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Okla. Stat.Title 42 — Liens

Okla. Stat. tit. 42, § 176 (2026)

Attorney's fees

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1954–2024 78citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 78 opinions since 1954, 1 of them in the last five years.

In an action brought to enforce any lien the party for whom judgment is rendered shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action. R.L. 1910, § 3877.

The 20 cases that cite Okla. Stat. tit. 42, § 176 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENK & H Well Serv., Inc. v. Tcina, Inc., 2002 OK 62, 51 P.3d 1219.
cites § 176 4×cited by 61 cases
Where it cites § 176
“Y BECAUSE K & H SECURED A MAJORITY OF THE RELIEF WHICH IT SOUGHT IN THE CASE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, IT IS THE PREVAILING PARTY IN THE ACTION AND ENTITLED TO AN ATTORNEY-FEE AWARD UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF 42 O.S.2001 § 176. 27 ¶ 24 K & H originally brought an action on December…”
The case’s holding
A lien statement is perfected if it substantially complies with statutory requirements, and a recorded leasehold assignment provides constructive notice to creditors.
Later courts cite it for
“issues of law are reviewed de novo since an appellate court has plenary, independent and non-deferential authority to reexamine a trial court's legal rulings.” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENTomahawk Resources, Inc. v. Craven, 2005 OK 82, 130 P.3d 222.
cites § 176 4×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 176
“We observed that two statutes supported the awards of attorney fees: 42 O.S. § 176 and 12 O.S. § 936. [1] ¶ 6 In the case at bar, both plaintiff and defendants were prevailing parties on their claims: Tomahawk for foreclosure of its *224 mechanic's lien and the Cravens on their…”
The case’s holding
Parties prevailing on separate claims are entitled to statutory attorney fees and trial costs regardless of whether a formal judgment is entered for each party.
Later courts cite it for
“generally, rehearing is granted: (1) to correct an error or omission; (2) to address an unresolved jurisdictional issue; or (3) to clarify the opinion.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 176 3×cited by 58 cases
Where it cites § 176
“MCNB and the Individuals separately sought attorney’s fees pursuant to Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, § 176 . The district court granted attorney’s fees to MCNB but denied attorney’s fees for the Individuals.”
The case’s holding
Attorney fees are not recoverable under Oklahoma law for a successful defense against claims of fraud and conspiracy.
Later courts cite it for
“as a general rule, we do not consider issues not passed on below, and it is appropriate to remand the case to the district 1088 court to address an issue first.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 176 2×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 176
“, this Court ruled that both parties were entitled to statutory prevailing party attorney fees, Wellington had successfully defended against a mechanic's lien foreclosure for which prevailing party attorney fees are authorized in 42 O.S.1971, § 176 and the roofing company had…”
The case’s holding
An arbitrator exceeds his authority and the award is subject to vacatur when he refuses to award attorney fees mandated by the parties' arbitration agreement.
Later courts cite it for
“coinciding with its ordinary meaning, 'prevailing party,' as a legal term of art, means the successful party who has been awarded some relief on the merits of his or her claim.” · 4 citing courts
5
GREENToma v. Toma, 2007 OK 52, 163 P.3d 540.
cites § 176 3×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 176
“4(C), 42 O.S. § 176 and 42 O.S. § 177. Her authority for taxation of costs [13] is Supreme Court Rule 1.”
Later courts cite it for
“creates a present estate which, absent severance during the life of the joint tenants, assures the surviving tenant absolute ownership of the whole subject matter of the joint tenancy.” · 4 citing courts
6
GREENLPCX CORP. v. Faulkner, 818 P.2d 431 (Okla. 1991).
cites § 176 3×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 176
“First, Johnson and Red Eagle were attempting to foreclose upon a lien against LPCX under 42 O.S. § 176 and the alternative argument proposed by the plaintiff is that the defendant is liable for fees taxed as costs under 12 O.”
7
GREENLucas v. Bishop, 1998 OK 16, 956 P.2d 871.
cites § 176 3×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 176
“" 42 O.S.1991 § 176 provides, "In an action brought to enforce any lien the party for whom judgment is rendered shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action.”
The case’s holding
Contract words are construed in context and given their plain ordinary meaning, so a default clause triggered by missed payments applies to nonconsecutive nonpayments as well.
Later courts cite it for
“must be viewed in the context of the contract and must be given their plain ordinary meaning.” · 1 citing court
8
GREENRobey v. Shapiro, Marianos & Cejda, L.L.C., 434 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2006).
cites § 176 1×cited by 47 cases
Where it cites § 176
“Okla. Stat. tit. 42 § 176. Plaintiffs mortgage at the time the foreclosure was filed and the demand letter was sent provided for the recovery of “reasonable attorney’s fees customarily charged in the area.”
The case’s holding
An unlawful demand for attorney fees under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act constitutes a statutory injury sufficient for Article III standing even if the fees are never paid.
9
GREENFirst Cmty. Bank of Blanchard v. Hodges, 907 P.2d 1047 (Okla. 1995).
cites § 176 2×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 176
“21 Because 42 O.S.1991 § 176 22 provides a basis for the award in the trial court, the wife’s motion is granted.”
The case’s holding
A decree-impressed lien securing unmatured alimony installments payable in lieu of property division is not a general money judgment and need not comply with the judgment-lien statute to be prioritized.
Later courts cite it for
“in which we recognized that alimony in lieu of property division is not an ordinary money judgment.” · 1 citing court
10
GREENWells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Ziegler, 780 P.2d 703 (Okla. 1989).
cites § 176 2×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 176
“The trial court awarded attorney fees to Wells Fargo against the Zieglers pursuant to 42 O.S. § 176. On appeal the Zieglers urge that the trial court erred in finding that as a matter of law the doctrine of lis pendens operates to prevent sale of real estate for delinquent taxes.”
The case’s holding
Mailing notice without proof of receipt fails to satisfy the requirement of reasonable diligence in ensuring actual notice for a tax resale.
Later courts cite it for
“in the instant case, the act of mailing without proof of receipt of notice falls short of the exercise of reasonable diligence in assuring actual notice.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 176 2×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 176
“1984), we said that when judgment by confession is entered against a defendant, the plaintiff, as recipient of the award is clearly the successful party.”
The case’s holding
Under Oklahoma's statute on attorney fees for negligent injury to property, a prevailing party is the party for whom judgment is rendered, so a defendant that merely reduces damages gets no fees.
Later courts cite it for
“our interpretation is that 'prevailing party' as used in â 940 of title 12 is the party for whom judgment is rendered.” · 1 citing court
12
GREENReeves v. Agee, 769 P.2d 745 (Okla. 1989).
cites § 176 1×cited by 113 cases
Where it cites § 176
“The terms of 42 O.S.1981 § 176 provide: "In an action brought to enforce any lien the party for whom judgment is rendered shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action.”
The case’s holding
The statute of limitations for malicious prosecution begins to run when the underlying claim is resolved in the plaintiff's favor.
13
GREENSec. Nat'l Bank of Enid v. Bonnett, 623 P.2d 1061 (Okla. Civ. App. 1981).
cites § 176 3×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 176
“In the action below, the Bank relied on 42 O.S.1971, § 176, as apparently did the trial court, for the proposition that an attorney’s fee in foreclosure actions is subject to the control of the court and not automatically fixed by the terms of a contractual agreement.”
Later courts cite it for
“is peculiarly within the province of a trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENRiffe Petroleum Co. v. Great Nat. Corp., 614 P.2d 576 (Okla. 1980).
cites § 176 1×cited by 102 cases
Where it cites § 176
“24 In an action to foreclose a security interest — which is one “to enforce a lien” within the meaning of 42 O.S.1971 § 176 — the successful party in the trial court may be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be taxed as costs.”
The case’s holding
Statutory liens must be strictly construed and common words in a statute retain their ordinary meaning unless the legislature provides a contrary definition.
Later courts cite it for
“in the absence of a contrary definition of the common words used in the act, we must assume that the lawmaking authority intended for them to have the same meaning as that attributed to them in ordinary and usual parlance.” · 4 citing courts
15
GREENMartin v. Buckman, 883 P.2d 185 (Okla. Civ. App. 1994).
cites § 176 2×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 176
“1991 § 936 33 (actions to recover under a contract for services), and 42 O.S.1991 § 176 34 (actions to enforce a lien).”
Later courts cite it for
“the common law doctrine of 'quantum meruit' . . . is founded on a latin phrase meaning, 'as much as he deserves,' and in law has been defined as 'a legal action grounded on a promise that the defendant would pay to the plaintiff for his services as much as he should deserve.” · 3 citing courts
16
GREENStaton v. Guarantee State Bank of Mangum, 2008 OK CIV APP 18, 178 P.3d 186.
cites § 176 6×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 176
“2002 § 936 and 42 O.S.2001 § 176 as statutory authority for their fee award.”
17
GREENWilson v. Glancy, 913 P.2d 286 (Okla. 1996).
cites § 176 2×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 176
“Appellant argues that this is but a continuation of a foreclosure action, in apparent reference to 42 O.S.1991 § 176. That section allows attorney's fees in an action to enforce a lien.”
The case’s holding
A mortgagor is not divested of title until the right to redeem is extinguished by a foreclosure decree and foreclosure sale.
Later courts cite it for
“the mortgagor may not be divested of title until the right to redeem is extinguished by foreclosure decree and foreclosure sale, and the right to redeem is defined by 42 o.s.1991 now 2011 2011 18,” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENCo. v. Trion Energy, 761 P.2d 470 (Okla. 1988).
cites § 176 2×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 176
“42 O.S.1981, § 176. The appellant (plaintiff) sued the appellee (defendant) in an action to enforce a lien, and in the alternative, for rent due and for damages to rental equipment.”
19
GREENWinkler v. Solutions Grp., Inc., 915 P.2d 386 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995).
cites § 176 3×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 176
“WinHer then sought to reinstate his action for recovery of the interplead funds and therein requested an award of attorney fees and costs against Bank as a competing lien claimant and prevailing party under 42 O.S.1991 § 176. The trial court reinstated WinHer’s claim, granted…”
20
GREENWelling v. Am. Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 617 P.2d 206 (Okla. 1980).
cites § 176 1×cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 176
“42 O.S.1971, § 176. Under such circumstances, plaintiffs should recover their attorney fees from defendant, and defendant should recover its attorney fees from the plaintiffs.”
The case’s holding
A person is a sub-contractor if they enter into an express or implied contract to perform work for a person who has already contracted for that performance.

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Citing cases by year
195419892024

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 5 cases in 1968–1969. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Okla.43Okla. Civ. App.2910th Cir.2W.D. Okla.210th Cir. BAP1N.D. Cal.1
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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