elyria Foundry Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 114 Ohio St. 3d 305 (Ohio 2007). · cites it 16× “” {¶ 74} Moreover, WPS’s argument that the commission’s failure to adjust the shopping credits violates the policies set forth in R.C. 4928.02 is without merit. The commission’s order in this case noted, “The shopping credit in the [rate-stabilization plan] is actually an…”
In Re Application Seeking Approval of Ohio Power Co.'s Proposal to Enter Into an Affiliate Power Purchase Agreement for Inclusion in the Power Purchase Agreement Rider, 2018 Ohio 4698 (Ohio 2018). · cites it 6× “{¶ 49} First, the relevant provisions of R.C. 4928.02 do not impose strict conditions on the commission.”
In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co. (Slip Opinion), 2016 Ohio 1608 (Ohio 2016). · cites it 4× “1: Whether the commission’s order is unlawful because it mismatched cost allocation and cost recovery for the RSR, in violation of R.C. 4928.02 {¶ 53} Kroger raises one proposition of law, arguing that the commission erred when it approved the rate design of the RSR.”
In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 2011 Ohio 1788 (Ohio 2011). · cites it 4× “{¶ 61} In the other part of its fifth proposition, IEU argues that the commission approved AEP’s “gridSMART” proposal “without any showing that [it] satisfied the cost-effectiveness requirements of R.C. 4928.02(D).” The provision cited by IEU states that “it is the policy of the…”
Ohio Consumers' Couns. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 111 Ohio St. 3d 300 (Ohio 2006). · cites it 5× “17(C), the commission’s discretion is limited only by the “good cause” standard and the requirement that the commission find that “such alternative plan will provide for ongoing compliance with the policy *318 specified in” R.C. 4928.02. OCC has not supported its claims of…”
In re Comm. Rev. of the Capacity Charges of Ohio Power Co. (Slip Opinion), 2016 Ohio 1607 (Ohio 2016). · cites it 6× “06 (requiring the commission to effectuate the policy specified in R.C. 4928.02). According to OCC, the deferral provides an unlawful subsidy to CRES providers in the form of discounted capacity that will ultimately be paid by retail customers when the deferral is recovered in…”
In re Application of Ohio Power Co., 2024 Ohio 2890 (Ohio 2024). · cites it 4× “Ohio law, including the state’s electric policy as expressed in R.C. 4928.02, mandates that electric- distribution utilities—like Ohio Power—separate competitive generation rates from noncompetitive distribution and transmission rates.”
In re Application of Ohio Power Co. (Slip Opinion), 2014 Ohio 4271 (Ohio 2014). · cites it 3× “The commission rejected Duke’s proposal with the following statement: In considering Duke’s request to include a “circuit breaker” provision in Rider SCR, the Commission does not believe that such a provision would advance the policy of the state as articulated in Section…”
In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 2012 Ohio 5690 (Ohio 2012). · cites it 2× “{¶ 65} Most importantly, the lower SEET is consistent with the policy of this state to “[e]nsure the availability to consumers of adequate, reliable, safe, efficient, nondiscriminatory, and reasonably priced retail electric service.”
In re Application of Ohio Edison Co. (Slip Opinion), 2019 Ohio 2401 (Ohio 2019). · cites it 2× “143(B)(2) and it lacks an adequate nexus to the provision of distribution service as required by R.”
Migden-Ostrander v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 812 N.E.2d 955 (Ohio 2004). “{¶ 5} As stated in R.C. 4928.02(G): “It is the policy of this state to do the following throughout this state beginning on the starting date 4 of competitive retail electric service: * * * (G) Ensure effective competition in the provision of retail electric service by avoiding…”
Show all 19 citing cases →
— Ohio Rev. Code § 4928.02(A) — 3 cases
In Re Application Seeking Approval of Ohio Power Co.'s Proposal to Enter Into an Affiliate Power Purchase Agreement for Inclusion in the Power Purchase Agreement Rider, 2018 Ohio 4698 (Ohio 2018). “{¶ 49} First, the relevant provisions of R.C. 4928.02 do not impose strict conditions on the commission.”
In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co. (Slip Opinion), 2016 Ohio 1608 (Ohio 2016). “1: Whether the commission’s order is unlawful because it mismatched cost allocation and cost recovery for the RSR, in violation of R.C. 4928.02 {¶ 53} Kroger raises one proposition of law, arguing that the commission erred when it approved the rate design of the RSR.”
In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 2012 Ohio 5690 (Ohio 2012). “{¶ 65} Most importantly, the lower SEET is consistent with the policy of this state to “[e]nsure the availability to consumers of adequate, reliable, safe, efficient, nondiscriminatory, and reasonably priced retail electric service.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 4928.02(B) — 1 case
In Re Application Seeking Approval of Ohio Power Co.'s Proposal to Enter Into an Affiliate Power Purchase Agreement for Inclusion in the Power Purchase Agreement Rider, 2018 Ohio 4698 (Ohio 2018). “{¶ 49} First, the relevant provisions of R.C. 4928.02 do not impose strict conditions on the commission.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 4928.02(D) — 3 cases
In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 2011 Ohio 1788 (Ohio 2011). “{¶ 61} In the other part of its fifth proposition, IEU argues that the commission approved AEP’s “gridSMART” proposal “without any showing that [it] satisfied the cost-effectiveness requirements of R.C. 4928.02(D).” The provision cited by IEU states that “it is the policy of the…”
In re Application of Ohio Edison Co. (Slip Opinion), 2019 Ohio 2401 (Ohio 2019). “143(B)(2) and it lacks an adequate nexus to the provision of distribution service as required by R.”
In re Application of Dayton Power & Light Co., 2025 Ohio 2953 (Ohio 2025).
— Ohio Rev. Code § 4928.02(G) — 3 cases
Elyria Foundry Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 114 Ohio St. 3d 305 (Ohio 2007). “” {¶ 74} Moreover, WPS’s argument that the commission’s failure to adjust the shopping credits violates the policies set forth in R.C. 4928.02 is without merit. The commission’s order in this case noted, “The shopping credit in the [rate-stabilization plan] is actually an…”
Migden-Ostrander v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 812 N.E.2d 955 (Ohio 2004). “{¶ 5} As stated in R.C. 4928.02(G): “It is the policy of this state to do the following throughout this state beginning on the starting date 4 of competitive retail electric service: * * * (G) Ensure effective competition in the provision of retail electric service by avoiding…”
Indus. Energy Users-Ohio v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 117 Ohio St. 3d 486 (Ohio 2008).
— Ohio Rev. Code § 4928.02(H) — 3 cases
In re Comm. Rev. of the Capacity Charges of Ohio Power Co. (Slip Opinion), 2016 Ohio 1607 (Ohio 2016). “06 (requiring the commission to effectuate the policy specified in R.C. 4928.02). According to OCC, the deferral provides an unlawful subsidy to CRES providers in the form of discounted capacity that will ultimately be paid by retail customers when the deferral is recovered in…”
In re Application of Ohio Power Co., 2024 Ohio 2890 (Ohio 2024). “Ohio law, including the state’s electric policy as expressed in R.C. 4928.02, mandates that electric- distribution utilities—like Ohio Power—separate competitive generation rates from noncompetitive distribution and transmission rates.”
In re Application of Ohio Power Co. (Slip Opinion), 2014 Ohio 4271 (Ohio 2014). “The commission rejected Duke’s proposal with the following statement: In considering Duke’s request to include a “circuit breaker” provision in Rider SCR, the Commission does not believe that such a provision would advance the policy of the state as articulated in Section…”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 4928.02(L) — 1 case
In re Comm. Rev. of the Capacity Charges of Ohio Power Co. (Slip Opinion), 2016 Ohio 1607 (Ohio 2016). “06 (requiring the commission to effectuate the policy specified in R.C. 4928.02). According to OCC, the deferral provides an unlawful subsidy to CRES providers in the form of discounted capacity that will ultimately be paid by retail customers when the deferral is recovered in…”
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