161.685 Effect
of nonpayment of fines, restitution or costs; report to consumer reporting
agency; rules. (1)
When a defendant who has been sentenced or ordered to pay a fine, or to make
restitution, defaults on a payment or installment ordered by the court, the
court on motion of the district attorney or upon its own motion may require the
defendant to show cause why the default should not be treated as contempt of
court, and may issue a show cause citation or a warrant of arrest for the
appearance of the defendant.
(2) If the court
finds that the default constitutes contempt, the court may impose one or more
of the sanctions authorized by ORS 33.105.
(3) When a fine
or an order of restitution is imposed on a corporation or unincorporated
association, it is the duty of the person authorized to make disbursement from
the assets of the corporation or association to pay the fine or make the
restitution from those assets, and if that person fails to do so, the court may
hold that person in contempt.
(4)
Notwithstanding ORS 33.105, the term of confinement for contempt for nonpayment
of fines or failure to make restitution shall be set forth in the commitment
order, and shall not exceed one day for each $25 of the fine or restitution, 30
days if the fine or order of restitution was imposed upon conviction of a
violation or misdemeanor, or one year in any other case, whichever is the
shorter period.
(5) If it appears
to the satisfaction of the court that the default in the payment of a fine or
restitution is not contempt, the court may enter an order allowing the
defendant additional time for payment, reducing the amount of the payment or
installments due on the payment, or revoking the fine or order of restitution
in whole or in part.
(6) A default in
the payment of a fine or costs or failure to make restitution or a default on
an installment on a fine, costs or restitution may be collected by any means
authorized by law for the enforcement of a judgment. The levy of execution or
garnishment for the collection of a fine or restitution shall not discharge a
defendant confined for contempt until the amount of the fine or restitution has
actually been collected.
(7) The court, or
the court clerk if ordered by the court, may report a default on a
court-ordered payment to a consumer reporting agency.
(8) The Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall adopt rules under ORS 1.002 establishing
policies and procedures for reporting a default under subsection (7) of this
section to a consumer reporting agency that may include, but are not limited
to, limitations on reporting a default to a consumer reporting agency.
(9) Except as
otherwise provided in this section, proceedings under this section shall be
conducted:
(a) As provided
in ORS 33.055, if the court seeks to impose remedial sanctions as described in
ORS 33.015 to 33.155; and
(b) As provided
in ORS 33.065, if the court seeks to impose punitive sanctions as described in
ORS 33.015 to 33.155.
(10) Confinement
under this section may be custody or incarceration, whether actual or
constructive.
(11) As used in
this section:
(a) “Consumer
reporting agency” means any person that regularly engages for fees, dues, or on
a nonprofit basis, in whole or in part, in the practice of assembling or
evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for
the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.
(b) “Restitution”
has the meaning given that term in ORS 137.103. [1971 c.743 §82; 1977 c.371 §5;
1987 c.709 §3; 1987 c.873 §28; 1991 c.724 §27a; 1995 c.79 §50; 1995 c.512 §4;
2015 c.9 §3]
AUTHORITY OF SENTENCING
COURT
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
33
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 1973–2025 · leading case:
State v. Dunham, 560 P.3d 736 (Or. Ct. App. 2024).
State v. Dunham, 560 P.3d 736 (Or. Ct. App. 2024).
· cites it 15× “ORS 161.685(1) authorizes a court to reduce or waive a past-due fine, or to extend the time for payment of a past-due fine, if the court determines that the nonpayment is not an act of contempt: “If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the default in the payment of a…”
Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
· cites it 4× “" Ore. Rev. Stat. § 161.685 provides: "(1) When a defendant sentenced to pay a fine defaults in the payment thereof or of any instalment, the court on motion of the district attorney or upon its own motion may require him to show cause why his default should not be treated as…”
Brown v. Multnomah Cnty. Dist. Court, 570 P.2d 52 (Or. 1977).
· cites it 2× “[13] The 1859 constitution commits the state to the hopeful aim of "reformation," whatever the more recent pessimism on that score.”
State v. Fuller, 504 P.2d 1393 (Or. Ct. App. 1973).
· cites it 6× “665 to ORS 161.685 neither denies a defendant the right to counsel, nor discriminates against him because of poverty.”
State v. Hart, 699 P.2d 1113 (Or. 1985).
· cites it 2× “The payment schedule arranged by the judge was most modest. The restitution ordered under the circumstances in this case was not excessive.”
State v. Hart, 985 P.2d 1260 (Or. 1999).
· cites it 3× “ORS 161.685(1). If she is successful in that effort, then ORS 161.”
State v. Benton, 810 P.2d 295 (Or. 1991).
· cites it 12× “ORS 161.685. 1 The Court of Appeals concluded that the statute authorized only civil contempt and that the trial court’s penalty was criminal because the court sentenced defendant to a determinate sentence of imprisonment with no provision for release if he paid the restitution.”
State v. Benton, 790 P.2d 1191 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 6× “ORS 161.685. He assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the order to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.”
State v. Calderilla, 580 P.2d 578 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
· cites it 2× “ORS 161.685(1). While we agree with the state that the legislature intended to permit flexibility to the sentencing court in ordering payment of restitution and costs, we think it is clear that it also intended that within that range of flexibility the order must be sufficiently…”
State v. Benton, 795 P.2d 601 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 6× “The provision for determinate sentences, he argues, makes the statute one for criminal contempt. We read ORS 161.”
State v. Noble, 842 P.2d 780 (Or. 1992).
· cites it 2× “3 ORS 161.685(1) permits a judge to issue a show cause citation or a warrant of arrest for the appearance of a defendant who has defaulted on the court’s order for the payment of fines or assessments as a condition of probation or suspension of sentence.”
State v. Meyer, 571 P.2d 550 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).
· cites it 2× “"(2) Unless the defendant shows that his default was not attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the order of the court or to a failure on his part to make a good faith effort to make the payment, the court may find that his default constitutes contempt and may order him…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.685(1) — 5 cases
State v. Hart, 985 P.2d 1260 (Or. 1999).
“ORS 161.685(1). If she is successful in that effort, then ORS 161.”
State v. Calderilla, 580 P.2d 578 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
“ORS 161.685(1). While we agree with the state that the legislature intended to permit flexibility to the sentencing court in ordering payment of restitution and costs, we think it is clear that it also intended that within that range of flexibility the order must be sufficiently…”
State v. Noble, 842 P.2d 780 (Or. 1992).
“3 ORS 161.685(1) permits a judge to issue a show cause citation or a warrant of arrest for the appearance of a defendant who has defaulted on the court’s order for the payment of fines or assessments as a condition of probation or suspension of sentence.”
State v. Meyer, 571 P.2d 550 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).
“"(2) Unless the defendant shows that his default was not attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the order of the court or to a failure on his part to make a good faith effort to make the payment, the court may find that his default constitutes contempt and may order him…”
State v. Dunham, 560 P.3d 736 (Or. Ct. App. 2024).
“ORS 161.685(1) authorizes a court to reduce or waive a past-due fine, or to extend the time for payment of a past-due fine, if the court determines that the nonpayment is not an act of contempt: “If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the default in the payment of a…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.685(2) — 8 cases
State v. Noble, 842 P.2d 780 (Or. 1992).
“3 ORS 161.685(1) permits a judge to issue a show cause citation or a warrant of arrest for the appearance of a defendant who has defaulted on the court’s order for the payment of fines or assessments as a condition of probation or suspension of sentence.”
State v. Meyer, 571 P.2d 550 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).
“"(2) Unless the defendant shows that his default was not attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the order of the court or to a failure on his part to make a good faith effort to make the payment, the court may find that his default constitutes contempt and may order him…”
State v. Benton, 810 P.2d 295 (Or. 1991).
“ORS 161.685. 1 The Court of Appeals concluded that the statute authorized only civil contempt and that the trial court’s penalty was criminal because the court sentenced defendant to a determinate sentence of imprisonment with no provision for release if he paid the restitution.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.685(4) — 3 cases
State v. Benton, 795 P.2d 601 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).
“The provision for determinate sentences, he argues, makes the statute one for criminal contempt. We read ORS 161.”
State v. Benton, 810 P.2d 295 (Or. 1991).
“ORS 161.685. 1 The Court of Appeals concluded that the statute authorized only civil contempt and that the trial court’s penalty was criminal because the court sentenced defendant to a determinate sentence of imprisonment with no provision for release if he paid the restitution.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.685(5) — 5 cases
State v. Dunham, 560 P.3d 736 (Or. Ct. App. 2024).
“ORS 161.685(1) authorizes a court to reduce or waive a past-due fine, or to extend the time for payment of a past-due fine, if the court determines that the nonpayment is not an act of contempt: “If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the default in the payment of a…”
State v. Hart, 699 P.2d 1113 (Or. 1985).
“The payment schedule arranged by the judge was most modest. The restitution ordered under the circumstances in this case was not excessive.”
State v. Hart, 985 P.2d 1260 (Or. 1999).
“ORS 161.685(1). If she is successful in that effort, then ORS 161.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.685(6) — 5 cases
State v. Fuller, 504 P.2d 1393 (Or. Ct. App. 1973).
“665 to ORS 161.685 neither denies a defendant the right to counsel, nor discriminates against him because of poverty.”
State v. Hart, 985 P.2d 1260 (Or. 1999).
“ORS 161.685(1). If she is successful in that effort, then ORS 161.”
State v. Calderilla, 580 P.2d 578 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
“ORS 161.685(1). While we agree with the state that the legislature intended to permit flexibility to the sentencing court in ordering payment of restitution and costs, we think it is clear that it also intended that within that range of flexibility the order must be sufficiently…”
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